

THE CONFEDERATION OF EUROPE

THE CONFEDERATION OF EUROPE

A STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN ALLIANCE, 1813-1823
AS AN EXPERIMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION OF PEACE

Six Lectures delivered in the University Schools, Oxford,
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BY

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PREFACE

THE lectures here reproduced were delivered at Oxford during Trinity Term of 1913. Though included among the courses falling under the Faculty of History, their object and scope, as I explain more fully in the introductory lecture, are not purely historical. Their intention is, briefly, to illustrate from a particular period of history the problems involved in the practical application of the principles of International Law, and my hope is that they may serve a useful purpose in helping to create a sound opinion upon questions which are too often discussed from a standpoint wholly out of touch with the realities of life.

Apart from the modern movement for the organization of peace, there is another question, of even greater practical importance, upon which the study of the experiment in international government during the period under review throws no little light. This is the question, or series of questions, involved in recent developments of the Monroe Doctrine, about which so much is now being heard in connexion with the relations of the United States with the Republics of Latin America. The doctrine, inspired by Canning, formulated by John Quincy Adams, and embodied by President Monroe in his famous Message to Congress in 1823, was originally a

protest against the principle of intervention consecrated by the Troppau Protocol. It has passed since then through many phases, and not the least singular is the latest, by which it has itself been made to consecrate the principle of intervention. The "Lodge Resolution" of 1912, by which it was declared that the United States would regard as an infraction of the Monroe Doctrine any concession made by a Latin American State to a foreign corporation of a maritime base or of territory in the neighbourhood of the Panama Canal, involved the assertion of the right of the North American Federation to interfere with the free discretion of sovereign States, a principle embodied in drastic form in the draft Treaty concluded with Nicaragua in 1913; and still more striking, from our present point of view, is the refusal of President Wilson to recognize an "illegitimate" Government in Mexico and his reservation of the ultimate right of intervention for the purpose of restoring order. Thus the United States, itself a confederation of sovereign States, would seem to be playing in the New World the part played in the Old by the "Confederation of Europe." The analogy, of course, is not perfect; no historical analogy ever is so; but it is sufficiently close to enable the lessons derived from the earlier experiment to be applied to the problems involved in the later. Especially is this true of the central problem of all, namely, how to reconcile a system of paternal supervision over a somewhat unruly family of nations with due regard to their sovereign rights. The Holy Alliance, in its inception at least, was coloured by a lofty idealism, and it ended by stinking in the nostrils of all lovers of liberty. To the Latin American nations the

Monroe Doctrine, once the palladium of their liberties, is rapidly becoming a portentous bugbear, and, as once the Holy Alliance, so now "Monroism" is denounced as threatening them with an alien and hateful domination.

The origin and development of the Monroe Doctrine I hope to make the subject of a separate study. In the present volume I have had to deal with it, so far as it falls within the scope of my lectures, somewhat summarily. Of great interest, however, are the discussions among the European Powers on the relations of the Old and New Worlds, discussions extending over many years, which I have summarized in the section on "the Question of Spain and her Colonies." The debates on this subject at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle especially have, so far as I am aware, never before been made public. It may tend to modify the traditional American view of the Holy Alliance to learn that the Emperor Alexander proposed that the United States should be invited to concert with the European Allies a settlement of the question of the Spanish American colonies, and that this proposal was discussed at Aix-la-Chapelle in a series of Conferences. This proposal is also interesting as throwing some light on Alexander's motives in opening communications, in the summer of 1823, with the American Secretary of State on the question of the recognition of the independence of Colombia, the language of Count Nesselrode's dispatches clearly showing that the Tsar had not given up hope of persuading the United States to recognize the beneficence of the principles of the Holy Alliance.

So far as other matters of purely historical interest

of my lectures are concerned, I think I may claim to have thrown some fresh light on the question of the origins of the Holy Alliance. These have been sought by various writers in various places, and the analogy of previous projects of peace has not been lost sight of. But hitherto no one, so far as I am aware, has recognized in the Instructions to Novosiltsov the "missing link" in the evolution of the Emperor Alexander's idea of a Confederation of Europe from these earlier peace projects. I have also been able to shed some new light on two of the most conspicuous figures of this period, namely, the Emperor Alexander and Lord Castlereagh. With regard to the former, I am under great obligations to the recent work on the Emperor by H.I.H. the Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich, and to M. Muhlenbeck's *Étude sur les origines de la Sainte-Alliance*, but I have been able to supplement these most fascinating studies by many vivid touches of characterization from letters preserved in the Foreign Office records. As for Castlereagh, in the *Cambridge Modern History* (vol. x, chap. i) I had already attempted to reverse the shallow judgments passed upon him and his work by the prejudice and ignorance of earlier generations; the present work will, I hope, serve to make still clearer the debt of gratitude which Great Britain and Europe owe to him.

The central theme of the lectures now published is practically the same as that of an article on "The Peace Movement and the Holy Alliance" contributed by me to the *Edinburgh Review* in April 1912, and much of the purely historical part covers the same ground as my chapter on the Congresses in the *Cambridge Modern History*. As regards the former,

the theme is now illustrated with a wealth of material impossible to include within the narrow compass of a review article. As regards the latter, while the present studies include much that is not in the *Cambridge Modern History*, there has necessarily been some repetition; but my readers will find it useful to refer to the *History* for the general affairs of the period, of which in these lectures I had to assume a knowledge in my audience.

Substantially the lectures are here printed as they were delivered, with a few modifications of form. The last of the series, however, which was unduly cramped by the necessary time limit, I have taken this opportunity of expanding. In preparing them I have drawn mainly on the unpublished records of the Foreign Office, so far as the period from the Conference of Châtillon to that of Verona is concerned. References to these are necessarily cumbersome, as the volumes are not permanently numbered and the full title (*e.g.*, F.O.: Congress, France, M. Talleyrand, etc., June 1814–June 1815) has usually to be given in order to make the reference clear. I need not repeat here the concise indication of the contents of the volumes for the period from the second Peace of Paris to the Conference of Verona given in the bibliography to my chapter on the Congresses in the *Cambridge Modern History* (x. p. 787), to which I refer my readers as possibly useful to them. The numerous published works and collections of documents on which I have drawn are sufficiently indicated by references in footnotes.

• WALTER ALISON PHILLIPS.

January 1914.

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I

THE CONCEPTION OF THE CONFEDERATION

As for the philosophers, they make imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths, and their discourses are as the stars, which give little light because they are so high.—BACON.

INTRODUCTORY

Limitations of treaty obligations—Opinion of Bismarck—Kant on International Law—Traditions of Machiavelli and Grotius—Diplomacy and International Law—Motives of the Holy Alliance—The fiction of a golden age of International Law—Practical effect of such fictions—The “Confederation of Europe” an example of this—Permanent lessons of this experiment—Modern Peace propaganda—The “moral” sanction of International Law—Effect of the Hague Conferences—Danger of extreme pacifism—Need for the appeal to experience—Historical precedents.

SINCE the records of the past, which we call “history,” may be approached from many points of view and with very various intentions, it is well that I should at the outset define the scope and aim of these lectures. It would have been possible to treat the history of the period which they cover from a purely academic standpoint, to have devoted our time, let us say, to a critical discussion of the sources and to the attempt to throw the light of any new evidence that may be available upon any problems that still remain obscure. This method I have deliberately rejected; and though, incidentally, my argument and the fresh material on which it is based may do something to correct old-established and traditional errors and prejudices, my main purpose is practical rather than “scientific.” It is not only to throw light on the problems of the past, but more especially to show what

light these can reflect upon the problems of the present. It is for this reason that, while keeping in view both the claims of exact scholarship and of clearness of narrative, I shall bring into special prominence those aspects of the period under review which have a special bearing on living issues ; notably on the international movement for the organization of peace, and incidentally on the question of the relations of the Old World to the New, as affected by that protean principle known as the Monroe Doctrine.

This course, which had suggested itself to me before a journey which I made round South America last year, I finally decided to adopt as a result of that journey. Since I cannot enter here into a discussion of the Latin American attitude towards international idealism on the one hand and the Monroe Doctrine on the other, my reasons must for the present remain obscure, unless I can illuminate them by repeating just one significant incident out of all my experiences.

In August of last year I was on my way from Panama to Callao, in one of the Peruvian coasting steamers, when I made the acquaintance of an American engineer who came on board at Chimbote. Our talk naturally fell on the Panama Canal, which I had just spent a fortnight in examining ; and from discussing the prospects of its completion, we came on to the delicate ground of the Canal Tolls Bill then before the Senate. As to this, his opinion was emphatic.

"I guess, Mr. Phillips," he said, "that the United States has a right to do what it likes with its own territory."

"What about the treaty ?" I asked.

"Damn the treaty !" he said.

Upon this I fell silent; since no comment was possible, and no answer, short of a series of lectures beginning with one on the elements of international law. But there rose up before me a vision of the desolation of war, vivified by the panorama of that terrible coast of Peru, doubly cursed by the parsimony of nature and the secular cruelty of man; there rose up, too, a memory of all the efforts made by men of good will in the past to avert or to minimize the evils of war, culminating in the solemn consecration of the underlying principles of international law by the Conferences at the Hague.

"Damn the treaty!" After all, this was but putting tersely what Bismarck had said at greater length in his *Reflections*: "No treaty can guarantee the degree of zeal and the amount of force that will be devoted to the discharge of obligations when the private interest of those who lie under them no longer reinforces the text and its earliest interpretation."¹ It was only illustrating once more Immanuel Kant's objection to international law as "a word without substance (*ein Wort ohne Sache*), since it depends upon treaties which contain in the very act of their conclusion the reservation of their breach."²

"Damn the treaty!" It is the principle of the old diplomacy—*Salus populi suprema lex*—applied in the interests of the new nationalism. It would not have shocked the master-builders of modern Europe, Bismarck, or Cavour, or the Balkan Allies. In this bitter competition of the nations which has replaced the old rivalry of kings there would seem to be as little room for nice distinctions of morality as in the

¹ *Reflections and Reminiscences* (Eng. trans., 1898), ii. p. 270.

² In his *Zum ewigen Frieden*.

bitter competition of modern commerce. Business is business, and, in the long run, might is right.

The political gospel according to Machiavelli, then, is still preached; and there has been no break in the apostolic succession of the great Florentine. What of the other political doctrine, that of the rights and reciprocal obligations of nations, of which Grotius is revered as the father? The great Dutchman, too, has his apostolic succession; his principles have been glossed and interpreted and expanded by generations of international lawyers; generations of statesmen and politicians have done lip-service to them. The Devil, if theologians may be believed, is never so dangerous as when he persuades people that he does not exist. To denounce Machiavelli has always been a last refinement of Machiavellism. Frederick the Great published his *Anti-Machiavel* before, in the pure spirit of "The Prince," he invaded Silesia; and in so doing he was but following old precedent. "It doth to me a little relish of paradox," says a seventeenth-century political writer, "that wherever I come, Machiavel is verbally cursed and damned, and yet practically embraced and asserted; for there is no kingdom but hath a race of men that are ingenious at the peril of the public . . . and in all the strugglings and disputes that have of late years befallen this corner of the world, I found the pretence fine and spiritual, yet the ultimate end and true scope was gold, and greatness, and secular glory."³

This suspicious attitude, for which there was so much justification in the traditions of diplomacy,⁴

³ *Modern Policies taken from Machiavel*, W. Blois.

⁴ For earlier theorists on the ethics of diplomacy see my article "Diplomacy" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (11th ed.), viii. 297 d.

survived and survives. In the language used by contemporaries about the experiment in international government after the fall of Napoleon, it was given loud and contemptuous expression, with how much justice I hope to show in the course of these lectures. In the concert of the Allies themselves a deep note of mutual suspicion sounds a diapason through all their surface harmony, which in the end it dominates and breaks into a discord; and this note has boomed in the ears, and to a certain extent dazed the judgment, of some of the most conspicuous historians of the period. Were the motives of the parties to the Quadruple Alliance wholly "selfish"? Was the so-called Treaty of the Holy Alliance no more than a hypocritical device for deceiving the world? Did its author, Alexander of Russia—to quote the opinion of the Austrian Baron Vincent—intend by it no more than to "disguise under the language of evangelical self-abnegation schemes of far-reaching ambition"? Was it, as the Whig Opposition in Parliament declared, the consecration of a conspiracy of despots against national and popular liberties? Or was it, as Metternich said, only "a loud-sounding nothing" which, according to Herr Alfred Stern, remained "an ineffective piece of paper that has had no influence on any noteworthy affairs, whether in the internal or external life of the states"? ⁵

Sorel, whose great work is coloured throughout by his French prejudices, and who has the Frenchman's love for clear-cut characterization, has no doubt whatever as to Alexander's motives. "Not for an instant," he says, "did he lose sight of the design,

⁵ *Geschichte Europas*, i. p. 41.

conceived in his youth, of reconstituting Europe and taking in the supremacy of the Continent the place usurped by Napoleon.”⁶ As for the principles of the Holy Alliance, from their first appearance in the preamble to the Treaty of Kalisch in February 1813 to their solemn consecration in the act of September 26, 1815, they were no more than a politic fiction, that religious faith and the inviolability of treaties were to consecrate the return to the sacred principle of a former system of law. Now, as Sorel rightly points out, these principles had never prevailed in the past; and international law had only been known “through the declamations of publicists and its violation by the Governments.” “In default of the guarantees to the peoples of the silver age promised them,” he says scornfully, “the next best thing is to invoke the legend of a golden age which they have never experienced, but of which the imaginary memory gives substance to all the illusions of hope.”⁷

We may admit the truth of this, yet deny its implication, affirming, with equal truth, that it is precisely such “legends” and “imaginary memories” that have been the impelling forces of nearly all great human movements:—the great religions of the world; the doctrines of the divine right of kings and the fundamental rights of the people; Rousseau’s “state of nature” and “social contract,” with their outgrowth, the revolutionary fictions of the brotherhood of men and of liberty and equality as the birthright of all; and lastly, in flat contradiction to revolutionary cosmopolitanism, the modern doctrine of the prescriptive

⁶ *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, viii. p. 185.

⁷ *Ibid.*, vii. p. 65.

and inalienable rights of nationalities. The significance of these legends lies, not in the fact that they are wholly or largely based on "imaginary memories," but in the fact that they secure widespread belief, govern the motives of men, and so exercise a practical effect upon the world.

This is the case with the legend of a European juridical system which the Revolution had violently overthrown. No such system had in fact existed. But whatever their motives, the Powers, in appealing to it, consecrated the principle of an international law, and gave to it a wholly new sanction, by committing themselves to the task of acting in concert for the maintenance of the sanctity of treaties. The significance of the European Coalition during the eight years that followed the signature of the Treaty of Chaumont is, that it represented, whatever the motives of the several Allies may have been, an experiment in international government, an attempt to solve the problem of reconciling central and general control by a "European Confederation" with the maintenance of the liberties of its constituent states, and thus to establish a juridical system. The attempt failed; but it left certain permanent effects:—the tradition of respect for the obligation of international engagements, the impetus thereby given to the study and application of international law, and the abiding hope of the ultimate establishment of an effective international system. Without the Holy Alliance, as we shall see, there would have been no Hague Conferences.

The main purpose of these lectures, then, is to study the history of the European Coalition which succeeded to Napoleon's dictatorship in Europe, from the point of view of an experiment in the international

organization of peace, in order to see what light it throws on those modern peace projects to the promulgation of which so great an impulse was given by the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and the magnificent prize founded by the late M. Nobel. In an article on "The Peace Movement and the Holy Alliance," published in the *Edinburgh Review*,⁸ I attempted within much narrower limits a somewhat similar task, and those who read it will know that I arrived at no very optimistic conclusions. Further study and a wider experience have not altered my attitude. But were I wholly pessimistic in this matter, ensuer of peace though I be, I would let the question rest. It is because the peace movement has achieved much, and may yet achieve more, that I am anxious that its forces should not be scattered in the pursuit of "wandering fires."

"As for the philosophers," says Bacon, "they make imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths, and their discourses are as the stars, which give little light because they are so high." This has been the case with all the framers of projects of peace, from the Abbé de St. Pierre to the enthusiasts of the Boston Peace Society. They clamour for the immediate establishment of an international system, all-embracing, all-compelling, unhampered by restrictions born of mutual suspicion, such as were imposed by the resolutions of the Hague Conferences. The system adumbrated in the programme of the American Peace Society may be taken as typical. It includes (1) the establishment of a general arbitration treaty between all nations, pledging reference of all disputes to the World Court, (2) the establishment of a stated

⁸ No. 440, April 1912.

World Congress, (3) gradual proportional disarmament, (4) a small international police force.⁹ The same idea recurs in the writings and speeches of this school all over the world. "Let all the states," wrote M. Nobel to the Baroness von Suttner, "undertake solidly to turn against the first aggressor. Then wars would become impossible, and even the most quarrelsome state would be forced to appeal to a tribunal or to keep quiet. If the Triple Alliance, instead of comprising three states, were to include all states, the peace of the centuries would be assured."¹⁰ "We have to-day six Great Powers," said the Garibaldian General Türr in his presidential address at the opening of the Peace Congress at Budapest in 1896, "and these too have united themselves, some in a Triple Alliance, the other in an *Entente cordiale* (*Freundschaftsbund*), and all with the purpose of preserving peace. If these groups would unite, the smaller states would attach themselves, and the union of the European Powers would be an accomplished fact."¹¹ "It is clear," wrote the Baroness von Suttner in reference to the war of 1897 between Turkey and Greece, "how beneficial would be a European system of law, a European tribunal, and a European army."

These are, of course, the voices of extremists. There are many eminent persons connected with the peace movement who do not share either their disappointment at the results already achieved or their views as to what is possible or desirable. M. Léon Bourgeois, for instance, holds it a great

⁹ *A Primer of the Peace Movement*, by Lucia Ames Mead (Boston, 1909).

¹⁰ Suttner, *Memoiren*, p. 272.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 353.

gain that "the society of nations" has become conscious of itself, and of the second Hague Conference he writes: ¹²

"Its object was not the establishment of perpetual peace, but to set up a network of universal conventions between states as a first tie between civilized nations, to create and organize institutions of public international law, to diminish the risks and the evils of war, and to maintain between the various Powers continuity of juridical relations."

The principles unanimously accepted by the Conference, he adds, though not embodied in binding instruments, but only in declarations and *vœux*, represent a moral force which will in time impose them on the Governments. It is the growth of this moral force, bearing fruit in a long series of arbitration treaties, which Sir Thomas Barclay also recognizes as one of the most valuable outcomes of the Hague meetings.¹³ For, like Kant in his *Zum ewigen Frieden*, he sees in the growth of the moral idea, as opposed to mere *Staatsklugheit* (the Machiavellian principle), the provision of that sanction which alone can make international law effective, *i.e.*, in the accepted sense of "law," as "a body of rules enforceable in the courts."

Unfortunately, in the peace movement, as in other similar agitations, it is not the voices of the more sensible and moderate evangelists that sound most loudly in the public ear. We may agree with M. Nelidoff, the Russian delegate to the second Peace Conference, that the essential condition of all progress is the pursuit of an ideal towards which one

¹² Preface to M. Ernest Lémonon's *La Seconde Conférence de la Paix* (Paris, 1909).

¹³ *Enc. Brit.* (11th ed.), Article, "Peace."

always advances without ever attaining it. Certainly even the extreme pacifists have their use in calling attention, by the very exaggeration of their attitude, to the ideal of universal peace and human brotherhood. But this form of advertisement has its dangers. It may attract those who like to build theories for an imaginary world, and these are many; it is apt to repel those whose vision is limited by the possibilities of the world in which they live and move, and these are many more. The agitation for peace at any price, for disarmament at any risk—by no means confined to one country—alarms even those who sincerely desire peace, but realize with M. Lémonon that “peace is a very difficult thing to establish here below, and very fragile.” The morality which inspires this agitation, moreover, shocks the consciousness of those, happily the majority, who still regard patriotism as the supreme political virtue, and are not prepared to hold with the late Baron von Suttner that “in any case the interests of humanity and of absolute right are superior to those of any one country.” Thus it happens that the exaggerations of extremists are apt, as M. Lémonon points out, to warp men’s judgment of the work of those “numerous and eminent people whose object is to restrict as far as possible the cases of war, knowing well that the word ‘war’ neither can nor ought to be, for the present, effaced from the national dictionaries,” but whose desire is “to make the state of peace the general rule, the state of war the exception.”

Since, then, in this all-important matter of the preservation of friendly relations between nations public opinion has played, and is still destined to play,

so determining a part, it is essential that it should be educated to distinguish between practical proposals and visionary schemes. The discourses of philosophers may give as little light as the stars ; but, like the stars, they may win reverence by their mystery, and be held to influence the destinies of men. The world of great affairs, after all, lies far beyond the experience of most people, and they have no criterion by which to judge whether the commonwealths of the philosophers are imaginary or not. It is, I think, not the least important function of the historian to supply this criterion by interpreting the bearing on the present of the recorded experience of the past.

It may be argued that no historical precedent can ever serve as an effective argument in a debate on present problems, since the conditions cannot be the same, and certainly it is only within cautiously defined limits that the lessons of history can be applied to practical politics. Occasionally, however, the conditions governing certain questions are so closely paralleled by those governing similar questions in the past as almost to justify the saying that history repeats itself. The modern peace propaganda, culminating in the Hague Conferences, is such a case. In these latest published programmes for a "federation of the world, a parliament of man," there is nothing new ; their genealogy, as we shall see, can be traced back at least three centuries to the Grand Design of Henry IV of France. In dealing with the period between the Congress of Chaumont in 1813 and that of Verona in 1822 we shall often meet, in diplomatic correspondence and the works of publicists, the phrases "General Treaty," "Universal Union," "International Police."

The force and implication of this historical precedent were indeed admitted at The Hague itself, when the President of the first Conference, M. de Beaufort, spoke of the desire of the Emperor Nicholas II, its august originator, "to realize the desire expressed by one of his most illustrious predecessors, the Emperor Alexander I—that of seeing all the nations of Europe united for the purpose of living as brethren, aiding each other to their reciprocal needs." Whatever the immediate moving cause, then—whether M. de Bloch's book on War or the Baroness von Suttner's *Die Waffen nieder!*—it was the Holy Alliance that inspired the famous rescript of Nicholas II. It is thus not without practical value, in testing the proposals of our modern peace propagandists, to examine again from this point of view the history of the period during which a serious effort was made to realize their ideals. By way of introduction to the subject, I propose to devote the rest of this lecture to a sketch of the more important of the many "projects of perpetual peace" which saw the light during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and to showing how these came to influence the mind of the Emperor Alexander and, through him, the counsels of Pitt and of the European Coalition.

II

EARLIER PROJECTS OF PEACE

The mediæval Empire and the Catholic Church—The Grand Design of Henry IV of France—Eméric Crucé's *Nouveau Cynée*—The project of the Abbé de St. Pierre—Its relation to later peace projects—Criticisms of Leibnitz, of Voltaire, and of Rousseau—Effect of the Revolution—Kant's *Zum ewigen Frieden*—Saint-Simon on the Holy Alliance.

I HAVE quoted elsewhere, but am tempted to quote again, from a pamphlet issued in 1910, on *The Mission of the United States in the Cause of Peace*, a portentous statement, of which the sole importance is derived from the fact that it is made by a Judge of the United States Supreme Court and is issued under the auspices of the Boston International School of Peace. "All through the Eastern Hemisphere, during its centuries of struggle," says the Hon. David J. Brewer, "the idea of humanity bound by any obligation of any of its members to all the rest was a thing unknown in practical life and almost unmentioned in the theories of social philosophers. In consequence, everything was determined by the mere matter of might." The moral he draws is that it is reserved for the virgin soil of the New World, fertilized by republican institutions and the open Word of God, to become the nursing-ground of peace and human brotherhood. After all, over the greater part of the New World—Latin America—

the "Word of God" is not open, and republican institutions are apt to degenerate into military dictatorships. But was the Eastern Hemisphere, through so many centuries, so utterly absorbed in the violent pursuit of selfish interests? Was there indeed "no idea of humanity bound by any obligation of its members to all the rest"? What of the Holy Roman Empire, idealized by Dante in his vision of a universal monarchy, and of its spiritual counterpart, the Holy Catholic Church? Phantoms perhaps, deriving such substance as they possessed from imperfect memories of Imperial Rome and Augustine's vision of the City of God; yet no more phantasmal, in view of the working motives of the world as we know it, than this modern development of the idea of the Brotherhood of Man. The fact is, as a French writer points out, that "we do not quite realize the part played in the world by phantoms." "The Empire," says M. Georges Blondel, "preserved during an age of violent hatreds and savage conflicts the idea of a great European commonwealth. . . . It is impossible to understand the mediæval Empire without realizing fully that for centuries the whole civilized world believed that it formed part of the eternal order of things." "The Holy Empire," says M. Lavissee, "like the Roman Empire, was an attempt to organize humanity, and it is because nowadays we are no longer able to define humanity that we find a singular charm in the history of an institution founded on the belief in the fraternal union of mankind under the fatherhood of God."

It is the more strange, and perhaps the more significant, that the first of the long series of "pro-

jects of perpetual peace"—the Grand Design which Sully ascribes to Henry IV of France—was directed quite frankly, so far as it had any substance at all, *against* the Empire; was, in fact, in its idea at least, little more than a strategical move in the secular conflict between France and Austria. Yet, though Sully says that its realization would have dealt a mortal blow at the Imperial authority,¹⁴ the Emperor was to be the chief or first magistrate of this new "Christian Republic"; but, in order to put an end to Habsburg dominance, he was not to be chosen from the same house twice in succession.¹⁵ For the rest, the "Grand Design," which Sully says was first suggested by Queen Elizabeth, was a singular anticipation of certain modern developments. Italy, for instance, was to be unified as a "Republic of the Church" under the Pope (one remembers Gioberti's dream), and the dukes of Savoy were to become kings of Lombardy; while the independence of Belgium under a foreign dynasty is foreshadowed by the singular idea that the Low Countries should be carved into a series of fiefs for English princes or "milords."¹⁶

As for the General Council of Europe, over which the Emperor was to preside, this was to be modelled, with certain necessary modifications, on the Amphictyonic Council of Greece, and to consist of a perpetual Senate of sixty-four commissioners or plenipotentiaries, four from each Great Power, two from each lesser Power, renewable every three years. The function of this Senate was to be to deliberate on affairs as they arose; to discuss matters of common

¹⁴ Sully, *Mémoires* (ed. 1814), v. 31.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, v. 303 seq.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, v. 279 seq.

interest ; to settle disputes ; to examine into and determine all civil, political, and religious suits either in Europe itself or arising out of the relations of Europe with the world outside.

Such was the Grand Design, which Sully recommended in language which anticipates that of the rescript of the Emperor Nicholas II. " He found the secret of persuading all his neighbours that his only object was to spare himself and them these immense sums which it costs them to maintain so many thousands of fighting men, so many fortified places, and other military expenses ; to deliver them for ever from the fear of bloody catastrophes, so common in Europe ; to secure for them an unalterable repose, so that all the princes might henceforth live together as brothers."

It is on this Grand Design that all other projects of peace, directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, are based—from that which Eméric Crucé gave to the world under the title of *Le nouveau Cynée*, two years before Grotius published his *De jure belli et pacis*, to the latest programme of the modern Peace Societies. It inspired the *Projet de paix perpétuelle* of the Abbé de St. Pierre, and through him the Emperor Alexander I's idea of a universal Holy Alliance. It may have played its part in forming the schemes of one whose name is not usually associated with projects of peace—Napoleon. Among the conversations of the great Emperor recorded by the Comte de Las Cases, in his *Mémoires de Sainte Hélène*, is one in which Napoleon explains the grand design which had underlain all his policy. He had aimed, he said, at concentrating the great European peoples, divided hitherto by a multiplicity of artificial

boundaries, into homogeneous nations, which he would have formed into a confederation bound together "by unity of codes, principles, opinions, feelings, and interests." At the head of the League, under the ægis of his Empire, was to have been a central assembly, modelled on the American Congress or the Amphictyonic Assembly of Greece, to watch over the common weal of "the great European family." Whether this plan had ever been seriously contemplated or not, it is easy to recognize in it the source of its inspiration.

The *Projet de traité pour rendre la paix perpétuelle* of the Abbé de St. Pierre was published in 1713, immediately after the signature of the Treaty of Utrecht. Its immediate effect was, of course, insignificant. The Abbé, Rousseau scornfully said, was trying to do by publishing a book what Henry IV had failed to do with the power of France behind him, and with the aid of the universal dread of Austrian ambitions, which supplied a stronger motive than any care for common interests. But the Abbé's project was destined to exert considerable practical influence later, and this gives to his proposals and to the comments of his critics a permanent interest.

The social order of Europe, he urges, is still largely determined by the passions rather than by reason. We are in civil relations with our fellow-citizens, but with the rest of the world we are in the state of nature. Thus we have only abolished private wars in order to set aflame general wars, which are a thousand times more terrible; and in forming partial alliances we make ourselves in effect enemies of the human race. Now Christianity, he argues, has given to the nations of Europe, in religion, morals, and customs, and even

in laws, the impress of a single society—to such a point that those peoples which, like the Turks, have become European in a geographical sense without becoming Christians, have been regarded as strangers ; and between the members of this Christian commonwealth “the ancient image of the Roman Empire has continued to form a sort of bond.”

But the public law of Europe, not being established or authorized in concert, having no foundation of general principle, and varying incessantly in different times and places, is full of contradictory rules, which can only be reconciled by the right of the stronger. Now, every society is based on a consciousness of common interests, while all divisions are caused by interests that are opposed, and both common and private interests may vary with a thousand changes of circumstance. In every society, then, it is necessary that there should be a coercive power to command and concert the movements of its members, and, to form a solid and durable European confederation, it would be necessary to place all its constituent states in such a condition of mutual dependence that no one of them should be in a position to resist the rest. If, under the system of the Balance of Power, states are limited in their opportunities for aggression, what would their position be when there is a great armed league, ever ready to prevent those who might wish to destroy or resist it? Such a league would not waste its time in idle deliberations, but would form an effective power, able to force the ambitious to keep within the terms of the general treaty.

The nucleus or model of such a league was already in existence in the “Germanic Body,” as constituted by the Treaty of Westphalia—the “conservative force

of Europe," since it was strong for defence but powerless for attack. Now since the Treaty of Westphalia was the basis of the European system—the Abbé argues—German public law was in a sense that of all Europe. His project was then, in effect, to remodel Europe somewhat on the lines of the Empire as it was after 1648. Its provisions are as follows :

1. The sovereigns are to contract a perpetual and irrevocable alliance, and to name plenipotentiaries to hold, in a determined spot, a permanent diet or congress, in which all differences between the contracting parties are to be settled by arbitration or judicial decision.

2. The number of the sovereigns sending plenipotentiaries to the congress is to be specified, together with those who are to be invited to accede to the treaty. The presidency of the congress is to be exercised by the sovereigns in turn at stated intervals, the order of rotation and term of office being carefully defined. In like manner the quota to be contributed by each to the common fund, and its method of collection, are to be carefully defined.

3. The Confederation thus formed is to guarantee to each of its members the sovereignty of the territories it actually possesses, as well as the succession, whether hereditary or elective, according to the fundamental laws of each country. To avoid disputes, actual possession and the latest treaties are to be taken as the basis of the mutual rights of the contracting Powers, while all future disputes are to be settled by arbitration of the Diet.

4. The Congress is to define the cases which would involve offending states being put under the ban of Europe.

5. The Powers are to agree to arm and take the offensive, in common and at the common expense, against any state thus banned, until it shall have submitted to the common will.

6. The plenipotentiaries in congress, on instructions from their sovereigns, shall have power to make such rules as they shall judge important with a view to securing for the European Republic and each of its members all possible advantages.

It is impossible to examine this project without being struck by the fact that there is scarcely one of

its provisions which does not emerge, at least as a subject of debate among the Powers, during the years of European reconstruction after 1814. This fact is, perhaps, not the least striking on what may be called its negative side. In the Abbé de St. Pierre's project there is no provision made for even an honorary pre-eminence of the Emperor; there is also no provision made for any representation other than that of the sovereigns. From this vision of perpetual peace the venerable phantom of the Holy Empire has vanished all but completely; this churchman and apostle of international union has as little use as the Powers of the Grand Alliance for "the centre of political unity," against the abolition of which at the Congress of Vienna Cardinal Consalvi was to protest in the name of the Roman Church. He knows nothing too of nationality as the term came to be understood in the nineteenth century; for him, as later for Metternich, a "nation" is but the aggregate of people bound together by allegiance to a common sovereign—a conception which, I may add, would greatly facilitate the establishment of an international system, did it but answer to the facts. Of popular rights, as developed by the Revolution, he of course knew nothing.

Apart from the generally contemptuous reception which the Abbé's project met with in that age of Machiavellian statecraft, the omissions above noted met with particular criticism during the eighteenth century. Leibnitz, to whom the Abbé submitted his scheme, held that in its general idea it was both feasible and desirable. He had, he said, seen similar proposals made in the *Nouveau Cynée* and in a book by the Landgrave Ernest of Hesse-Rheinfels entitled

Le Catholique discret; and Henry IV, though his scheme was aimed at Austria, had clearly believed it to be practicable. For Leibnitz, however, the subordination of the Empire was a serious blot. It had been a maxim of international law for centuries that the Emperor was the temporal head of Christendom, and jurisconsults had reasoned on this basis. The Empire had become weak, partly owing to the Reformation, partly owing to the alienation of its revenues and its consequent incapacity to enforce the decisions of the courts. But the dignity and precedence of the Emperor survived, and he still possessed some rights of direction in Christendom. "I do not think it would be just," he says, "to destroy all at once the authority of the Roman Empire, which has lasted so many centuries. . . . Jurisconsults know that one does not lose one's rights, nor even their possession, because there has been no occasion to exercise them; and that it is not necessary even to insist on them, save where those who owe these rights declare that they wish to repudiate their obligation."¹⁷

He goes on to point out certain respects in which the system of the Empire is superior to that suggested by St. Pierre. The Tribunal of the Imperial Chamber (*Reichskammergericht*), for instance, consists of judges and assessors who are free to follow their consciences, not being bound by the instructions of the princes and states which nominated them. Moreover, in the Abbé's project there is no provision for the hearing of the complaints of subjects against their sovereigns, while in the Empire subjects can plead against their princes or their magistrates.

The comment of Leibnitz is interesting because it

¹⁷ *Observations sur le projet de paix. Œuvres*, t. 4, p. 328 (Paris, 1832).

anticipates the objection which, a hundred years later, Castlereagh considered fatal to the system of guarantees, precisely similar to that suggested in the third article of St. Pierre's project, which the reactionary Powers sought to formulate at Aix-la-Chapelle and did formulate in the Troppau Protocol. The Abbé de St. Pierre pointed out how the proposals in this article would not weaken but strengthen the princes, by guaranteeing to each of them "not only their states against all foreign invasion, but also their authority against all rebellions of their subjects." In a Memorandum on the Treaties presented to the Powers at Aix-la-Chapelle, Castlereagh wrote :

"The idea of an *Alliance Solidaire* by which each state shall be bound to support the state of succession, government and possession within all other states from violence and attack, upon condition of receiving for itself a similar guarantee, must be understood as morally implying the previous establishment of such a system of general government as may secure and enforce upon all kings and nations an internal system of peace and justice. Till the mode of constructing such a system shall be devised, the consequence is inadmissible, as nothing could be more immoral, or more prejudicial to the character of government generally, than the idea that their force was collectively to be prostituted to the support of established power, without any consideration of the extent to which it was abused."

In writing this, Castlereagh was unconsciously repeating and expanding a comment on the Abbé's third article made long before by Rousseau, who in his *Jugement sur la paix perpétuelle* had written :

"One cannot guarantee princes against the revolt of their subjects without at the same time guaranteeing subjects against the tyranny of princes. Otherwise the institution could not possibly survive."

With Rousseau we come to the eve of the Revolutionary age ; universal peace is to be the outcome, not of a fraternal union of princes, but of the brotherhood of an enlightened humanity. “The *Projet de paix perpétuelle*,” Voltaire wrote, “is absurd, not in itself, but in the manner of its proposal.” “The peace imagined by the Abbé de St. Pierre is a chimera, which will not subsist between princes any more than between elephants and rhinoceroses, between wolves and dogs. Carnivorous animals will always tear each other to pieces at the first opportunity.” Wars of ambition will cease when the mass of people realize that it is only a few generals and ministers who have anything to gain by them ; wars of commerce will cease with the universal establishment of free trade ; wars of religion with the spread of the spirit of tolerance. As for questions of succession, these are for the people to decide. “The establishment of a European Diet,” he continues, “might be very useful for deciding controversies about the extradition of criminals or the laws of commerce, or for settling the principles on which cases in which the laws of different nations are invoked should be decided. The sovereigns should concert a code according to which such disputes would be settled, and should engage to submit to its decisions or to the final arbitrament of their sword :—the necessary condition for the establishment, durability, and usefulness of such a tribunal. It is possible to persuade a prince, who commands two hundred thousand men, that it is not to his interest to defend his rights or his pretensions by force ; but it is absurd to propose to him to renounce them.”¹⁸ Elsewhere Voltaire asks : “What is neces-

¹⁸ *De la paix perpétuelle. Œuvres*, t. 29, (1785 ed.), note.

sary in order to govern men, one's brothers (and what brothers!), by right?" And he answers: "The free consent of the peoples."¹⁹

The outbreak of the French Revolution, then—as the triumph of popular forces over those of the divine right of kings—was hailed by many as heralding the dawn of an era of universal peace. A single quotation may serve to illustrate a widespread hope which was destined to be so utterly belied. At a meeting of the Revolution Society to celebrate the first anniversary of the capture of the Bastille, Dr. Price—the first object of Burke's attack in the *Reflections*—thus apostrophized the leaders of the French Revolution: "O heavenly philanthropists, well do you deserve the admiration, not only of your own country, but of all countries! You have already determined to renounce for ever all views of conquest and all offensive wars. This is an instance of wisdom and attention to human rights which has no example. But you will do more; you will invite Great Britain to join you in this determination and to enter into a compact with you for promoting peace on earth, good will among men. . . . Thus united the two kingdoms will be omnipotent. They will soon draw into their confederation Holland and other countries on this side of the globe, the United States of America on the other," and so on.²⁰

Five years later, in 1795, Immanuel Kant published his treatise *On Perpetual Peace (Zum ewigen Frieden)*, an essay in the construction of an inter-

¹⁹ "Pour gouverner de droit ses frères, les hommes (et quels frères!), que faut-il? Le consentement libre des peuples."—*Les droits des hommes et les usurpations des papes. Œuvres*, t. 29, p. 76.

²⁰ Morgan's *Life of Price*, pp. 161-3.

national system on a philosophical basis. This basis he finds in the development of enlightened self-interest among the peoples and the growth of the moral idea, which has already made men open to the influence of the mere conception of law, as though this in itself possessed physical power. Perpetual peace will thus, he argues, ultimately be guaranteed by nature itself, through the mechanism inherent in human inclinations. "Seek first," he says, "the kingdom of pure practical reason and its justice, and your goal (the benefit of perpetual peace) will be added unto you of itself."

But this moral idea and this pure practical reason can, in Kant's opinion, only be developed fully under republican institutions, because the people will never vote for war! His practical suggestions for an international organization, therefore, include these articles :

1. The civil constitution in every state is to be republican. But this republicanism is not to be democracy, which is opposed to liberty. The true republican government is representative.

2. The law of nations is to be established on a federation of free states. Such a great federal republic, if once established, would gradually attract other states and so ultimately include all.²¹

It is perhaps not wholly without significance that a French translation of Kant's treatise was published at Paris in 1814 during the first occupation by the Allies. It is also interesting to note that in this same year was published the *Réorganisation de la Société européenne* of the Comte de Saint-Simon, who later on was to proclaim his appreciation of the benefit conferred upon Europe by the Holy Alliance. The

²¹ *Zum Ewigen Frieden. Werke*, Band 6 (1868 ed.), p. 408 seq.

language in which he does so is, I think, worth quoting here. In the third of his *Opinions philosophiques à l'usage du XIX^{me} siècle*, he writes :

“ The interests and the most widespread opinion of Europe called upon the kings to unite, in order to exercise the supreme direction over the social interests of Europe. In order that the transition from the feudal regime to the industrial system might take place in a peaceful manner, it was necessary that a supreme power should be established. The Holy Alliance fulfils this condition to perfection ; it dominates all spiritual and temporal powers. . . . Finally, thanks to the formation of the Holy Alliance, European society is in a position to reorganize itself very securely, from the moment that a clear public opinion shall have been formed as to the institutions which correspond to the present state of its civilization.” ²²

²² *Quelques opinions philosophiques*. Œuvres de Saint-Simon, t. 39, pp. 100, 101 (Paris, 1875).

III

THE PEACE PROJECT OF ALEXANDER I OF RUSSIA

Its probable inspiration—Novosiltsov's mission to England in 1804—His instructions—Scheme for European reconstruction and a European Confederation—Reply of Pitt—His remarks on the proposed "general system of public law"—The proposal embodied in the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1805—The common danger from France—The principle of collective intervention—Circular of Kaunitz, 1791—Burke's view.

PROJECTS of peace, then, were clearly in the air during the War of Liberation, and played their part in disposing men's minds to hope at least for a "silver age" as the outcome of the European Alliance against the common enemy, a hope which was encouraged by the language of the proclamations to the peoples issued by the Powers, from the moment when Alexander of Russia, in 1813, crossed the borders of his Empire and offered to all the peoples who should abandon the cause of Napoleon his disinterested assistance.

Were these proclamations entirely hypocritical? Was there in the Tsar's mind no idea but that of throwing dust in the eyes of the nations and using them as the blind agents of his own ambitions? Of Alexander's enigmatical character I shall have a good deal more to say another time. He was a creature of impulse, imaginative, impressionable, egoistic, vain, capable of large generousities—so that

the credit were his. The Grand Design of Henry IV was eminently fitted to appeal to his soaring imagination; nor is it difficult to see how he may have come to harbour the thought of reviving it. The works of Rousseau, which he had studied under La Harpe's guidance, contained an elaborate exposition and criticism of the Project of the Abbé de St. Pierre. Now Rousseau's main objection to this project was that the means suggested by its author for putting it into practice were "childish"; the plan, he argued, was absurd "without a Henry IV or a Sully to carry it out." The whole circumstances of the time, at the beginning of Alexander's reign, recalled those which had first evoked the idea of a federated Europe. The peril was no longer from Austria, it is true, but from France; from that very France of the political *philosophes* to which the young Alexander had looked to aid him in establishing the universal sway of enlightenment. In 1802 La Harpe had returned from Paris and had presented to the Tsar his "Reflections on the Consulship for life." "The veil has fallen!" replied Alexander; "Napoleon is no true patriot. He himself has stripped himself of his best glory, which may prove fatal to him, a glory which alone it remained for him to acquire, that of proving that, setting aside all personal views, he was working solely for the honour and glory of his country and remaining loyal to the Constitution to which he himself took the oath, by resigning after ten years the authority which was in his hands. Instead of this, he has preferred to ape a Court in addition to violating the Constitution of his country."²³

²³ Shilder, *Imperator Aleksander I*, iii. p. 117, cf. note 186. The letter, dated July 7, 1813, is given in full in the Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich's *L'Empereur Alexandre I^{er}* (1912), i. p. 336.

The murder of the Duc d'Enghien confirmed this opinion; the Russian Court went into mourning, and broke off diplomatic relations with Paris. Then came the proclamation of Napoleon as Emperor of the French, and the decision of Russia to go to war, not indeed against France, but against Napoleon. The Third Coalition was in process of formation. It was, then, natural that Alexander should see a vision of himself as another Henry IV, with his friend Czartoryski as his Sully, realizing the grand design of converting the temporary alliance against France into a permanent Christian Republic, with himself, of course, as the arbiter of its destinies.

The idea is embodied in instructions addressed, on September 11, 1804, by Alexander to his friend Nikolai Nikolaievich Novosiltsov, envoy on special mission to London, who was to lay it before Pitt.²⁴ The document, which was drawn up by Czartoryski, and is printed in his *Memoirs*, is too long to quote in full; but, though it has often been quoted in part,²⁵ it is so important for the development of my thesis that I shall deal with it somewhat at length.

An absolute condition, the Tsar wrote, of any cordial union between Russia and England for the overthrow of Napoleon was that it should not lead to any set-back to humanity. The Governments were to agree not to re-establish ancient abuses in the

²⁴ The Grand Duke (*op. cit.*, p. 38) says that there is no evidence in the archives as to who inspired this mission, "which left Czartoryski and Novosiltsov sceptical." It was, he says, probably Alexander's own idea, and the first evidence of independent action on his part in foreign affairs.

²⁵ Tatishchev, *Alexandre I^{er} et Napoléon*, 1801-1812, pp. 82, 84, 85; *Cambridge Modern History*, x. p. 3. Curiously enough, it is not mentioned by Shilder.

countries liberated from the yoke of Bonaparte, but were to study to ensure them liberty based upon sound foundations. "It is on this principle," the Tsar said, "that, according to my ideas, the Powers should act, and their conduct, their language, and their proclamations should consistently conform to it."

He goes on to outline his plan for the reconstitution of Europe. The King of Sardinia should be restored to his dominions, and should have additions made to them, the Powers at the same time engaging him to grant a Constitution to his peoples. Switzerland was to be re-established and enlarged, with a Constitution adapted to the localities and conformable to the will of the inhabitants. Holland was to be made independent, under an hereditary Stadtholder with powers constitutionally limited. As for France, it was to be made clear that the Allies were not at war with the French nation, but only with Napoleon, and that their object was to liberate France from the yoke under which she had so long groaned, and to leave her free to choose the government she might desire. This government, indeed, must be monarchical, but whether under a Bourbon or any other dynasty was indifferent.

As to the forms of government to be established in the various countries, the only definite principle that could be laid down was that "everywhere they must be founded on the sacred rights of humanity."

The principles enunciated by him as the basis of the intimate concert between the two Powers, the only ones, perhaps, on which the power of France could be restrained within its just limits, would also singularly contribute towards fixing on firm and lasting foundations the future peace of Europe. "It seems to me,"

wrote the Tsar, "that this great aim cannot be looked upon as attained until, on the one hand, the nations have been attached to their governments, by making these incapable of acting save in the greatest interest of the peoples subject to them, and, on the other, the relations of states to each other have been fixed on more precise rules, and such as it is to their mutual interest to respect. The conclusions of profound thinkers and the experience of centuries sufficiently prove that these two results cannot be attained save when internal order shall have been founded on a wise liberty, which seems to consolidate the governments, surrounding them with a barrier against the passions, the unbridled ambition, or the madness which often drives out of their senses the men at their head; and when at the same time the law of nations, which regulates the relations of the European Confederation, shall have been re-established on true principles."

"If Europe be saved, the union of the two Governments which has achieved these great results ought to last on, in order to preserve and augment them. Nothing would prevent, at the conclusion of peace, a treaty being arranged, which would become the basis of the reciprocal relations of the European states. It is no question of realizing the dream of perpetual peace, but one could attain at least to some of its results if, at the conclusion of the general war, one could establish on clear, precise principles the prescriptions of the rights of nations. Why could one not submit to it the positive rights of nations, assure the privilege of neutrality, insert the obligation of never beginning war until all the resources which the mediation of a third party could offer have been

exhausted, until the grievances have by this means been brought to light, and an effort to remove them has been made? On principles such as these one could proceed to a general pacification, and give birth to a league, of which the stipulations would form, so to speak, a new code of the law of nations, which, sanctioned by the greater part of the nations of Europe, would without difficulty become the immutable rule of the cabinets, while those who should try to infringe it would risk bringing upon themselves the forces of the new union."

Particularly significant of future developments in the Emperor's policy are his references to the Ottoman Empire. "It is impossible to deny," he says, "that its weakness, the anarchy of its régime, and the growing discontent of its Christian subjects, are so many elements tending to encourage speculative ambitions, and are diametrically opposed to the principles which have been advanced in these instructions as the only ones capable of securing a stable peace in Europe." He urges that, in the event of Turkey joining France, the two Powers should concert beforehand what was to be done with the Ottoman territories, if their joint attack should succeed in overthrowing the Turkish Empire. The least that should be done would be to secure a more tolerable existence for the Christian peoples who groaned under Turkish tyranny.

Significant, too, is Alexander's suggestion that, after the conclusion of peace, the two Powers should continue a certain degree of preponderance in the affairs of Europe, as being "the only ones who by their position are invariably interested in the reign there of order and justice, the only ones who by their position can maintain it, and, being free from conflicting desires

and interests, will never trouble this happy tranquillity."

I have dwelt on these instructions at such length because we have in them the final link in the chain of cause and effect connecting the Holy Alliance with the projects of peace of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In them we have suggested all the elements of the European system as established at the Peace of Paris and the Congress of Vienna. In the Tsar's communication these elements, it is true, are somewhat vaguely defined and somewhat ideally coloured. A clearer definition and a more immediately practical application was given to them by Pitt in a note of January 19, 1805, in response to these overtures.

He begins by expressing his satisfaction that the views of the Emperor in respect of the deliverance of Europe and of its future peace and security agree entirely with those of His Britannic Majesty. This being so, His Majesty is anxious, with a view to a close concert, to enter into the frankest explanations, with a view to forming with the Russian Emperor a union of such a nature as to induce the other great military Powers to join it. For this purpose it is necessary to define as clearly as possible the objects at which this concert is directed. These he divides into three main groups : (1) To release from the domination of France the territories conquered since the Revolution ; (2) to form out of the countries thus released, with due regard to their peace and happiness, a barrier against future French aggression ; (3) to establish, after the restoration of peace, a convention and guarantee for the mutual protection and security of the different Powers, and to establish in Europe a general system of public law.

Of these objects the first was, of course, for Pitt the most immediately important, though it need not detain us. The second also, he said, contained matter for more than one important consideration. The countries taken from France ought, as far as possible, to be restored to their ancient rights, and regard ought to be had to establishing the well-being of their inhabitants; but the general security should not be lost sight of, and on this even this particular object ought to depend. It is at this point that the views expressed by Pitt and by the Emperor Alexander diverge, and in a way significant of future developments. On the question of a barrier against future French aggressions both were agreed, and also on the nature of this barrier, such as a restored and strengthened Holland, and an accession of territory to the Crown of Sardinia. But the Tsar, with Poland in his mind, had put forward the modern principle of nationality in his scheme, contending that in any rearrangement of Europe consideration should be given to the questions of homogeneity of population as well as of natural boundaries. This Pitt simply ignores, putting forward the purely conservative principle of a restoration of ancient rights.²⁶ This principle it would be possible, however, to apply only in some cases; for some states had been too utterly crushed out, and others were too weak to re-establish, and he suggests a territorial settlement which anticipated that actually made at Vienna, the main features being the creation or

²⁶ This accounts for Czartoryski's condemnation of Novosiltsov's weakness in not insisting on the "just demands" of Russia and abandoning affairs to take the direction which England desired (*Mem.*, i. p. 376). That the mission was not so fruitless as the Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich supposes (*op. cit.*, i. p. 38) I hope to show.

strengthening of the Netherlands and Savoy as barrier states against France; the establishment of Prussian power on the Rhine and the augmentation of Austrian power in Italy, at the expense of the weaker German and Italian states respectively.

Most interesting, however, from our present point of view, are Pitt's remarks on the third proposal. Much, he says, will have been done for the repose of Europe by the carrying out of the proposed territorial rearrangements, but "in order to make this security as perfect as possible, it seems necessary that at the time of the general pacification a treaty should be concluded, in which all the principal European Powers should take part, by which their possessions and their respective rights, as then established, should be fixed and recognized; and these Powers should all engage reciprocally to protect and support each other against all attempts to violate it. This treaty would give to Europe a general system of public law and would aim at repressing, as far as possible, future attempts to trouble the general tranquillity, and above all to defeat every project of aggrandizement and ambition, such as those which have produced all the disasters by which Europe has been afflicted since the unhappy era of the French Revolution."²⁷

The first "separate and secret" article of the Treaty of April 11, 1805, between Russia and Great Britain embodied these views in a formal engagement. "Their Majesties," it ran, "who take the most lively

²⁷ Comte de Garden, *Hist. générale des traités de paix*, viii. p. 323. Garden did not know of the instructions to Novosiltsov, and he therefore ascribes to Pitt the suggestion that the peace should be followed by the establishment of a European system for mutual guarantee of possessions. M. Muhlenbeck (*Sainte-Alliance*, p. 328) refers to Garden, but also says nothing of Novosiltsov's mission.

interest in the discussion and precise definition of the law of nations and in the guarantee of its observance by general consent and by the establishment in Europe of a federative system, to ensure the independence of the weaker states by erecting a formidable barrier against the ambition of the more powerful, will come to an amicable understanding among themselves as to whatever may concern these objects, and will form an intimate union for the purpose of realizing their happy effects."²⁸

Thus Pitt committed himself to the Grand Design. That in doing so his mind was preoccupied by the immediate peril from France is clear; and in this he was but following precedent. It was this which, according to Sorel, had given birth to the idea of the Concert of Europe in the circular letter of July 17, 1791, in which Count Kaunitz had impressed upon the Imperial ambassadors the duty of all the Powers to make common cause for the purpose of preserving "public peace, the tranquillity of states, the inviolability of possessions, and the faith of treaties," and had based his appeal on the fact that the nations of Europe, united by ties of religion, institutions, and culture, formed but a single family.²⁹ It was in the Declaration of Pillnitz, inspired by the same motive, and issued in

²⁸ F.O. Treaties, Ser. 1, No. 217. The French text is printed in Holland Rose's *Select Despatches . . . relating to the Third Coalition against France*, Appendix, p. 273. Compare Art. 2 of the Convention of Bartenstein of April 26, 1807, between Russia and Prussia: "Rendre à l'humanité les bienfaits d'une paix générale et solide, établie sur la base d'un état de possession enfin assuré à chaque puissance et mis sous la garantie de toutes, voilà le but de la guerre" (Garden, *op. cit.*, x. p. 405).

²⁹ *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, ii. 232.

1792 by the Emperor Leopold and King Frederick William of Prussia, that, in 1821, the Abbé de Pradt was to see the "first germ" of the Holy Alliance.³⁰ Finally, it was the peril from France which, in 1796, had inspired Burke to find a juridical basis for the principle of European intervention.³¹ How far Pitt would have gone in the attempt to realize the Confederation of Europe, with the principle of intervention necessary to its maintenance, it is perhaps idle to speculate. The Third Coalition was shattered at Austerlitz, and Pitt's dying thoughts were not of Europe but of his country. It is probable that, had he lived to take the lead in the rearrangement of Europe after Napoleon's fall, he would have followed much the same course as Castlereagh, who carried on the tradition of his policy with a courage and a constancy equal to his own. He would certainly have found, as did Castlereagh, that the principle of the European union of guarantee was calculated to produce more and greater evils than it cured, and that even the blessing of peace may be too dearly bought at the price of liberty.

³⁰ *L'Europe et l'Amérique en 1821* (Paris, 1822).

³¹ "*Vicini vicinorum facta præsumentur scire*. The principle, which . . . is true of nations as of individual men, has bestowed on the grand vicinage of Europe a duty to know and a right to prevent any capital innovation which may amount to the erection of a dangerous nuisance" (*Letters on a Regicide Peace*, i. *Works* (ed. 1887), v. p. 323).

II

THE BIRTH OF THE CONFEDERATION

The time will come when treaties shall be more than truces, when it will again be possible for them to be observed with that religious faith, that sacred inviolability, on which depend the reputation, the strength, and the preservation of empires.—PREAMBLE TO THE TREATY OF KALISCH.

THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER I

Czartoryski and Polish nationalism—Influence on Alexander's project—Alexander falls from grace—Friedland and Tilsit—Napoleon and Alexander—Effect of the campaign of 1812—Character of Alexander—His education—Influence of La Harpe—"Jacobin" views of the young Alexander—Plans for a democratic Russia—Influence of Paul I's militarism—Effect on him of Paul's murder—His religious mysticism—Religious character of the age—The coming millennium—Influence of Golitsin and Koshelev—Effect on Alexander of the burning of Moscow—Napoleon as "the Beast"—Alexander's mission as the world's peace-maker—He crosses the Niemen.

CZARTORYSKI in his *Memoirs* says that his object in putting forward the principles embodied in the instructions to Novosiltsov was to conciliate the traditional Russian policy of aggrandizement with generous ideas, by making the Russian passion for glory and supremacy serve the purposes of the general good of humanity. "My wish was," he says, "that Alexander should become in some sort the arbiter of peace for the civilized world; the protector of the weak and oppressed; the guardian of international justice; that his reign should begin a new era in international politics; politics henceforth based on the general good and on the rights of all and each."¹

The scheme was, he adds, stillborn. It was,

¹ *Mém.*, i. 370.

indeed, by its very remoteness, calculated to captivate Alexander, who delighted in giving free play to his imagination and in forming all sorts of plans, so long as there was no immediate necessity to realize them, and loved general principles and the terms in which they were expressed, without ever going deep into the practical issues involved. But Alexander was the only man in his empire capable of adopting such a plan from conviction. The influence of Czartoryski might carry him a certain distance ; but, this influence removed, he would be isolated among counsellors who, like the future Chancellor Rumyantsev, had from the first protested against the breach with France and the "moral" motive that underlay it. Under these circumstances the disastrous rout of Friedland, and the politic generosity of Napoleon at Tilsit, were enough to turn Alexander's mind from his dream of becoming the arbiter of the peace of Europe to that other dream—which the unhappy Paul I had already cherished—of dividing with Napoleon the empire of the world. A vision so dazzling awakened in him the purely personal ambition, latent in his very blood, of which he had hitherto been unconscious. In the contemplation of his new greatness the interests of Europe were forgotten. "What is Europe?" he said to Savary, the French ambassador ; "what is it, if it be not you and we?"²

It is not necessary for our purpose to say more than a few words about the eventful history of the five following years, culminating in Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812. After 1807 Czartoryski

² Savary to Napoleon, November 18, 1807. In Tatishchev, *Alexandre I^{er} et Napoléon*, p. 239.

was no longer Minister of Foreign Affairs; and though he retained Alexander's friendship, there was little use in reminding a sovereign who—as Bismarck said later of the Emperor William I—had “acquired a taste for conquest” by the annexation of Finland, of his European mission or of the claim of oppressed nationalities to his protection. In his relations with Napoleon, Alexander learnt the truth of the proverb that “who sups with the devil needs a long spoon;” but it was not—to use his own phrase—till his soul had found illumination by the burning of Moscow that he realized the full enormity of his backsliding in entering into this unholy alliance with the “Demon of Revolution.” Who shall gauge, in that medley of motives which at this supreme crisis determined Alexander's attitude, the exact force of each? To Alexander himself, when he made the confession to Bishop Eylert which I have just quoted, the religious motive seemed uppermost; amid the horrors of the war the call of God had been plain, bidding him assume once more the trust to which he had been false—that of using his power to establish the empire of peace. But how far was this an afterthought?—the outcome of hours of morbid brooding over the Bible, night by night, during the pursuit of the broken army of France over the pitiless snows? There was no hint of Christian charity in his attitude when first he realized the desperate plight of the Grand Army: nothing but a sense of the outrage to Holy Russia and the insult to himself, which called for vengeance. Napoleon, in his desperation, had stooped to write a letter in which he appealed to any remnants of Alexander's former sentiments. To these “fanfaronnades” he returned no answer, and to

Colonel Michaud, who brought to him the news of the abandonment and burning of Moscow, he declared his intention of continuing the struggle even if his armies perished and he was forced to lead a guerilla war of his peasants. "Napoleon or I, I or he : we cannot longer reign together. I have learned to know him ; he shall never deceive me again. . . ." ³

The ruin of the Grand Army had in effect made Alexander the arbiter of Europe, and all Europe was watching anxiously to see what use he would make of his power. Would he use it, as his predecessors would have done, solely to his own greater glory and the aggrandizement of his Empire? Or would he, now that he was conscious of the responsibility that rested upon him, rise to the height of his earlier professions and see his greatest glory in establishing the universal reign of liberty and justice, and the true interests of Russia in maintaining her due weight, and no more, in the balance of the nations? The answer to these questions, never clear in the experiences of the years that followed, nor even yet in most opinions formed about the Tsar's policy, lay deep in the fundamental contradictions of Alexander's character. This it is necessary, not indeed to understand, for that would puzzle the high gods, but in some measure to mirror in our minds, if we are to follow with intelligence the debates in the inner councils of Europe

³ Count Michaud's letter describing the scene (dated July 1819) is given in Shilder, iii. p. 509.

To the Prince Regent Alexander wrote (September 19, 1812) that he would rather be crushed under the ruins of his empire than make peace with this modern Attila, who, "furious at not having found in Moscow either the riches which he coveted or the peace which he had hoped to dictate," had burned this fair city, reducing it to a mass of ashes and ruins" (Shilder, iii. p. 510).

during the years to come. I propose, then, to digress awhile from my main theme in order to attempt to throw some light on this.

Physically Alexander took after his mother, the beautiful Empress Maria Feodorovna; there is not a trace in his portraits of likeness to the repulsive face and diminutive figure of his father, the ill-fated Paul I, though in certain of their mental qualities father and son were not unlike. Very interesting, too, is the comparison between the portraits of the youthful Alexander and those of the young Napoleon. The Russian Emperor's gigantic frame is surmounted by a round, almost chubby face, with kindly, dreamy eyes, and a weak, smiling, sensuous mouth—in the greatest possible contrast to the eagle-beaked hatchet face, with the fierce eyes and close-pressed lips, of the young Bonaparte as David drew him for us. If these two met, it is easy to see which would impress his personality on the other.

Alexander, in fact, was above all impressionable and receptive, and it is for this reason that a knowledge of his early environment is so important for the comprehension of his later policy; since it is to the influences that surrounded him as a boy, as well as to his innate disposition, that his idiosyncrasies may be traced.

The education of the Grand Dukes Alexander and Constantine had been taken by the Empress Catherine II entirely out of the hands of her heir, the Grand Duke Paul. But though the old Empress looked to her grandson Alexander to carry on her policy, and even meditated excluding Paul from the succession in his favour, she did nothing to initiate him into the conduct

of practical affairs. Her choice of tutors for the lads did little to repair this omission. Chief of them was Prince Nicholas Soltikov, a former lover of the Empress, who, though he took his charge seriously enough, was neither by character nor endowments equal to its proper discharge. Of the others, Protosov, while his daily reports show that he followed with a conscientiousness almost pedantic the progress of his pupil, had, according to Czartoryski, no sort of influence over him, while Muraviev, though a man of excellent intentions, was too timid to impress either his personality or his ideas on the two high-spirited lads.

The only one who was in the least fitted for his place was Frédéric César de La Harpe, who had come to Russia in 1782 on the recommendation of Grimm to act as tutor to the younger brother of Lanskoy, the Empress Catherine's favourite of the moment.⁴ La Harpe, says Czartoryski, "belonged to the generation of men nourished on the illusions of the end of the eighteenth century, who believed that their doctrine, a new philosopher's stone, a universal remedy, explained everything, and that sacramental phrases were enough to cause every kind of difficulty in practice to disappear."⁵ He was, in short, a *philosophe* and a prig, the last person in the world to do anything to remedy the gaps in Alexander's education due to Catherine's jealous exclusion of him from practical affairs. But such as he was he succeeded in exercising over the imaginative boy an empire which was destined to survive the most singular vicissitudes. Even his excursions in practical Jacobinism during

⁴ La Harpe, *Le gouverneur d'un prince*, p. 9.

⁵ *Mémoires*, ii. p. 272.

the Revolution in Paris and in Switzerland did not discredit him in Alexander's eyes. At the outset of Alexander's reign he appeared at the court of St. Petersburg swaggering in his uniform sash and huge sabre as a member of the Swiss Directorate, to contribute interminable dissertations to the counsels of the young Emperor's secret committee of reform; he appeared again, to the great disconcertment of the Allies, at the Tsar's side during the advance on Paris in 1814 and at the Congress of Vienna. To the last Alexander proclaimed the obligations under which he lay to him for his influence and his teaching.⁶

This influence and teaching had been directed to turning the young Cesarevich out a very gentle, complete, and perfect Jacobin, an imperial apostle of the new gospel of humanity. "Providence," La Harpe wrote later, "seemed at last to have taken compassion on the millions of people who inhabit Russia; but a Catherine was necessary who was willing to have her grandsons brought up as men."⁷ And the education of a man meant, of course, education in the principles of Rousseau. "It is necessary," said La Harpe, "for every good citizen to know these principles, but above all a prince must early be penetrated with them. He will thus learn that there *was* at least a time when all men were equal, and that if things have changed since then, this can never have been in order that the human race, bound hand and foot, should be given over to the caprice of a

⁶ ". . . à vous, cher ami, de qui je tiens la presque totalité des notions et des connaissances que je possède" Letter to La Harpe. Weimar, November 23/December 5, 1818. In Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich, *L'Empereur Alexandre I^{er}* (1912), i. p. 341.

⁷ *Mémoires* (ed. 1864), p. 74.

single man, and that there should be found absolute monarchs generous and truthful enough to proclaim publicly to their subjects: 'We glory in saying that we only exist for the good of our peoples.'"⁸

La Harpe ceased to be Alexander's tutor in the spring of 1795, when the Czarévich was sixteen years old, but the seed he had scattered had fallen on receptive soil, and produced in the course of the next few years a singular crop of youthful ideals. In 1797 Alexander found a sympathetic soul in Prince Adam Czartoryski, who, with his brother, had been brought to the Court of Catherine II as a hostage for the good behaviour of his family in Poland, and has left in his memoirs an account of the Grand Duke's confidences, so interesting in itself, and so valuable in the light it throws on Alexander's future attitude, that I shall quote from it at some length.

"He told me then," writes Czartoryski, "that he did not at all share the ideas and doctrines of the Cabinet and the Court; that he was far from approving the policy and conduct of his grandmother; that he condemned her principles; that he had prayed for Poland and her glorious struggle; that he had deplored her fall, and that in his eyes Kosciuszko was a man great by reason of his virtues and the cause which he had defended, which had been that of humanity and justice. He protested to me that he detested despotism everywhere and in whatsoever manner it was exercised; that he loved liberty, which was the birthright of every man; that he had taken the most lively interest in the French Revolution; that while disapproving its excesses, he wished success to the Republic and rejoiced in it. He spoke to me with veneration of his tutor, M. de La Harpe . . . that he owed to him all that was good in him, and all that he knew—above all, those principles of truth and justice which he was happy to carry in his heart."⁹

We have also the independent testimony of the

⁸ Quoted in Shilder, i. p. 227, n. 51.

⁹ *Mém.*, i. p. 96.

young Alexander himself in a letter to La Harpe, dated October 8, 1797, preserved in the Russian Imperial archives.¹⁰ This letter was carried to Switzerland by the Grand Duke's new-found friend and confidant Novosiltsov, who was charged to secure La Harpe's advice and assistance on an affair of great importance—no less than a plan to give Russia a free Constitution. Alexander begins by recounting all the abuses and follies of his father Paul's fantastic tyranny. He had thought, he said, of leaving the country; but this being impossible, he was devising instead a plan by which Russia should become free, so that she should never again become the plaything of madmen (*servir de jouet à des insensés*). The best kind of revolution directed to this end, he thought, would be one operated by the legal power (*i.e.*, the autocracy), which should cease to exist so soon as the Constitution should be achieved and the country had representatives.

"I have communicated this idea to certain enlightened persons who have long shared my views in this matter. In all we are but four, *i.e.*, M. Novosiltsov, Count Strogonov, the young Prince Czartoryski, my aide-de-camp, and I."

"Our idea is during the present reign to have translated into Russian as many useful books as possible, publishing those of which the printing is allowed, and reserving the rest for a future time, in order to begin to spread enlightenment and educate men's minds as much as possible. On the other hand, when once my time comes, it will be necessary to work, of course little by little, to establish a representation of the nation, which under direction shall devise a free Constitution; after which my power shall cease absolutely and, if Providence support our work, I shall retire into some corner and live content and happy in seeing the well-being of my country and rejoicing in it." •

¹⁰ Shilder, *op. cit.*, i. p. 280. Appendix XV.

Alexander was only eighteen years old when he wrote this, and if, when brought face to face with the hard realities of his position, he failed to realize his early ideals, it is not for us, here in Oxford, to condemn him. We, at least, know what Czartoryski meant when he spoke of Alexander being "under the spell of youth as yet scarce begun, which builds projects that reach out of sight into a future that has no end." Czartoryski, who had the best reason to know, and also the best reason to resent, the failure of Alexander to fulfil his early promises, expresses no doubt of his sincerity, both then and afterwards. His views and his intentions, he says, remained precious as the purest gold, and the great qualities he displayed were all the more precious, since he developed them in spite of the education he had received and of the example of those among whom he lived.

Two other influences, of which I must speak very shortly, introduced into Alexander's complex character traits wholly contradictory to this early Utopianism. Of these one was the love of military detail and display with which he and his brother Constantine had been infected by their father, Paul I. After all, in the Empress Catherine's palace they had no importance beyond their rank and no serious duties; their rank in Paul's toy army at Gatchina gave them at once a sense of importance and something to do. Thus it was that Alexander, though at times he seemed to realize its absurdity, was a victim all his life to what Czartoryski calls "paradomania, that epidemic malady of princes."¹¹

The second influence, the most fateful one in his life, was the effect produced upon him by the murder

¹¹ *Mém.*, i. p. 109.

of his father. That he was privy to the plot against Paul is now established. Who can tell what arguments were brought to bear on the young idealist to induce him to clear out of his path this fantastic and ruinous obstacle to the realization of his dreams? It would have been easy to persuade him that the deposition of Paul was necessary, not only for the safety of himself and his family, but for the very preservation of Russia.¹² He was privy, then, to the plot; but when the plot issued in murder, though this was an issue more than probable,¹³ he was overwhelmed with misery and remorse. "This ineffaceable blot," says Czartoryski, who hurried back from his mission in Naples to the side of the young Tsar, "attached itself like a canker to his conscience, paralyzing at the outset of his reign the best and fairest of his faculties, and plunged him at the end of his life into a profound depression and into a mysticism which at times degenerated into superstition."¹⁴

This latter element in Alexander's character, which in the end dominated and obscured all the others, deserves special study, since it not only determined, in the Holy Alliance, his attitude towards the idea of

¹² We may again refer to the letter to La Harpe quoted above, in which he says: ". . . The happiness of the State counts for nothing in the present régime; there is nothing but an absolute power which acts at random. It would be impossible to enumerate all the acts of madness which have been committed; and to these must be added a severity which knows no justice, extreme partiality, and the greatest inexperience in everything. . . . My poor country is in an indescribable state."

¹³ "C'est difficile d'admettre qu'en disant oui, il put s'abuser sur la nature du danger" (The Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich, *op. cit.*, i. p. 8).

¹⁴ *Mém.*, i. p. 237.

a federated Europe, but in the later years of his life profoundly affected all his policy. It is true that, as Czartoryski says, the haunting horror of his father's murder, by which his soul was tormented, predisposed Alexander to emotional religion; but in this he was by no means singular among his contemporaries, and in order to understand this development of his character we must realize something of the religious tendencies of that particular age.

It was an age of violent reaction against the shallow enlightenment of the eighteenth century; against that "Reason" which had been set up on the desecrated altar of Notre Dame and was held responsible for all the woes which the Revolution had brought upon Europe. In France there was the Catholic Reaction, heralded by Chateaubriand's *Génie du Christianisme*, one symptom of that romantic movement, with its appeal to an idealized vision of the Ages of Faith, which was so profoundly to affect the art and the thought of Europe. In Germany, tormented for a quarter of a century by so great an accumulation of woes, there was, under the influence of the Pietists, a reaction, not so much to the standpoint of the old Protestant orthodoxy, with its dryasdust theology and its reverence for things established, as to the Bible, the fountain-head of Divine revelation, the infallible oracle which it was believed would solve all mysteries for those who had eyes to see and ears to hear. Here men began to seek the explanation of the portents of the times, and there were plenty of seers who, guided by their own inner light, were willing and anxious to interpret to seekers after truth the utterances of the oracle. Mysticism hung like a fog over the stricken land, at first over the lower social levels,

but rising gradually to the most exalted heights. Prophets and disciples were drawn from every rank, and whatever impassable social barriers there may have been in the life of the world, in this strange other-world of the spirit there was a complete confusion of degrees. Of its leaders some, like Jung-Stilling at Karlsruhe, were writers of repute; some, like the Baroness von Krüdener, persons of rank; but sovereign princes and princesses did not disdain to listen to the exhortations of converted cobblers and to take comfort in the visions of inspired housemaids. In view of what human nature is, it is not surprising that conversions and visions multiplied.

This mystical spirit, long before Alexander himself was touched by it, had invaded the most influential circles of the Russian Church and State. Among the servants and intimates of the Emperor two were particularly affected by it: Prince Alexander Golitsin and Alexander Ivanovich Koshelev. Golitsin, Alexander's friend from childhood, had been appointed by the young Emperor Procurator of the Holy Synod at the early age of thirty. His previous life had in no way fitted him for the office; but responsibility sobered him, and both as Procurator and later as Minister of Religion and Education he threw himself zealously, in the spirit of evangelical piety, into the work of elevating the intellectual and spiritual level of the Church. Koshelev, who had come under the influence of Swedenborg's teaching and long corresponded with the mystics of many lands, in 1812 resigned his office of Grand Marshal of the Court in order to devote himself wholly to mystical religion. These two men it was who were mainly instrumental in determining Alexander's religious

development, Golitsin by introducing him to the Bible, Koshelev by suggesting its mystical interpretation.¹⁵

It was in the summer of 1812, when he was on his way to meet Bernadotte in Finland, that Alexander first began to read the New Testament. Golitsin, in pressing him to do so, had very wisely recommended him to confine himself to the Gospels and Epistles, and not to read the Apocalypse or the Old Testament for the present. But Alexander's appetite once aroused was insatiable; the Bible became his daily study, and the apocalyptic books precisely those over which he brooded most. Their mystic language, capable of many interpretations, enabled him to give form to his own confused and nebulous emotions, and in their oracular utterances he sought with child-like faith the solution of the world's problems and his own. Such being his actual mood, it is not difficult to realize the effect upon him of the apocalyptic horrors of the campaign of 1812. The disasters of his armies were the visible judgment of God upon him; the flames of Moscow God's revelation to him of the mission to which he was called. All the signs of the times, as interpreted by the prophets, pointed to this. Napoleon was quite evidently Antichrist and the Beast; the "latter days were about to be accomplished," and everywhere the belief was vocal that, as Isaiah had foretold, a man would be raised up "from the north . . . from the rising of the sun," by whom Antichrist would be overthrown and the

¹⁵ The Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich, *op. cit.*, i. p. 167. The Grand Duke comments on the absence of material for the life of Koshelev, whose influence over Alexander he describes as profound and abiding.

way prepared for the second advent of Christ to establish his thousand years' rule upon earth. Who could "the Man" be but Alexander himself? There were plenty of flattering voices to suggest it to him; and after all, King David, a meaner murderer than he, had been the man after God's own heart.

If the burning of Moscow had seemed to Alexander the outpouring of God's wrath upon him, the awful fate of the Grand Army was no less a manifestation of the Divine judgment—*adflavit Deus et dissipati sunt*. His spirit was exalted by a victory which he ascribed to the act of God; and though he could not as yet find peace for his own soul, tormented by remorse, he accepted the Divine mission of becoming the peacemaker of the world. In his private letters, as in his public acts, during the years to come it is to the overruling providence of God that he ascribes the successes of his policy and of his arms. But of God working through *him*, the chosen instrument, the dispenser of benefits from above. For Alexander, for all his talk of renunciation, was—as boys always are and men not seldom—the *ὄμφαλος* of all the visionary worlds he created. "The Emperor," writes Czartoryski, in a passage often quoted that must be quoted again, "would willingly have consented that every one should be free, on condition that every one should do his will alone."¹⁶

Such was the complex character of the man—autocrat and Jacobin, *philosophe* and pietist, altruist and egoist—who on January 1, 1813, crossed the Niemen into Prussia, proclaiming his mission as the liberator of Europe.

¹⁶ *Mém.*, i. p. 345.

THE GRAND ALLIANCE

Alexander's proclamation—Treaty of Kalisch—Appeal to the principle of nationality—Renewed influence of Czartoryski—Alexander and Poland—Partial alliances of Teplitz and Reichenbach—Capo d'Istria—Alexander revives the idea of a Universal Union—Questions involved in a territorial "restoration": France, Germany, Italy, Poland—Threatened disruption of the Alliance—Mission of Castlereagh.

It is not my purpose to deal with the stirring events of the War of Liberation; the national uprising of Prussia and Germany; the negotiations, issuing in a series of treaties, which culminated in that coalition of the nations by which the power of Napoleon was crushed in October 1813 on the field of Leipzig; the long negotiations with Napoleon during the advance of the Allies towards France, and the discussions, revelations of divided aims, and recriminations to which these gave rise in the councils of the Alliance. Since, however, my object is to trace the origins of the underlying ideas of the "Confederation" which succeeded to the place of Napoleon in Europe, I shall gather from the records such material as may serve to throw light upon these, putting for this purpose into what to some may seem undue relief those proclamations of the sovereigns addressed to the peoples, and those solemn preambles to the treaties, which have usually,

the peoples exhausted by so much unrest and so many sacrifices. The time will come when treaties shall be more than truces, when it will again be possible for them to be observed with that religious faith, that sacred inviolability, on which depend the reputation, the strength, and the preservation of empires.”¹⁸

The Treaty of Kalisch, so far as its public articles were concerned, was published on March 20th. Five days later Alexander and his new ally, Frederick William III of Prussia, issued their famous proclamation to the German people. The alliance, which deserved the enthusiastic support of all classes, aimed only at recovering for the German nation its inprescriptible rights of liberty and independence. The Confederation of the Rhine, “the chain by which Germany had been garrotted,” must cease to be. The desire of the Russian Emperor was that Germany should be re-established “on the ancient spirit of the German people,” and that with youth renewed, vigorous and united, it should once more take its due place among the nations of Europe.¹⁹ “In 1792,” comments Sorel, “France had preached war and the cosmopolitan Revolution; in 1813 Russia unchained the war of nationalities.”

The principle of nationality was to become, as it still is, the main obstacle to any realization of the vision of perpetual peace; and in appealing to it Alexander without doubt had no conception of the power and tendencies of the forces he was unloosing—forces which were destined to mingle with the air his daydream of a confederated Europe, and from the insurrection of the Greeks in 1821 to the Balkan wars

¹⁸ Garden, *Hist. gén. des traités de paix*, xiv. p. 167.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, xiv. p. 180. Sorel, *op. cit.*, viii. p. 68. It was issued by Marshal Kutusov in the name of the sovereigns.

of 1912 and 1913, to keep Europe in a state of war or ominously quiet under the oppressive shadow of the "armed peace." But was Alexander insincere? Were his appeals to the nations mere loud-sounding nothings? If we turn back for a moment to the project of peace submitted by Alexander to Pitt in 1804, we see that in it not only the principle of constitutional liberty, but also that of nationality, is recognized. It was argued, perfectly justly, that in order to secure the stability of an international system, the boundaries of the nations must first be fixed, not only so as to give to each its natural frontiers—rivers or mountains or sea—but "so as to compose the several states of homogeneous peoples, which could agree among each other and act in harmony with the government that rules them."²⁰ And the prime cause of all the unrest in Europe for centuries past is stated to be that no attention had been paid to this national equilibrium.

During the alliance with Napoleon, Alexander may have forgotten this principle; or, to put the best, and not an improbable, interpretation on his policy, he may have realized after Friedland the hopelessness of its application, and seen in an understanding with the French Emperor the only means of ensuring the general peace. This illusion shattered, he returned to his earlier plans. At Kalisch, moreover, Czartoryski was once more at his side. On December 12, 1812, he had written to Novosiltsov to say that the Tsar's victories should lead to something "stronger and fairer" than commonplace conquests, and pointed to the restoration of Poland as a thing not only glorious in itself but required by the interests of all

²⁰ Czartoryski, *Mem.*, ii. p. 36.

Europe.²¹ On the 6th he had written anonymously to the Emperor Alexander in the same sense—acknowledging the authorship of the letter in another of the 15th—praying him not to treat the Poles as a conquered people, but to reconcile them to Russia by putting into execution as soon as possible the project for their national restoration which he had so long harboured. He pointed out that in this matter the Emperor was under no obligation to the other Powers, adding the significant sentence: “It is to the general confederation that the matter will have to be addressed, and with this that it will have to be settled.”²²

In view of the part played by Poland in the late war, this was to ask much of the Russian Emperor's generosity. Though Adam Czartoryski himself had kept as far as possible in the background, his father had presided over the Diet which, at the declaration of war, had proclaimed the kingdom of Poland and recalled all the Poles in Russian service to join the Polish contingents of Napoleon's armies. But Czartoryski well knew the character of the ruler to whom he appealed, and that in his present exalted mood he was not likely to let petty motives of resentment or narrow considerations of policy stand in the way of the realization of a long-cherished dream. Alexander's reply is dated from Leypouny on January 13, 1813. Nothing, he says, has been altered in his

²¹ To Novosiltsov, *Imp. Russ. Hist. Soc.*, ix. p. 431, quoted in Shilder, iii. n. 220, p. 381.

²² The letters are printed in full in the appendix to the Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich's *L'Empereur Alexandre I^{er}*, vol. i. In Prince Ladislaus Czartoryski's *Alexandre I^{er} et le Prince Czartoryski* (Paris, 1865) they are given (p. 197 *seq.* Nos. XVIII and XIX) with considerable cuts.

sentiments and intentions towards Poland. How much he will be able to do will depend on the success of his arms and on the attitude of the Poles themselves. But meanwhile he has given orders to his generals to treat them as friends and brothers. So soon as he should be in a position to do so he would realize their aspirations, on the lines of Liberalism, which were those that he himself preferred.²³ The letter is obviously sincere ; it shows also a clear perception of the obstacles to be overcome—the jealous opposition of the Powers and the resentment of the Russian people at the part played by the Polish troops in Napoleon's invasion.

During the campaign of 1813 another significant figure appeared at Alexander's side, that of the Greek Capo d'Istria. He had entered the Russian diplomatic service in 1811 as attaché to Baron Stakelberg, the ambassador in Vienna, and was now attached to the staff of General Barclay de Tolly as chief of the political division. If Czartoryski represented Polish nationalism, Capo d'Istria championed that of the Greeks. It was not this, however, which attracted Alexander's special attention to him, though it was of great importance later. The neutrality of Switzerland, which Alexander had guaranteed, had been violated at the instigation of the oligarchy of Bern, and the Emperor proposed to send a plenipotentiary to the Landamman and Diet in order to call "ces messieurs" to order. For this mission he chose Capo d'Istria, whom he commended to La Harpe as "a man highly recommendable for his honesty, his tact, his enlightenment and liberal views." "He is from Corfu," he added, "and consequently a republi-

²³ *Alex. I^{er} et le Pr. Czartoryski*, No. XX, p. 206.

can, and it is the knowledge of his principles that has led me to select him.”²⁴ These principles were to carry Capo d’Istria far into the Tsar’s confidence after the signature of the first Peace of Paris. He was destined to play an influential part during the Congress of Vienna, and from 1815 to 1822, as adjunct Foreign Minister under the Chancellor Count Nesselrode, he was to be one of the main supporters of Alexander’s liberalism and of his plans for a Confederation of Europe.

It is from Capo d’Istria, indeed, and in connexion with his Swiss mission, that we have the next definite proof that, throughout this period, Alexander had never lost sight of his favourite plan for organizing peace on a permanent basis. On January 1, 1814, the anniversary of the passage of the Niemen, the Russian headquarters were established at Basel, Alexander himself leading his troops over the bridge across the Rhine in a storm of sleet and wind. Here, on the eve of his advance into France itself, he communicated to Capo d’Istria, before he left for Zürich, his plan for the restoration of Europe. So far the treaties which bound the Coalition together, at Kalisch, at Teplitz, and at Reichenbach, were not instruments common to all the Allies, but mere agreements between this Power and that, though all directed to a common end, namely, the overthrow of Napoleon. That end attained, the Emperor Alexander declared his plan to be “to restore to each nation the full and entire enjoyment of its rights and of its institutions; to place all, including ourselves, under the safeguard of a general alliance,

²⁴ To La Harpe. Freiburg-im-Breisgau, December 22/January 3, 1813-14.

in order to guarantee ourselves and to save them from the ambitions of a conqueror: such are the bases on which we hope, with the help of God, to establish this new system. Providence has placed us on the path which leads directly to this goal. We have traversed part of it. That which it remains for us to do is encumbered with great obstacles. Our duty is to remove them.”²⁵

The obstacles to be removed were, indeed, formidable enough; and the least formidable of them was Napoleon himself, though the unexpected vitality of his brilliant defence during the next few months more than once threatened to dissolve the Great Alliance into its elements. But as his power of resistance declined, with every fresh advance of the allied arms, the sole tie which bound the Coalition together was loosened. Of the spoils to be divided only a comparatively insignificant portion had been earmarked: what of Poland, of Italy, of Germany, of France itself? Above all, for the present, what of France? The Allies had loudly proclaimed throughout that they were making war, not on France, but on Napoleon. But what did they mean by France? The France of the old régime? Or the France of 1792, with its rectified frontier and the alien *enclaves* absorbed? Or France as Frenchmen have ever conceived it in its perfection, with its natural frontiers of the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees? And in this France, however defined, what government was to be established?

What of Italy? Was Murat, ranked now with the enemies of Napoleon, to be allowed to realize his

²⁵ *Aperçu de ma vie*, by Count Capo d'Istria, in Imp. Arch. and Sbornik of the Imp. Russ. Hist. Soc., vol. iii. p. 178.

dream of exchanging the crown of Naples for that of Italy? What of Germany, which, now that Napoleon's system was overthrown, reflected as in a convex mirror all the intricate problems of Europe; where there were as many conflicting interests and ambitions as there were states, and every one was clamouring for compensations, from the rival Great Powers, Austria and Prussia, down to the crowd of mediatized princes who, now that the age of restorations had begun, petitioned insistently for the recovery of their "liberties"? And last, and by no means least, what of Poland? Would Alexander keep the engagements made at Kalisch, and subsequently twice confirmed, and partition the duchy of Warsaw with his allies? Or would he take advantage of his overgrown power to realize, in despite of Austria, his lifelong dream of restoring Poland, with himself as king?

With every advance of the Allies these questions, shelved or but vaguely determined in earlier conferences, became more and more urgent; and in December 1813 the British Government, in order to prevent the Coalition from falling to pieces, decided to send Lord Castlereagh to the headquarters of the Allies. In the councils of the Coalition the other Allies were represented by the sovereigns themselves or by their Foreign Secretaries; it was rightly judged that the views of Great Britain would carry more weight if represented there by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in person. Castlereagh's instructions are contained in a Cabinet Memorandum of December 26, 1813.²⁶ He was to ascertain with precision the basis on which it was proposed to negotiate, and to come to a clear and definite understand-

²⁶ F.O. Records : Continent, France, i.

ing with the Allies, not only on all matters of common interest, but on such points as were likely to be discussed with the enemy, so that the Allied Powers might in their negotiations with France act in perfect concert and together maintain one common interest. The interests of Great Britain in the negotiations were clearly defined. The maritime power of France must be restricted within bounds by her absolute exclusion from Antwerp and the Scheldt, Holland being guaranteed, under a prince of the house of Orange, by a barrier; the Italian monarchies must be secured against French aggression, and likewise the Spanish Peninsula.

Subject to these conditions, Great Britain might be induced to apply the greater portion of her conquests to promote the general interests, to which Castlereagh was "to evince a desire as far as possible to conform." The memorandum, after detailing the colonial conquests which Great Britain was prepared if necessary to restore, concludes with a paragraph of great importance to our present subject. "The Treaty of Alliance," it runs, "is not to terminate with the war, but is to contain defensive engagements, with mutual obligations to support the Power attacked by France with a certain extent of stipulated succours. The *casus foederis* is to be an attack by France on the European dominions of any one of the contracting parties."

Here we have at the very outset the European Alliance defined as Great Britain from first to last conceived it. In contradistinction to Alexander's unlimited union with indefinite objects, it was to be a limited union with definite objects. In taking this attitude Great Britain was doubly strong; she was

materially strong because on her financial support the whole combination depended; she was morally strong because from the first she clearly defined her own requirements and the limits within which she was prepared to sacrifice her own immediate profit to the ultimate good. Sorel, writing as usual from a somewhat narrowly French point of view, says in his summary of Castlereagh's character and policy that "he piqued himself on principles to which he held with an unshakable constancy, which in actual affairs could not be distinguished from obstinacy; but these principles were in no degree abstract or speculative, but were all embraced in one alone, the supremacy of English interests; they all proceeded from this high reason of state."²⁷

Now, even had this been entirely true, it could hardly be put to Castlereagh's discredit; it is the duty of a statesman to consider first of all the interests of his country. But it is only partially true—or rather it is a *suggestio falsi*. Castlereagh put English interests first; but he believed firmly that these interests were not inconsistent with the general good. Years later, Canning was to declare that henceforth Great Britain was to "revolve in her own orbit." If Castlereagh brought her into the European system, allowing her course to be deflected by the influence of alien bodies, it was because he believed—and I think rightly—that under the circumstances of the times this was the only way to produce and preserve the general peace.²⁸ "The interests of Great Britain,"

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, viii. p. 248.

²⁸ "The wish of the Government is to connect their interests in peace and in war with those of the Continent . . . that whilst the state of Europe afforded little hope of a better order of things, Great

we find in a memorandum signed by the British plenipotentiaries at Langres on February 2, 1814, "neither require to be asserted with chicane nor with dexterity—a steady and temperate application of honest principles is her best source of authority." And these principles, as Sorel rightly says, were in no degree abstract or speculative. We may sum them up as those of *Realpolitik* tempered by altruism. They stood from first to last in contrast and opposition to the principles championed by the Emperor Alexander, which may be summed up as altruism tempered by *Realpolitik*—principles which he maintained with that invincible obstinacy which, as Caulaincourt rightly observed, in spite of an apparent pliability, due to the dissimulation almost obligatory on princes, lay at the very root of his character.²⁹

Britain had no other course left than to create an independent existence for herself, but that now she might look forward to a return to ancient principles, she was ready to make the necessary sacrifices on her part to reconstruct a Balance in Europe." (In Castlereagh to Liverpool. Châtillon, February 6, 1814. F.O.: Continent, France.)

²⁹ See the interesting analyses of Alexander's character in Caulaincourt's letters of September 19 and November 10, 1810, to Champagne, published in the Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich's *Relations diplomat. de la Russie et de la France, 1808-1812*.

III

THE TREATY OF CHAUMONT

Castlereagh at Langres—The British policy defined—Contrast with Alexander's views—Divisions in the Alliance—Austria and Russia—Conferences of Châtillon—Effect of Napoleon's victories—"Criminations and recriminations"—General character of Austrian policy—Metternich—Fear of Alexander's designs on Poland—Mediation of Castlereagh—Treaty of Chaumont—Declaration of Châtillon.

CASTLEREAGH arrived at Langres, where the headquarters of the Allies were established, on January 25, 1814. He at once realized the difficulties of the task before him. The principal object of his mission was to draw closer the bonds between the Allies by substituting a general treaty for the series of dual treaties which had hitherto bound them together, in order to present a serried front to Napoleon whether for purposes of negotiation or of war. For the success of such a treaty it was necessary that the Powers should agree at least as to the main feature of the territorial settlement to be effected in the event of their ultimate victory; and it was just such a concert that it was impossible to obtain. The Emperor Alexander had hurried to Langres on the 22nd in order to urge Schwarzenberg, the Austrian Commander-in-chief, to continue the advance; on the 25th Metternich, too, had arrived there, intent on defining the bases of the

ultimate peace, as an indispensable condition to continuing the war. The chief obstacle to such a definition was the Emperor Alexander. As to his designs about Poland, especially, he maintained an obstinate silence, which Metternich interpreted as proof of his intention to establish a greater Poland at Austria's expense.³⁰ Scarcely less disconcerting was his attitude towards France. In view of the condition of the Allied Army, the insecurity of its communications, and the disastrous consequences to be expected from a possible reverse, the representatives of Austria, Prussia, and Great Britain were agreed as to the expediency of coming to terms with Napoleon. But Alexander was inexorable. He had received from La Harpe, recently arrived from Paris, accounts of the state of French opinion which confirmed him in his resolution to make no terms with him. If Austria refused to advance, he would himself join the Silesian army under Blücher and Gneisenau, whose insubordinate impetuosity, encouraged by Stein as Alexander's mouthpiece, flouted the prudent counsels of the Prussian King and his politic advisers. The crowning triumph of the occupation of Paris, Alexander determined, should be his. He himself would lead the victorious armies into the French capital and there dictate the terms of a magnanimous peace. As for the future government of France, that should be left for the French themselves to decide, in an assembly presided over by a Russian representative, who could be none other than La Harpe.

³⁰ Were this to happen, Metternich argued, the whole settlement as projected by Great Britain would break down, as Austria would have to revive her claim to the Low Countries. (Fournier, p. 61.)

The answer of Austria to these proposals was a threat of making a separate peace with Napoleon; the alliance seemed on the verge of dissolution; but, after heated debates, more prudent counsels prevailed, and it was decided to continue the advance of the whole Allied force, not indeed to Paris, but as far as might be "consistent with the dictates of military prudence." At the same time it was agreed to invite Caulaincourt, Napoleon's representative, to Châtillon, where the peace negotiations were to be resumed on February 3rd. With a view to these conferences the representatives of the Powers agreed, on January 30th, to a formula which, though the general Treaty seemed as far off as ever, once more consecrated the principle of common action. As a result of the debate on the form the negotiations should take, wrote Castlereagh to Liverpool,³¹ it was decided, "that the negotiators should act as common parties under a general instruction, and that they should consider themselves as maintaining one and the same interest on behalf of themselves and their Allies, now collectively constituting, as opposed to France, the whole of Europe with the exception of Turkey."

The events of the war soon broke the harmony of this concert into discord once more. The Emperor Alexander, leaving the sorry business of patching up the compromise to his ministers, had left Langres on the 29th, the very day on which the first conference opened, and hurried to the Allied headquarters, which were now at Chaumont. King Frederick William of Prussia was with him, and it was believed that Alexander's intention was to

³¹ F.O. : Continent, France. Langres, January 30, 1814.

place himself at the head of the Prussian army, and with the King at his side, to advance on Paris. Blücher's victory over Napoleon at La Rothière, on February 2nd, the day on which the ministers assembled at Châtillon, increased Alexander's determination. To his Allies, who argued that the victory should be used to secure reasonable terms of peace with a now chastened Napoleon, Alexander replied that the overthrow of Napoleon was "an affair of morality and of justice" which admitted of no compromise. On February 8th he ordered the conferences to be suspended, and the next day he made it clear to Metternich that he still held tenaciously to his idea of marching on Paris and there holding an assembly for the election of Napoleon's successor. The old controversy of Langres began again with greater vehemence, Metternich once more threatening to withdraw from the Coalition if Alexander continued his "tyranny." Napoleon's successive victories at Montmirail, Champaubert, and Etoges (February 8-10), by damping the Tsar's over-confident temper, enabled a compromise to be patched up once more. Alexander formally gave up his plan for a French Assembly, and, while refusing to consent to an armistice, agreed that the conferences should be resumed, with a view to establishing the bases of peace. Austria, for her part, consented to press the war, and Schwarzenberg was directed to advance to the support of the defeated Silesian army.

The harmony thus restored was not long preserved. At Mormant on the 17th, at Montereau on the 18th, and at Méry on February 21st, Napoleon dealt such heavy blows at the Austrians that Schwarzen-

berg was forced to retreat with some precipitation to Bar-sur-Aube. The effect which this produced in the councils of the Alliance is described in a letter written by Castlereagh³² from Chaumont to report the results of a conference held on the 25th to decide the future plan of campaign. "I could not but perceive," he wrote, "the altered tone of my colleagues . . . their impressions being strongly tinged by the demoralizing influence of a rapid transition from an advance made under very lofty pretensions, to a retreat of some embarrassment and of much disappointment and recrimination." In another letter of the same date he wrote: "The internal temper here is very embarrassing and alarming. The criminations and recriminations of the Austrian and Russian ministers are at their height . . . Austria," he continued, "both in army and Government is a timid power. Her minister is constitutionally temporizing . . . he is charged with more faults than belong to him, but he has his full share, mixed up, however, with considerable means for carrying forward the machine—more than any other person I have met with at headquarters."

At this point we may pause for a while to consider the underlying motives of the Austrian attitude, which have an intimate bearing upon the development of our whole subject; for Metternich, whose name was for more than thirty years to come to be identified with the Austrian system, was also, more than any other, to become associated in the public mind with the policy known as that of the Holy Alliance. Castlereagh's appreciation of him—excellent so far as it

³² To Liverpool, Chaumont, February 26, 1814. F.O.: Continent, France.

goes—which I have just quoted, gives the key to Metternich's policy throughout our period. Austria was a timid Power, as she had reason to be, and Metternich, who lived to be the last representative of the old *haute diplomatie*, was an opportunist by training and by force of circumstances. For Alexander's shadowy idealism he had neither understanding nor respect. His own mission was to prop up the mouldering institutions of the Austrian Empire, which seemed to be threatened by the Tsar's Jacobin humanitarianism, itself suspected of being no more than a mask to disguise a very practical Russian *Weltpolitik*. We shall see later on how Metternich, aided by circumstances, was able to turn the Tsar's idealism to serve his own purposes, and to convert the Holy Alliance, which was to have heralded the dawn of a new era of liberty, into an oppressive instrument for stereotyping old abuses. For the present Alexander held quite other views; and what would it profit Austria to overthrow Napoleon, the son-in-law of the Emperor Francis, only to see set up in his place, in a liberalized France, another military adventurer—Bernadotte, whose pretensions Alexander at this time favoured—and so risk the almost certain recementing of that Franco-Russian Alliance which was the dream of the Russian and the nightmare of the Austrian Chancery? Hence the "criminations and recriminations," due to suspicion of ulterior designs on the one side and of immediate treachery on the other, which distracted the counsels of the Allies during these fateful weeks. How embittered were the relations between these brothers in arms may be shown by a quotation from a letter of Czartoryski, who arrived at Chaumont at the height of the crisis produced by the impres-

sion of the retreat, to his friend Novosiltsov.³³ "Austria," he wrote, "is with the greatest perfidy still supporting Napoleon and his dynasty, and it was because of this that Blücher was beaten; the Austrians maintained an unworthy inactivity and exposed Blücher a second time to all the forces of the French."

Clearly, in view of dissensions such as these among the Allies, Napoleon's cause was by no means desperate. Under the impression of the series of sledgehammer blows he had dealt their armies, already decimated by disease, he could have come to terms with them, had he been willing to risk wearing a discredited crown in a shrunken France. It was a risk which, as Sorel has demonstrated, he could not take. "When a man like Napoleon falls," Count Nesselrode had written to his wife immediately after Leipzig, "he falls altogether."³⁴

On his part too, then, the negotiations opened at Châtillon were but a device to gain time, to give an opportunity for the rift within the Alliance to develop till he could complete the breach by some crowning victory. To Castlereagh this plan was soon clear, and he pressed for the conclusion of the general treaty which it had been his main object to secure. The chastened temper of the Allies after the disasters of February gave him his opportunity. He had removed all suspicion of Great Britain's own ulterior objects by the frank declaration of her requirements made at Langres, in the conference of January 31st,

³³ Dated Chaumont, March 2/14, 1814. In *Imp. Russ. Hist. Soc.* ix. p. 435.

³⁴ Zeitz, October 22, 1813. *Lettres et papiers du chancelier comte de Nesselrode*, v. p. 146.

and he was in the better position to act as mediator between the conflicting interests. By eliminating all mention of the most contentious questions and scheduling certain others for further deliberation and settlement, he succeeded in securing a concert. The Emperor Alexander was content with an instrument which embodied two of his main objects: the overthrow of Napoleon and the establishment of a balance of the Powers under a European guarantee, from which, however, he was careful to exclude his own Asiatic dominions. Prussia, too, was equally agreeable, and Metternich, the other Powers being unanimous, had no choice but to bring Austria into line. The result was the signature, on March 10th, of the Treaty of Chaumont, "perhaps the most far-reaching treaty," Metternich wrote, "that has ever been signed."³⁵

Since the Treaty of Chaumont is the foundation upon which the "Confederation of Europe" in all its subsequent phases ultimately rested, it will be well to examine its provisions in some detail. The preamble declares its object to be "to draw closer the ties which unite [the Powers] for the vigorous pursuit of a war undertaken with the salutary object of putting an end to the misfortunes of Europe . . . of assuring the repose of Europe by the re-establishment of a just equilibrium . . . and of maintaining against all attacks the order of things that shall be the happy outcome of their efforts." The treaty, that is to say, is directed to two ends, the one temporary and particular, *i.e.*, the successful prosecution of the war with France, the other permanent and general, *i.e.*, the collective protection or guarantee of

³⁵ The treaty was ante-dated March 1st.

territorial and other arrangements agreed upon as the result of successful war. With the articles of the treaty falling under the first of these heads we need not here concern ourselves. Of the articles falling under the second head, the most important are the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 16th.

Article V provides that the Allies will, without delay, concert as to measures for preserving the peace when established, and for mutual protection against any attack by France. Article VI provides, in such an event, primarily for "amicable" intervention; Article VII stipulates that, such amicable intervention having failed, each of the contracting Powers shall place 60,000 men in the field. To save waste of time in such an emergency, the question of the supreme command and of the pay of the troops is determined. Article XVI which from our present standpoint is the most important, runs as follows :

"The present Treaty of Alliance having for its object the maintenance of the Balance of Europe, to secure the repose and independence of the Powers, and to prevent the invasions which for so many years have devastated the world, the High Contracting Parties have agreed among themselves to extend its duration for twenty years from the date of signature, and they reserve the right of agreeing, if circumstances demand it, three years before its expiration, on its further prolongation." ³⁶

It is important to note, in view of later discussions, that the Treaty of Chaumont, while announcing the intention of the signatory Powers to maintain the "order of things" established by them against all attacks, contemplates these attacks as likely to be

³⁶ Text in Martens, *Nouveau Recueil des traités*, etc. I. (ix.), No. 79, p. 683.

made only from one direction—France, against which alone its specific provisions are directed. Even the language of Article XVI, which might bear a wider interpretation, is limited in effect by the articles which give its general principles a particular application.

To this treaty the sovereigns of Spain, Portugal, and Sweden were to be invited to accede, as well as the Prince of Orange, for whom, under one of the secret articles attached, the kingdom of the Netherlands was destined. By the other secret articles it was agreed that, in the ultimate reconstruction of Europe, Germany was to be composed of sovereign princes united by a federal tie; Switzerland was to be independent, under the guarantee of the Powers; Italy was to consist of independent states; and Spain was to be restored to the Bourbons. The omission of Poland may be noted as of especially ominous significance. "The treaty was signed," says Sorel, "but in spite of the solemn character of their engagements under it, the Allies had not abjured their disagreements and their rivalries: in the background, for the general peace, the questions of Poland and of the supremacy of Russia; in the foreground the question of peace with Napoleon or the destruction of his empire."

The latter was, of course, the main point immediately at issue. The treaty had been signed; but for some days yet the negotiations with Napoleon continued. Alexander alone was absolutely implacable in his attitude towards the French Emperor. Even Castlereagh had expressed himself in favour of "signing a peace with Buonaparte, provided no act of the French nation speedily overthrow him."

harsh sentence could not, indeed, have been more graciously passed than in the language in which the Allies condemned France to confinement within her ancient limits. "France," the proclamation ran, "restored to the dimensions which centuries of glory and prosperity under the rule of her kings have assured her, should share with Europe the blessings of liberty, national independence, and peace."

To this common proclamation the Emperor Alexander, three days later, added one of his own. "The Allies," he announced, "respect the integrity of France, such as she was under her legitimate kings; they may even do more, because they always profess the principle that for the happiness of Europe, France should be great and powerful." Thus were foreshadowed the terms of the First Peace of Paris, which left to the restored French monarchy the conquests of the Revolution up to 1792.

III

THE PREPARATION OF THE CONFEDERATION

If ever the Powers should meet again to establish a political system by which wars of conquest would be rendered impossible and the rights of all guaranteed, the Congress of Vienna, as a preparatory assembly, will not have been in vain.—GENTZ.

THE FIRST PEACE OF PARIS

The fall of Paris—The abdication of Napoleon—Disquieting attitude of Alexander—Russia and the balance of Power—Castlereagh aims at “grouping” Alexander—Justification of the policy of maintaining the Alliance—Question of its legitimate sphere of influence—This to be confined to Europe—Question of Asia, the British Empire, the United States and Latin America—Immediate questions: Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain—The First Treaty of Paris—The future Alliance; question of its constitution—Talleyrand urges a wider Alliance, to include France—The principle of “legitimacy”—The Allies and the French claim—Exclusion of France.

IN the abortive programme concerted by Pitt and the Emperor Alexander in 1805, the three great objects of the Alliance were thus defined: (1) The overthrow of Napoleon, and the reduction of France to her ancient limits; (2) the arrangement of the territories taken from France so as to secure a “just equilibrium” in Europe; (3) the establishment of an international system for preserving the settlement effected on the basis of public law. Of these objects the first seemed to have been triumphantly attained when on March 30, 1814, Paris fell, and its fall was followed by Napoleon’s abdication under the Treaty of Fontainebleau and the signature, on May 30th, of the First Treaty of Paris between the Powers of the Great Alliance and the legitimate monarchy of France, restored now in the person of Louis XVIII.

Voices, indeed, were heard in criticism of the impolitic generosity which left to Napoleon his title and established him, with plentiful funds and the nucleus of an army, in an independent principality close to the coast of Italy, where Joachim Murat, King of Naples, was playing a dubious game, which gave, moreover, to France at large frontiers wider than those of 1792.

This generosity was mainly due to the attitude of the Emperor Alexander. Two months before the fall of Paris, Castlereagh, in a letter to Lord Liverpool from Langres, had commented on the *chevaleresque* spirit in which the Tsar was conducting the war. The Emperor Alexander was opposed to any immediate conclusion of peace, he said, because he wanted to enter Paris at the head of his Guards, and there prove his quality by the magnanimity of his revenge for the burning of Moscow.¹ Fortune favoured his ambition. The Emperor of Austria was not present when the Allied forces entered Paris; he was spared, men commented, the pain of witnessing his daughter's humiliation; and, at the head of his splendid cavalry of the Guard, Alexander rode down the Champs Elysées, captivating the volatile Parisians by his handsome presence and the charm of his smiling and friendly address. Nor were the Parisians alone in exalting him. "It would be an injustice not to declare," wrote Sir Charles Stewart to Castlereagh, "that, if the Continent has had the curse of all the evil arising out of the existence of Bonaparte, it is also crowned with the blessing of possessing a legitimate Emperor, who, by a series of firm and glorious conduct, has richly

¹ *Castlereagh Correspondence*, 3rd Ser., i. p. 212.

deserved the appellation of the liberator of mankind.”² But the proceedings of the “legitimate Emperor” soon began to be almost as disconcerting as those of the rival he had overthrown. For the moment there was no one in Paris to dispute his supremacy, and he showed a disquieting disposition to play the part of Providence in France, with little regard for the views of his Allies. He was ominously silent on the subject of the Bourbons, for whom he had often enough expressed his cordial contempt and dislike, and Sir Charles Stewart, only five days after penning the panegyric just quoted, was writing in a flutter to Lord Bathurst, lamenting the absence of Castlereagh and complaining that the Emperor, with whom lay the management of every concern, was “coquetting with the nation” instead of “making any public and manifest declaration of his wishes relative to Louis XVIII.”³ In brief, there rose before the eyes of the other Allies the nightmare vision, which was not soon to fade, of another Franco-Russian Alliance more fateful than that of Tilsit, in which the visionary autocrat of All the Russias would figure as the patron of the Jacobinism of France and all Europe. Castlereagh, on his arrival in Paris, correctly diagnosed the case and suggested the remedy. “The Emperor has the greatest merit, and must be held high,” he wrote on April 20th to Lord Liverpool, “but he ought to be grouped, and not made the sole feature for admiration.”⁴

Here we have the key to the continental policy

² Stewart to Castlereagh, Heights of Belleville, March 30, 1814. *Castlereagh Corresp.*, 3rd Ser., i. p. 412.

³ To Bathurst, Paris, April 4. *Ibid.*, p. 415.

⁴ *Corresp.*, 3rd Ser., i. p. 478.

of the British Government, as represented by Castlereagh, during the following years. Their consistent aim was the traditional one of establishing and maintaining the balance of power. After the downfall of Napoleon this balance was seriously threatened by Russia alone, and to preserve it Great Britain—as the secret treaty of January 3, 1815, showed—would have used against Alexander the same weapons that had prevailed against Napoleon. Between Napoleon and Alexander, however, there was from the first this essential difference, namely, that Napoleon could never have been grouped, whereas Alexander could—was, indeed, an enthusiast for grouping, so long as he was allowed to pose in the centre of the picture. This is the supreme justification for the attitude of Castlereagh towards the European Alliance after its immediate object had been accomplished. The need of Europe at the moment was peace, to “heal her of her grievous wounds,” peace established on a “just equilibrium,” so that it might endure at least a while; and the best, indeed the only, way to secure this peace was to take advantage of Alexander’s ideal of a confederated Europe in order to “group” him. The immediate questions were: of whom the rest of the group was to consist, what was to be its sphere of influence,⁵ and how it was to be kept together.

In discussing these questions it will be most convenient to take first that of the sphere of influence. From the earliest stages of the alliance its primary function, in the event of its success, was to be to deal with the territories reconquered from France, which were partly to be restored to their ancient “rights,”

⁵ The phrase is not used here in its modern technical sense.

partly to be re-arranged so as to form a barrier against further French aggression. Beyond this, however, the Alliance, after the conclusion of the general Treaty, was to survive as a sort of board of trustees for Europe, to guarantee the permanence of the settlement effected and generally to look after the common interest of the European nations. The point to notice here is that, under these agreements, the sphere of influence was to be confined to Europe. In his instructions to Novosiltsov in 1804 the Emperor Alexander had given reasons why the Ottoman Empire must be excluded from any European Concert; at Châtillon he had only consented to pledge himself to the principles of the Alliance on it being clearly understood that his own Asiatic dominions were not to be included in its sphere; later he was to argue that even the questions of the Near East belonged properly to the "domestic politics" of Russia. As for Great Britain, she had anticipated all question of her Empire being included in the sphere by herself defining beforehand on a generous scale the conquests which she was willing to restore in the general interests of Europe; and as for the vexed question of the rights of neutrals at sea, she refused to allow any interference, concerted or otherwise, with the established maritime code. The abolition of the Slave Trade was the chief of her interests which she was content to bring within the sphere of international regulation, and even to secure this—as was proved at Aix-la-Chapelle—she was not prepared to pool her empire of the seas. As for America, Great Britain was still engaged in a war with the United States, which had ostensibly been caused by her insistence on her own interpretation of the maritime code; and behind the defiance of the United States loomed

the larger question, raised by the revolt of the Latin American colonies, of the whole attitude of the New World against the Old. In August 1814 negotiations for peace between Great Britain and the United States were opened at Ghent, and in connexion with this Pozzi di Borgo, the Russian ambassador in Paris, in a letter to Nesselrode, foreshadowed all the later developments of the Monroe Doctrine. "The conclusion of this important matter," he said, "is uncertain. The dominant party in America, which desired the war, is aiming at a complete revolution in the relations of the New World with the Old, by the destruction of all European interests in the American continent." "Will the fact that Great Britain has a free hand," he asks, "stop this plan? I said all this in England, which takes short views, but was not believed."⁶ In the long run, as we shall see, the "short views" prevailed, and, in spite of all the efforts to bring the question of the Spanish colonies in America within the sphere of the Alliance, it never got beyond the preliminary stages of discussion. The sphere of influence of the Alliance, then, was Europe defined within somewhat narrow limits.

It remains to glance at the immediate problems, with respect to the territorial settlement within these limits, that called for solution. On certain of these an agreement had been reached at Chaumont. As we have seen, in the secret articles of the treaty of March 1st it was stipulated that Germany was to consist of sovereign states united by a federal tie; that Switzerland was to be independent under a European

⁶ Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, Paris, July 28/August 9, 1814. Polovtsov, *Correspondance des Ambassadeurs*, etc. Imp. Russ. Hist. Soc. 112. p. 60.

guarantee ; that Italy was to be composed of independent states ; and that Spain was to be restored to the Bourbons. The first Treaty of Paris repeated these stipulations, except that in regard to Spain, which was already a *fait accompli*. By Article VI, moreover, it established the new Dutch sovereignty which became the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, and by Article VII it confirmed the possession of Malta in full sovereignty to Great Britain. As an essay in international government, however, Article V, regulating the navigation of the Rhine and other rivers, is perhaps the most significant. "The future Congress," it runs, "with a view to facilitate the communications between nations, and continually to render them less strangers to one another, shall likewise examine and determine in what manner the above provisions can be extended to other rivers which, in their navigable course, separate or traverse different states,"⁷

The Treaty of Paris, then, to which eight Powers attached their signatures, was the first formal step in the process of the reconstruction of Europe, a cautious and tentative step, moreover, as is clear from its omission of all the more burning questions that threatened a division among the Powers : especially those of the fate of Poland, of Saxony, and of Murat's Neapolitan crown. These and all other questions were to be brought before the great general Congress which it was proposed to open at Vienna on August 1st. In considering the problems raised in the organization of the Congress it is important to remember that, in spite of its more widely "European" character, this was essentially but a continuation of the conferences

⁷ Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*. I, No. I. Art. V was developed into the Regulations passed by the Vienna Congress on March 11, 1815.

which preceded the signature of the Treaty of Paris, which instrument, as modified in the second treaty after Napoleon's final fall, was to rank with the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna as the foundation of the public laws of Europe.

This brings us to the question of the group of Powers by whom, as trustees for Europe, this public law was to be established. It will be remembered that, by the terms of the original concert between Great Britain and Russia, as suggested by Alexander in 1804, these two Powers were to form the nucleus of a wider alliance which in time was to develop into a union of all the states. But in this universal union, according to the Tsar's project, Russia and Great Britain—as the Powers most disinterested—were to retain a preponderant influence. Circumstances had since developed this nucleus into the group of the four signatory Powers of the Treaty of Chaumont, the instrument which, as we have seen, was the foundation charter of the new Concert of Europe. The first Treaty of Paris, on the other hand, was signed, in addition to the Allies of Chaumont, by four other Powers, viz. France, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden. The question was whether the instrument thus constituted, as it were, a wider concert and gave to all its signatories the right to an equal voice in the councils of Europe, or whether the four Allies alone were to have the determining voice in the coming Congress. Such a narrower concert was certainly contemplated by the Treaty of Chaumont, which was valid for twenty years and renewable at the discretion of the Allies; and especially was it laid down that France was to have no voice in the disposal of the territories

ceded by her, that is to say, in the most important matters with which the Congress would be called upon to deal.

From the point of view of France, then, it became of the utmost importance to press the principle of the wider concert consecrated by the signature of the Treaty of Paris. This was the object which Talleyrand, with consummate skill, pursued during the time preceding the Congress and at the Congress itself. His diplomacy was based on the language of the Allies themselves. They had, in proclamation after proclamation, declared that their quarrel was not with France but with Napoleon; they had posed as the liberators of the nation from an intolerable tyranny; they had over and over again declared that their mission was to restore ancient "rights" and the system of public law which the Revolution had overthrown. During the final crisis of Napoleon's fall Talleyrand, to quote Gentz,⁸ had become "the political oracle of France," and the oracle found it convenient to repeat, with a disconcerting emphasis, the lofty sentiments of the allied Powers. He had, indeed, laboured for the restoration of the "legitimate" monarchy in France in order to enable him to do so;⁹ and with magnificent impudence, the man who had served in turn every "usurping" Government in France, now proclaimed *urbi et orbi* the sacred principle of "legitimacy." "The legitimacy of kings, or rather of governments," he said, "is the safeguard of

⁸ To Caradja, April 14, 1814. *Oesterreichs Theilname an den Befreiungskriegen*.

⁹ "A Government 'imposed' would be weak. With a principle we are strong. Louis XVIII is a principle. He is legitimate King of France" (*Memoirs*, ii. p. 165).

nations; the legitimacy of a government is the effect of long possession, as prescription is a title to private property." ¹⁰

In taking this line he was doing more than merely asserting the right of France to a voice in the councils of Europe; he was opening a rift in the Alliance, and so placing France, now strengthened by the return of the troops in garrison beyond her borders, in a position to hold the balance in a divided Europe. The principle of "legitimacy" in the sense proclaimed by Talleyrand, *i.e.*, "the effect of long possession, as prescription is a title to private property"—was that which had been consistently upheld by Great Britain as the basic principle of any European juridical system; and clearly, if the era of conquest was to be superseded by the era of peace, it was the only possible basis. But it was one not likely to appeal to Alexander, who had committed himself to a principle wholly inconsistent with it—that of nationality, so far at least as this could be reconciled with his maintaining his position in countries, *e.g.*, Finland and Poland, which he held by that very "right of might" it was sought to discredit. It might appeal to Austria, which, when once the traditional Habsburg inheritance was restored to it, was to seek salvation, under Metternich's inspiration, in a rigid adherence to the principle of "stability." It was not likely to appeal to Prussia, which, rent and dismembered during the Revolutionary epoch, was planning to compensate herself for losses in Poland by the annexation of Saxony. It would appeal, finally—and this was the traditional statecraft of France—

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

to those lesser German Powers which feared to be ground between the upper and nether millstone of Austria and Prussia, and to that host of German princelings whose petitions for the restoration of their "liberties" were flooding the chanceries of the Allies.¹¹

The time of waiting between the signature of the Treaty of Paris and the opening of the Congress of Vienna was an anxious one for France. So far as the patent provisions of the treaty were concerned, there was indeed nothing to cause her misgiving. By Article XXII it was stipulated that all the Powers engaged on one side or the other in the war were to send plenipotentiaries to Vienna to regulate in a general Congress the arrangements for the completion of the treaty. But an annexed secret article, embodying the principle settled at Chaumont, laid down that the disposition to be made of the territories ceded by France under Article III of the Treaty of Paris was to be regulated at the Congress on the basis agreed upon by the Allied Powers among themselves. Whether or no, as Talleyrand wrote in his *Memoirs*, the diplomatists were a little ashamed of their weakness in signing the Treaty of Paris, he was right in suspecting that they were not disposed to admit France to the Congress on equal terms, and that the Alliance of Chaumont was still in force. The postponement from August to October of the opening of the Congress, necessitated by Castlereagh having to attend the session of Parliament and by the urgent

¹¹ Many of these documents are preserved among the F.O. Records. Their language is that of a world even then perished beyond hope of revival. There is much allusion to traditional "liberties," but the word is used in the same feudal sense as in Magna Charta.

demand for the Emperor Alexander's presence in Russia,¹² seemed to him but a ruse to extend the period of the tutelage of France; for, pending the completion of the arrangements as to the Balance of Power, the Allies remained armed.¹³ On this point he was speedily reassured; but his suspicions reawoke when, on August 14th, it was announced that Castlereagh had reached Ghent on the way to Vienna, where preliminary conferences were to be held without France being invited to participate. "The English minister," writes Pozzo di Borgo, "in explaining the matter, did so in such a way as to inspire grave misgivings as to the part assigned to the French Government in future transactions." The explanations given by Castlereagh to King Louis in person, he added, were more satisfactory, and these had been conveyed through Metternich to Talleyrand. The preliminary meetings at Vienna, Castlereagh said, were only concerned with transactions that had previously passed between them, and were not for the purpose of deciding, without the knowledge of France, any questions, whether general or particular, on which she was naturally called to give her opinion. As to the treaties made during the war with Napoleon, these had no application to the legitimate monarchy.¹⁴

There was in all this, in spite of Pozzo's opinion, little enough to satisfy Talleyrand. The questions on which France was not "naturally called to give an opinion" had been defined at Chaumont, and they were precisely the questions in the solution of which

¹² Nesselrode to Pozzo di Borgo, London, June, 10/12, 1814, Polovtsov, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

¹³ Talleyrand to Noailles, July 23, *Ibid.*, p. 44.

¹⁴ Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, August 16/28, 1814. Polovtsov, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

it was imperative that France should have a voice, namely, the disposal of the territories she had ceded in such a way as to produce a "just equilibrium." It was in the controversies certain to arise over the redistribution of these territories that Talleyrand looked for the means of breaking up an Alliance which was still pointed against France; and if before the opening of the Congress these questions should have been in principle settled by the Allies among themselves, the diplomacy of France at Vienna would have to be directed to undoing all that had previously been done without her. Otherwise, so far from gaining anything by attending the Congress, she would by her presence forfeit all right in the future to dispute its decisions, though she had had no voice in their formulation. If, then, Talleyrand attended the Congress, it was with the deliberate intention of turning the tables against the Alliance. The restored monarchy of France was to be the spokesman of the European idea against the partial union of the four Allies, the *raison d'être* of which had ceased with the fall of Napoleon and the dissolution of his empire. France, content with her legitimate boundaries, would pose as the disinterested champion of legitimacy everywhere, and, herself desiring nothing, would be in all the stronger position to resist the particularist ambitions of the Powers, sowing the seeds of dissension among them, and thus recovering her own due weight in the balance of the European states.

II

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

Its general character—Dictatorship of the Great Powers—Talleyrand leads the opposition of the lesser Powers—He champions “justice and public law” against the particularist ambitions of the Powers—Questions of Poland and Saxony—Attitude of Alexander and its causes—Threatened break-up of the Alliance—Diplomacy of Castlereagh—Talleyrand admitted to the Conferences—Secret Treaty of January 3, 1815—Harmony restored—The Vienna Final Act—General analysis of its provisions from the point of view of a basis of an international system—The return of Napoleon from Elba—Revival of the Quadruple Alliance.

As for the great Congress—with which I only propose to deal in its broadest aspects—it was soon clear that Talleyrand's suspicions as to its scope and objects were abundantly justified. In its outward aspect, indeed, it promised fulfilment of some at least of the exalted hopes that humanity had based upon it. Never before had the civilized world witnessed its like. “The city of Vienna,” wrote Gentz to the Hospodar of Wallachia on September 27, “presents at present an overwhelming spectacle; all the most illustrious personages in Europe are represented here in the most exalted fashion.”¹⁵ But this brilliant assemblage, so far as international business was concerned, was nothing but a chaotic mass, in which no one had any defined rights or definite functions. As

¹⁵ Prokesch-Osten, *Oesterreichs Theilnahme an den Befreiungskriegen*, p. 443.

to form or procedure nothing had been fixed; and for three months the very fundamental character of the Congress was the subject of heated debate, *i.e.*, as to whether it was an assembly capable of arriving at decisions—a European Parliament, as it were—or merely a collection of negotiators. A collection of negotiators, in effect, it was and remained, though with spasmodic efforts at organization, as in the formation of committees for the settlement of particular issues, *e.g.*, the constitutions of Germany and Switzerland; “for to the last moment there was neither certainty nor consistency.” As for the negotiators themselves, Gentz, who was secretary to the Congress, gives us a picture of their unequal status. There were “sovereigns negotiating in person, some of them as though they were their own prime ministers¹⁶; presidents of cabinets of the first rank turned into plenipotentiaries; plenipotentiaries of the second rank; nearly a hundred princes and ministers of princes of every degree, each one intent on furthering some private interest; deputies from every part of Germany, agitating day and night for a federal constitution,” and, it may be added, representatives of the great European financial houses—the “money-changers,” as Wellington called them—and a host of miscellaneous hangers-on and fortune-seekers. In such an assemblage it was obvious that the stronger must prevail and that the weak would have to seek salvation in intrigue. The dictatorship of the Great Powers, comments Gentz with much truth, though theoretically an injustice, was under the circumstances a necessity; for the Quadruple Alliance was the only nucleus of an organization having behind it the sanc-

¹⁶ This was a hit at the Emperor Alexander.

tion of force. "The key to the Congress," said Gentz, "is given by the entire lack of any plan, the preponderance of the four Powers, and the frequent misunderstandings between them."¹⁷

The formal opening of the Congress had been fixed for October 1st; but Gentz dates its inception from September 10th, when the ministers of the four Allied Powers—Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia—held their first meeting. At these preliminary meetings, as was natural enough, the constitution of the Congress was discussed. The first proposal was to constitute a Congress and then to propose the nomination of a committee for the purpose of preparing a project of arrangement to be laid before it. As to the question of the constitution of the Congress itself, Castlereagh wrote on September 24th, to Lord Liverpool, that there was only one opinion, that the conduct of business must practically rest with the leading Powers; and it was agreed, after some debate as to the admission of Sweden, that the "effective cabinet" should not be carried beyond the six Powers of the first order, with an auxiliary council of the five principal German states for the affairs of Germany. In making this announcement, however, Castlereagh added that, in spite of his efforts to effect "a coincidence of sentiment" between the French and the Allied ministers, the three continental Courts, whatever their differences with each other, seem to feel equal jealousy of admitting France either to arbitrate between them or to assume any leading influence in the arrangements consequent on the Peace.¹⁸

¹⁷ Gentz's "account of the various decisions and the final results of the Congress" in Prokesch-Osten, *op. cit.*, p. 540 *seq.*

¹⁸ To Liverpool, September 24, 1814. F.O.: Continent, Congress, Vienna.

The *Protocole Séparé* of the conference of September 22nd, enclosed in this letter, makes the attitude of the Powers abundantly clear. Its provisions were as follows :

1. The four Powers alone were to decide on the distribution of the provinces to be disposed of as the result of the late war and the Treaty of Paris, but the two other Powers were to be allowed to hand in opinions and objections afterwards.
2. The plenipotentiaries of the four Powers would not enter into conferences with those of the two Powers for this object until they had arrived at a complete understanding among themselves on the questions of Poland, Germany, and Italy.
3. To save time the plenipotentiaries of the four Powers would, as soon as the Congress opened, consult the two Powers on other matters.

The underlying principle, commented Castlereagh, was that the Allies should have the disposal of the results of their own work, to which, by the Treaty of Paris, France had formally assented. The practical motive was that, while it would be open to France to raise objections in her own name or that of Europe to the arrangements made by the Powers, if she were admitted to the conferences and allowed to discuss each question in detail as it arose, there would be endless opening for intrigue, especially with the small princes of Germany.

The "general principle" of the coming Congress, then, as accepted in these preliminary conferences, was that there was to be a "directing committee" representing Europe. Particular questions were to be decided by commissions of the Powers interested in them, which were to report to the directing committee, which in its turn was to place the results before those Powers which ought, in its judgment,

to be consulted. The battle was to rage round the constitution of this directing committee; but for the present it was clear that the four Allies intended to confine it, for all effective purposes, to themselves.

Such was the condition which Talleyrand found when he arrived in Vienna. He at once protested. "A commission," he wrote, "can only be appointed by consent of the Congress, which if it is to accept the decisions, should also delegate the power of making them. Business will not be expedited by passing resolutions of which the legitimacy will be disputed." The proper procedure, he added, would be to form a committee of the eight signatory Powers of the Treaty of Paris, to settle preliminaries.¹⁹ As for what had been done between May 30th, when the Congress was agreed upon, and October 1st, when it was to meet, he declared that it had no existence for him;²⁰ and when Metternich mentioned the Alliance he roundly told him that this no longer existed. His own idea of what the Congress should be he submitted to Castlereagh in a formal project. His proposal was "that every prince having a universally recognized sovereignty over countries engaged in the late war, which he has not ceded, and which is not recognized as belonging to any other, as well as every state which the war found free, may have plenipotentiaries at the Congress—but no others."²¹ This project, as a pencil note on

¹⁹ Protest of France against the mode of conducting the Congress. Vienna, October 1, 1814. In F.O.: Congress, France, M. Talleyrand, etc., Archives, June 1814–June 1815.

²⁰ Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, October 4, 1814, Pallain, *Correspondance*, p. 10, No. III.

²¹ Enclosed in Castlereagh to Liverpool, October 9, 1814. F.O., *loc. cit.*

the margin of the copy in the Foreign Office Records points out, "would have excluded Naples and admitted Saxony," and was "considered therefore by Prussia as particularly hostile to her interests." It was, in fact, French policy masquerading in "European" guise.

The disguise was easier when only generalities were involved than when these had to be translated into practical proposals. In a circular addressed on October 3rd from Vienna to all the French diplomatic agents, Talleyrand declared that his instructions were to support the principles of justice and of public law, and consequently to aim at securing the rights of each in order to secure the repose of all.²² In an interview with the Emperor Alexander he used similar language, with Poland as his *arrière-pensée*, till the irritated autocrat was goaded into exclaiming: "Sooner war than give up what I hold." Socially and politically boycotted by the continental Great Powers, Talleyrand put forth all his incomparable diplomatic arts to form a party among the secondary Powers and all the mass of princelings who had been accustomed to look to France for support against the aggressions of Austria and Prussia.²³ The result was a meeting of the representatives of thirteen small German states under the presidency of Bavaria, to protest against the "usurpation of the

²² Polovtsov, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

²³ The agents of the Secret Police reported that his house was perhaps the most interesting to keep under observation, as it was a veritable *refugium peccatorum*. To the discontented and alarmed German princes he maintained that no Congress from Westphalia onward had been without a mediator, that a mediator was now more necessary than ever, and that the only possible mediator was France, which wanted nothing for herself. (Report of October 8th. Fournier, *Die Geheimpolizei auf dem Wiener Kongress*, p. 167.)

Great Powers.”²⁴ The fate of Saxony, in which Talleyrand was more particularly interesting himself, was after all a question that could not but concern them; for its projected absorption by Prussia, in exchange for her Polish provinces ceded to Russia, would form from their point of view an ugly precedent. From the British point of view, on the other hand, the suppression of Saxony was a small matter, and Castlereagh, who had need of Talleyrand’s co-operation in the more vital matter of Poland, used every sort of pressure—including a threat to recognize Murat as King of Naples—to prevent France from making “such a subordinate point” a *casus belli*.

Talleyrand, however, had his own motives for continuing to pose as the defender of legitimate rights and for choosing to apply his principle to this particular instance. In effect it threw an apple of discord into the councils of the Alliance; for Austria was glad enough of an opportunity for opposing an expansion of Prussia towards her own frontier, and in the long run Great Britain would be guided in this matter by the opinion of Austria. In view of this attitude, then, it became impossible to exclude Talleyrand from the preliminary conferences, to which he was admitted on the motion of Austria and Great Britain. As to the Congress itself, on October 8th, it was decided to adjourn its formal opening to November 1st, pending the settlement of the controversies among the leading Powers, and in spite of

²⁴ Castlereagh to Liverpool, October 9, 1814. This was the first of many meetings. One was held on the 14th, at which Baron Gagern made a long speech, protesting against the intervention of foreign Powers in Germany, and demanding the restoration of the Holy Empire. See Fournier, p. 169.

the protests of Prussia this was agreed to, Talleyrand giving the proposal his support on condition that the opening of the Congress should be carried out "conformably to the principles of public law." In a circular to the French diplomatic agents the Comte de Jaucourt announced this decision, which was due, he said, to the failure of the Powers to agree. "One would have thought," he added, "that the Powers would have agreed to maintain the sentiments of the King of France, but instead they seem to be more disposed to follow the principles against which they took up arms"—the principles, that is to say, of "*le droit du plus fort*."²⁵

The "effective cabinet" of the Congress—to use Castlereagh's expression—was further enlarged, on his motion, by the admission of Spain; and finally, at the suggestion of Count Palmella, the representative of Portugal, it was decided to include in it all the eight signatory Powers of the Treaty of Paris.²⁶ To this committee, Talleyrand wrote, all more important points and all matters of general interest were to be submitted. Five months after the Allies had entered Paris, he added exultantly, France had regained her due place in the councils of Europe.²⁷ This exultation was premature. It is true, as Gentz said, that henceforth all ostensible decisions, all public and formal declarations, were made in the name of the signatory Powers of the Treaty of Paris, as though this form had received the universal sanction. The committee of eight enjoyed for a while the honour of

²⁵ Polovtsov, *op. cit.*, No. 102.

²⁶ Cf. protest of Count Palmella at the exclusion of Portugal, dated September 30th. Enclosed in Castlereagh to Liverpool, October 9, 1814. F. O.: Vienna.

²⁷ *Mémoires*, ii. p. 283.

representing the Congress, but its dominion was neither long nor brilliant. The burning questions of Saxony and Poland were still discussed "in the recesses of the cabinets" until, at Russia's suggestion, a committee of four, representing the Allied Powers, was appointed to consider them.²⁸ Then the old debate began again with increasing heat; until with great difficulty Castlereagh succeeded in getting Talleyrand admitted into this innermost circle, which thus became a committee of five. This committee consisted of eight representatives: Metternich and Wessenberg for Austria, Rasumovsky and Capo d'Istria for Russia (Nesselrode, temporarily out of favour, being included later), Castlereagh (replaced later by Wellington, and, after the opening of the Waterloo campaign, by Clancarty) for Great Britain, and Talleyrand for France. Their main concern was with the questions of Poland and Saxony, to which I shall refer later, but after these questions were settled, the committee absorbed all important matters, and was, in Gentz's words, "till the last moment the real and only Congress." From January 1815 onward, the committee of eight met but rarely, only appearing conspicuously at the very end to sign the Final Act on the 9th of June. As for the rest, the secondary and minor Powers, they were nowhere.

Before commenting on this development of the Congress from our present point of view of the organization of international peace, I wish to devote a few moments to the questions raised at Vienna by which at the time this peace, bought at so extravagant a price, was seriously threatened. The principal question was that raised by Alexander's fixed determination

²⁸ So, too, Fournier, *Die Geheimpolizei auf dem Wiener Kongress*, p. 67.

to restore the kingdom of Poland, a question to which that of the absorption or partition of Saxony was subordinate. "The drawback to Russia as an ally," said Moltke, "is that she arrives on the field very late and is then too strong." In the struggle against Napoleon Russia had arrived late, and she was now present in Northern and Central Europe in alarming force. Not only was Poland occupied by Russian troops, but the Grand Duke Constantine was already busy organizing that Polish national army which was to be his pet preoccupation till it turned against him in the insurrection of 1830. Russian troops held Saxony until, to give weight to the counsels of Alexander at Vienna, they evacuated it in favour of the Prussians. Holstein was occupied by the Russians, and to Holstein the Tsars, as representing the Gottorp line, could advance a not too shadowy claim. Finally, so late as November, 60,000 Russians, under Field-Marshal Bennigsen, were still posted on the line of the Elbe. As early as August Castlereagh, in a letter to Hardenberg, had warned Prussia of the danger of having Russia on both her flanks, and bidden him watch both the Polish and Holstein frontiers. "I have reason to believe," he said, "that the French Government partakes strongly of the general alarm produced by the accumulating armament on the Russian frontier, and by the organization of a purely Polish army." As for Talleyrand, his attitude was quite satisfactory, since he would view with great displeasure the introduction of Russian influence into the North of Europe.²⁹

²⁹ Castlereagh to Hardenberg, August 8, 1814. F.O.: Congress, Prussia. Archives, Hardenberg and Humboldt, August, 1814-June, 1815.

Whatever the fears of Prussia as to the menace of Russia may have been, at Vienna these were outweighed by her desire to secure Alexander's support for her designs on Saxony. This then was the situation which Castlereagh discovered at Vienna: the Emperor Alexander obstinately bent on restoring the kingdom of Poland in personal union with Russia; Prussia obstinately bent on annexing the whole of Saxony; Austria using towards Prussia an "extravagant tone of war," which in Castlereagh's opinion suggested a willingness to compromise; Talleyrand, on the outskirts, denouncing in the name of "legitimacy" any interference by *force majeure* with the rights of the King of Saxony, a principle which would have made compromise impossible. Upon Castlereagh fell the task of untying the knot, if it could be untied; for of all the Powers Great Britain was the only one which could in these questions take up an attitude wholly disinterested and European; as for the others, after two months' experience of them, he was to realize how little they were prepared to sacrifice for the common good.³⁰

In personal interviews with Alexander he did his best to move him from his resolution. Great Britain, he said, would favour the restoration of an independent Poland, but this idea of a partial restoration under the Russian sovereign was pregnant with future troubles. For, if the Poles were content under their measure of liberty, those under Austria and Prussia would be discontented, and Russia would then have not only the 10,000,000 Polish subjects at her back,

³⁰ "I have witnessed every day the astonishing tenacity with which all the Powers cling to the smallest point of separate interests." (To Liverpool, December 7th.)

but 5,000,000 others nominally foreign. In a weighty memorandum he pointed out that the Emperor's project was a violation of the treaty under which Russia held her Polish provinces; for by a secret article of the Convention of St. Petersburg of January 15, 1797, it was stipulated that none of the high contracting Powers was to include in its title the designation of kingdom of Poland, which was to remain for ever suppressed. It was a violation also of the Treaty of Kalisch, according to which the duchy of Warsaw was by a friendly arrangement to be partitioned between the three Allies, a stipulation confirmed by the subsequent treaties of June 27, and September 9, 1813. Moreover, he pointed out with prophetic insight that the system which Alexander proposed to establish would not last, but would probably "either be deliberately destroyed or perish at the hands of his successor."³¹ A few days later he addressed a letter to the Tsar couched in language particularly calculated to appeal to him. "It depends exclusively," he wrote, "upon the temper in which your Imperial Majesty shall meet the questions which more immediately concern your own Empire, whether the present Congress shall prove a blessing to mankind or only exhibit a scene of discordant intrigue and a lawless scramble for power. . . . Give to Europe that peace which it expects at your hands!"³²

The Emperor, in reply, used the curious argument

³¹ To Liverpool, October 2, 1814. Compare "A memorandum on the Tsar's designs in Poland," dated October 4th, in .: Congress, Russia. Archives. Enclosed in Castlereagh to Liverpool. No. 6.

³² Castlereagh to Alexander I, October 12, 1814. In Castlereagh to Liverpool, October 14th. F.O.: Vienna. Also in Congress, Russia. Archives, 20.

that the Polish kingdom, so far from proving an increase to Russian power, would create a "balance and check" upon it, and that when the Russian provinces were united, as he intended, under a free system and his army withdrawn beyond the Niemen, Europe would have nothing to fear. The argument, based on a plan never likely to take form save in Alexander's imagination, was probably put forward in all sincerity for reasons to be mentioned later; but Castlereagh may be forgiven for failing to be impressed by such language in the mouth of a Russian emperor. He was the less impressed, since, as he reported home, in any case "His Imperial Majesty insinuated that the question could only end in one way, as he was *in possession*." ³³ In vain he pointed out that Great Britain had not acted thus, but had freely restored her conquests in order to help in the work of European restoration. This was, of course, to assume that the Russian occupation of Poland was on the same moral level as Great Britain's colonial conquests, a suggestion offensive in view of the Emperor's avowed intention of restoring the national existence of Poland, an exalted motive which justified him before God and man in retaining the hold he had acquired over the country, even though in doing so he seemed to violate engagements entered into with his Allies.

Not that there had been, or would be, any such violation. In a formal memorandum the Tsar dealt with the special charges contained in Castlereagh's communication. As for the accusations of breach of faith, he regarded them with calm. The treaty of 1797 had been "cancelled by circumstances," while

³³ To Liverpool, October 14, 1814. F.O.: Congress, Vienna.

the stipulations of those of 1813 were "purement éventuelles," and in view of the large acquisitions made by Austria as a result of the war, no longer applied. On November 4th Castlereagh enclosed his answer in a letter to the Tsar. The Russian memorandum, he said, contained "maxims of public law perfectly novel in themselves and subversive of every received principle of confidence and good faith between states." As for the stipulations of the treaties cited being "éventuelles" — "éventuelles" upon what? "Apparently upon the extraordinary principle that, there being ample means to satisfy the treaty, a new right accrued to Russia, another party to the treaty, to decide according to her pleasure whether Austria should obtain the object stipulated or accept in lieu of it what Russia deems an equivalent at the opposite extremity of her dominions. On what securities will treaties rest if they are thus constantly annulled?" He goes on to denounce the false principle that states have in all cases the right to compensation by annexations for war expenses, and points out the peril of this principle of partition and compensation to the future of Europe. The answer of the Emperor Alexander to this straightforward statement was a note to Castlereagh, dated November 9th, requesting that this "private" correspondence should cease.

The situation created by the stubborn temper of the Tsar was made worse by the mutual distrust of the other two Allies and their fear of offending Russia. Metternich, indeed, as Castlereagh expected, quickly "descended from the tone of war to one of compromise" with Prussia, and Castlereagh was able to persuade him to go some way towards meeting the Prussian demands, on condition that Prussia should come into

line with the others, in the matter of Poland.³⁴ But the jealousy of the two German Powers was too great to admit of their effective concert ; the separate understanding between Russia and Prussia, helped by the personal influence of Alexander over Frederick William III, continued ; and the break-up of the Alliance, for which Talleyrand has been consistently working, seemed to be inevitable. "Unless the Emperor of Russia can be brought to a more moderate and sound course of public conduct," wrote Castlereagh on November 11th, "the Peace which we have so dearly purchased will be of but short duration."

It was not until the beginning of December that Alexander at last, to quote Castlereagh, showed "a disposition to regard the Polish Question as a subject of negotiation with the Allies," and when he did so it was to make the complete cession of Saxony to Prussia the condition *sine qua non* of some wholly inadequate concessions in the matter of territories to be included in his Polish kingdom.³⁵ This decided Metternich to throw in his lot on the Saxon question with France and the German states. In a letter to Hardenberg he declared that nothing would induce the Emperor Francis to yield on this point, and he enclosed a copy of his letter to Talleyrand. It was, wrote Castlereagh, the first regular overture made by Austria to France.³⁶ The British minister now demanded that France should

³⁴ October 9, 1814. Cf. Metternich to Hardenberg, November 2nd. Congress, Austria. Archives. Metternich and Baron Wessenberg. He offered an independent Poland, or a division of Poland, on the line of the Vistula, into two kingdoms of North and East Poland under Prussia and South Poland under Russia. •

³⁵ To Liverpool, December 5th.

³⁶ *Idem.*, December 18th.

be admitted to the conference on the Saxon Question, "not," as he explained, "to the abandonment of the confidential discussions between the Powers that had been allied during the war, but that she might not feel excluded from the consideration of a question in which she had professed to take so strong an interest." Moreover, he added, until France was brought in, Saxony, which certainly ought to yield something, would not come to terms.³⁷

The reply of Prussia, which had fortified Dresden, was to press forward her armaments and to declare that she would consider a refusal to recognize her claim on Saxony as tantamount to a declaration of war. Castlereagh feared "some sudden coup on the part of Russia and Prussia to coerce Austria," and he protested that, since the Powers were no longer deliberating "in a state of independence," it would be better to break up the Congress. The threat was explained away; but in view of the fact that it had been uttered by two great Powers in a formal conference, it appeared to the others—to quote Castlereagh—"to call for some precautionary correction by which the other Powers might be induced to feel that, in the discharge of their functions in Congress they are not exposed individually and in details to the destructive effect of such a domineering dictation."³⁸ The "precautionary correction" was the defensive alliance between Great Britain, Austria, and France, signed on January 3, 1815. "I flatter myself," wrote Castlereagh, "that the necessity will never arise of acting upon these engagements."³⁹

³⁷ *Ibid.*, January 2, 1815 (dated 1814).

³⁸ To Liverpool, January 1, 1815. •(Most secret and confidential.)

³⁹ *Ibid.*, January 3rd, enclosing the Convention of Alliance. The

He was right. On the 5th he was able to report home that the danger of war seemed over, Hardenberg having invited his good offices in the Saxon Question. The Emperor Alexander, who had heard rumours of the alliance, met Castlereagh in the most conciliatory spirit, and a month later the whole question could be reported as closed. Prussia had to be content with part of Saxony, and Alexander with a kingdom of Poland which, though it thrust itself ominously between Prussia and Austria, was less extensive than that of his dreams.

I have dealt in some detail with this particular question, the most critical which the Congress had to face, because it illustrates the difficulty of working any international system where acute differences of opinion arise between equal Powers, more especially where the conflict is not only one of interests but of principles. It may be asked where, in this particular controversy, principle was involved. To the mass of contemporary opinion Alexander's attitude seemed to be dictated by no higher a motive than to keep what he held, an opinion to which his language, in moments of irritation, lent weight. In fact, however, he was using his power to realize his favourite idea of the regeneration of Poland,⁴⁰ and to fulfil the oft-repeated promises made to his friend Czartoryski. His Polish policy was certainly

treaty is printed in Marten's *Nouveau Suppl., un Recueil des traités* (ed. Murhard, 1889), i. p. 368, No. 49.

⁴⁰ "Cette guerre . . . me dégage de tous les ménagements que j'ai eu à garder envers la France, et me laisse la liberté de travailler à mes idées favorites sur la régénération de votre patrie." (Alexander to Czartoryski, April 1, 1812. Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich, *l'Empereur Alexandre I^{er}*, vol. i. App., p. 363.

not inspired by consideration for the interests of Russia. It was hated by his people and condemned by his Russian advisers. To have consented to the creation of an independent Poland, as Castlereagh suggested, would have cost him his throne and his life, and he resented the importunity of the veteran Kosciuszko, the hero of the war of 1794, who had come to Vienna to plead a cause so dangerous to the Imperial person and so little flattering to the Imperial vanity. But Castlereagh was not the only one to point out the perils of the half-measure of independence which Alexander proposed to bestow upon Poland. In 1832, after the Polish insurrection, Pozzo di Borgo told Baron de Meyendorff that in a conversation with the Emperor at Vienna he had foretold the ruin which would result if his Polish plans were realized, and the Emperor's reply had merely been to enlarge, "with eyes aflame and in the tone of one inspired, on the injustices so long committed against this poor Poland."⁴¹ Clearly, Alexander was not acting the hypocrite when he told Castlereagh that in insisting on the restoration of Poland he was but performing a moral duty; for the question was for him not one of political expediency, to be determined by the advice of his ministers, but one of lofty principle to be decided by himself as the anointed agent of the Divine Will. "The Czar," Castlereagh had written home early in November, "had ceased to be guided in the question of Poland by his regular servants. It is unfortunately his habit to be his own minister, and to select as the instrument of his immediate

⁴¹ Unpublished papers of Baron de Meyendorff, quoted by the Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich, *ibid.*, i. p. 149.

purpose the person who may fall in most with his views." The person in this case was Czartoryski, by whom the Tsar's memorandum on the Polish Question had been drawn up.

There was then nothing in Alexander's attitude really inconsistent with his "European" ideals,⁴² save perhaps in so far as it was in conflict with his championship of the "faith of treaties." The Europe of his dreams, as pictured in the instructions to Novosiltsov in 1804, was a confederation of constitutional states, demarcated by their national boundaries and by homogeneity of population; and in commenting on the Tsar's reply to his second memorandum, Castlereagh notes "the energy of the author in pleading the rights of nations."⁴³ For the most part the dream was clearly unrealizable; but so far at least as Poland was concerned, he was in a position at least partially to realize it. The whole incident is historically mainly significant as the earliest and most conspicuous illustration of a difficulty which has ever since proved insuperable: that of reconciling the effective establishment of an international system of public law with national aspirations and ambitions.

That, speaking generally, these aspirations were little regarded in the acts of the Vienna Congress is a commonplace of history. The ultimate settlement effected by it was dictated, in fact, almost wholly by

⁴² The Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich, whose whole work is a criticism of Alexander for sacrificing the interests of Russia to his cosmopolitan idealism, comments on the fact that of the Tsar's ministers and advisers at Vienna only one, Rasumovsky, was a Russian. Of the rest Nesselrode and Stein were Germans, Capo d'Istria a Greek, Pozzo di Borgo a Corsican, La Harpe a Swiss, and Czartoryski a Pole.

⁴³ To Liverpool, November 21, 1814.

the old doctrine of the balance of power, and by the policy of erecting barriers against French aggression. Into the details of the territorial settlement I do not propose to examine, since they have no bearing on my main argument. A few words may be said, however, about the question of constitutional government as dealt with by the Congress. In Alexander's ideal scheme, as we have seen, free Constitutions played an important part; for his perfected European Peace Confederation included not only "the fixing of the relations of states to each other by more precise rules, but the attaching of the nations to their governments by making them incapable of acting save in the greatest interest of the peoples subject to them," *i.e.*, by the grant of Constitutions. Alexander's influence had been used to realize this ideal in the case of France; through Capo d'Istria, under the inspiration of La Harpe, he had helped to press through the reformed Constitution of Switzerland; finally, the kingdom of Poland, created by the Congress, was to be a constitutional one. Most interesting, however, from our particular point of view, is the Constitution of Germany under the *Bundesakt*, which was formulated in hurried sittings during the last ten days of the Congress. In spite of the great pressure brought to bear on the Emperor Francis by the German princes, in spite of Cardinal Consalvi's protest in the name of the Holy See against the suppression of "the centre of political unity," the Holy Roman Empire was not revived. Germany, as stipulated at Chaumont, became a federation of states, sovereign, but bound by the Treaty of Vienna to conform to public law as far as it was formulated in this treaty; and among the provisions of this law was the

obligation laid on each one of them by Article XIII of the Act of Confederation to summon "assemblies of estates." Germany thus became a sort of miniature Confederation of Europe, the *Bundestag* representing the central council of the Powers, and its working exactly illustrates what would have happened if Alexander had ever succeeded in realizing his dream of a universal union:—in the struggle between the great Powers for predominance in the central diet, due to the fact that their voting power was ludicrously unequal to their effective force, the uneasy submission of the lesser Powers to the greater, and the jealousies of the two leading Powers which, fifty years later, led to open war between them and the break-up of greater Germany.

What then was the outcome of the Congress from which Europe had expected so much? "Universal expectation," wrote Gentz in his account of the final results of the Congress, "has perhaps never been roused to such a pitch as before the opening of this dignified assembly. Men had promised themselves an all-embracing reform of the political system of Europe, guarantees for universal peace, in one word, the return of the golden age. The Congress has resulted in nothing but restorations, which had already been effected by arms, agreements between the Great Powers of little value for the future balance and preservation of the peace of Europe, quite arbitrary alterations in the possessions of the smaller states; but no act of a higher nature, no great measure for public order or for the general good, which might compensate humanity for its long sufferings or pacify it for the future." 44

⁴⁴ Prokesch-Osten, p. 540.

“But to be just,” he adds, “the treaty, such as it is, has the undeniable merit of having prepared the world for a more complete political structure. If ever the Powers should meet again to establish a political system by which wars of conquest would be rendered impossible, and the rights of all guaranteed, the Congress of Vienna, as a preparatory assembly, will not have been without use. A number of vexatious details have been settled, and the ground has been prepared for building up a better social structure.” In subsequent lectures we shall examine the attempts to complete the work left unfinished at Vienna and to build up this better social structure.

As for the guarantee of “rights,” it must be noted that there was no general guarantee even of such rights as had been established at Vienna. Early in February, indeed, Castlereagh, in answer to a proposal for renewing the Alliance of Chaumont, had suggested instead a common declaration stating the determination of the Powers to maintain the settlement effected; and this declaration was actually drawn up by Gentz. But it was never issued. The news of Napoleon’s return from Elba intervened, and on March 25, the four Powers signed at Vienna a treaty renewing that of Chaumont.

The Final Act of the Congress of Vienna was signed on June 9, 1815, nine days before the Battle of Waterloo. On June 2nd Lord Clancarty, who had succeeded Wellington as British plenipotentiary at Vienna, wrote to Castlereagh that, to avoid delay, due to multiplication of copies, the great treaty was to be ratified only by the eight Powers, possibly only by the five; and that treaties involving the rights of others, *e.g.* Sardinia and the Netherlands,

were to be signed separately and then incorporated.⁴⁵

The Treaty of Vienna thus formed, as it were, the nucleus of an international public code to which additions were to be made as occasion served. It established, in idea at least, a concert of the Great Powers and the right of others to be taken into counsel when their interests were involved—a right, it may be added, destined in practice to be but little recognized. But for the moment, whatever the wider concert may have been on paper, the effective concert was once more the Quadruple Alliance directed against France.

⁴⁵ F.O. : Congress, Vienna, Clancarty. May-July, 1815.

THE CONVERSION OF ALEXANDER

The Second Restoration—Divergent views as to the fate of France—Action of Wellington and Castlereagh—Popularity of Louis XVIII's restoration—But weakness of the King's position—Napoleon's troops hold out in the fortresses—Excesses of the Allies—Danger of a disruption of the Alliance—Question of Alexander's attitude—This determined by his "conversion"—The Baroness von Krüdener—The interview at Heilbronn—The Imperial prayer-meetings—Alexander arrives in Paris—The Alliance re-cemented.

THE declaration of the Allied Powers proclaiming Napoleon Bonaparte, as the enemy and disturber of the world's peace, outside the pale of the law was issued at Vienna on March 13th, and reached him on March 20th, the very day on which he took up his residence once more in the Tuileries. What would have happened had it been delayed a few days, and had Napoleon been able to publish the secret treaty of January 3rd, a copy of which he found in Paris, before the Allies had bound themselves to the principle of war *à outrance* against him? Gentz, in a confidential memorandum of April 24th, deplored the hasty resolution of the Powers, which was but the result of panic, and was founded on the belief in the stability of Louis XVIII's throne. The proclamation, he says, was the outcome of long and bitter debates in which

“the preponderating influence of the English ministers, the declarations of M. de Talleyrand, the fine phrases of the Emperor Alexander, and the ravings of Prussia carried all before them.” It would have been better to wait and see what success Napoleon had, and how far his promises of a new moderation would be kept—better certainly for Austria, for the new war could only end in increasing the already outrageously excessive preponderance of England, in raising the dominating influence of Russia, and favouring Prussia’s schemes of conquest. “But of course,” adds Gentz scornfully, “the sacred bonds of the Great Alliance must not be broken.”¹ From all this one can see how easily they might have been broken, had Napoleon succeeded in breaking the “thin red line” at Waterloo. As it was, Gentz proved a true prophet, for the war did increase the preponderance of England, and, after Waterloo, Wellington and Castlereagh were the arbiters of the destinies of France and of Europe.

Fortunately there was complete harmony between them. While repudiating any idea of forcing a government upon France,² both desired to see the legitimate monarchy restored, with as little damage to its prestige as possible; both desired to preserve the European Concert for the purpose of keeping it there. The first, as matters stood, presented little difficulty. Louis XVIII had taken refuge in the Low Countries, and, after Waterloo, he was therefore in a position, with the good will of Wellington, to re-establish himself, or rather to be

¹ Prokesch-Osten, *Oesterreichs Teilnahme*, etc., p. 597 seq.

² Castlereagh to Clancarty, April 8th. Congress, Vienna. Drafts to the Earl of Clancarty.

re-established, in Paris before the Russians and Austrians had time to arrive. Haste was essential, for the attitude of both the Emperors Alexander and Francis was doubtful. That of Alexander especially, whose contemptuous estimate of the Bourbons had been completely justified, to all appearance, by the ignominious collapse of the restored monarchy, inspired serious misgivings. To "group" him effectually once more it was necessary to confront him on his arrival in Paris with the *fait accompli* of the monarchy once more restored.

To secure this end Wellington and Castlereagh had been at pains to impress upon Louis XVIII counsels of moderation, and had persuaded him, greatly against his will, to come to terms with Fouché, the ex-Terrorist Minister of Police, who had known how to make himself indispensable to every Government in turn. In a letter from Paris, dated July 7th, Castlereagh reported the result to Lord Liverpool: "The decision of the Duke of Wellington's march and the commanding character of his victory have reduced the question to one of political management. After my arrival yesterday evening we had a conference at the Duke's with Talleyrand and Fouché, in which the latter undertook to arrange the retreat of the Provisional Government, and, he hoped, of the Assemblies. He appeared to me to conduct himself with fairness, and to be in earnest, which was probably not a little owing to the intimation that the King had taken him into his service."³

The success of the plot was favoured by the temper displayed by the Parisians when, on the following day, Louis XVIII entered Paris. Though he did so, as

³ F.O.: Congress, Paris. Viscount Castlereagh, July 7-20, 1815.

the Liberal wits put it, "in the baggage-train of the Allies," his reception, Castlereagh reported, was no less cordial than that of the year before. This fact is vividly illustrated by a "private and confidential" dispatch written by Castlereagh on the same date. "The King," he writes, "sent for the Duke and me this evening to the Thuilleries. . . . We found him in a state of great emotion and exaltation at the reception he had met with from his subjects, which appears to have been even more animated than on his former entrance. Indeed, during the long audience to which we were admitted, it was almost impossible to converse, so loud were the shouts of the people in the Thuilleries Gardens, which were full, though it was dark. Previous to the King's dismissing us, he carried the Duke and me to an open window. Candles were brought, which enabled the people to see the King with the Duke by his side. They ran from all parts of the Gardens, and formed a solid mass of an immense extent, rending the air with acclamations." ⁴

But in spite of this striking evidence of the popularity of the Restoration, the whole situation was one of extreme uncertainty. Bonaparte was still at Rochefort; it was not until the 17th that he surrendered, and even his surrender did not stop the resistance of his troops. Day by day reports came in that the soldiers were "restraining the enthusiasm" of the people for the white flag; in some of the cities the garrisons kept the tricolour flying with the support of the citizens; while all over the country fortresses were holding out against the invader. It was not till September 20th, more than three months after Waterloo, that the last of these, Longwy, surrendered,

⁴ F.O.: Congress, Paris. Viscount Castlereagh, July 7-20, 1815.

its garrison of little more than 400 men marching out with the honours of war. In the siege 20,000 Prussians had taken part, of whom 6,000 had fallen.⁵

The fact that one of the first acts of Louis XVIII had been to disband the army doubtless accounted for much of the stubbornness of this resistance—Fouché, now Minister of Police, pointed out the folly of mixing 200,000 discontented fighting men with the population—but the bitterness of the resistance was most marked, and it was backed by a growing popular sympathy. This was increased by the excesses of the Allied troops, notably of the Prussians—excesses in which it is gratifying to know that the British took no part. If these outrages were not stopped, Castlereagh wrote home, they would end by uniting France and dividing the Alliance.

There was, indeed, a serious danger that the Alliance would resolve itself into its elements. In the letter of July 8th, quoted above, Castlereagh reported that attempts were being made to poison the mind of the Emperor Alexander against the measures taken by Wellington and himself; but fortunately the Russian Ambassador, Pozzo di Borgo, who had been present during all the interviews, was going to meet him, armed with the necessary papers, in order to give him the correct view. More immediately serious was the attitude of the Prussians, who were treating France as a conquered country and indulging in "measures of arbitrary and unconcerted severity,"⁶ natural enough, perhaps, considering

⁵ See the interesting *Bulletins de la Correspondance de l'Intérieur*, in F.O. : Congress, Paris. Castlereagh, July 7–20, and subsequent volumes. For Longwy, *Bulletin* of September 24th, in No. 28.

⁶ Blücher had laid on Paris a contribution of 100,000,000 livres and

the provocation they had received, but fatal to any idea of the development and maintenance of a *European* peace policy. As for Louis XVIII himself, his position, deprived as he was of any armed force save the National Guards, was one of absolute weakness, a weakness advertised to all the world by the fact that the traitors of the Hundred Days were still at large, and that no attempt was being made to arrest and punish them.

France at war with herself—white cockade against tricolour, Catholic against Protestant—overrun with foreign invaders bent on vengeance, and, as Talleyrand was to complain, making little distinction in their attacks between the white flag and the tricolour, and presided over by a King without power—such was the condition of things when, on the evening of July 10th, the Emperor Alexander, accompanied by Frederick William of Prussia, made his entry into Paris. On his attitude, hitherto ambiguous, everything depended. Would he, in his contempt and dislike for the Bourbons, now doubly discredited, join hands with the Jacobins to create a liberal France in intimate league with a Russia soon to be liberalized? Would he, remembering the secret treaty of January 3rd, revenge himself by listening to his Prussian allies, who were clamouring for the utter dismemberment of France? Or would he be faithful to his vision of a European Confederation, founded upon the principles of legitimate right and a just equilibrium, and assist Great Britain in establishing and maintaining the national monarchy of France in its traditional place in Europe? The

equipment for 100,000 men; and he was "at this moment mining the Pont d'Iena with a view to blowing it up."

answer, in the case of this incalculable autocrat, depended largely upon the mood of the moment; and Alexander's mood at this particular moment was determined by an event that had happened shortly before, namely, his conversion by the Baroness von Krüdener.

It is impossible here even to outline the singular life-story of this lady, which, apart from the powerful but temporary influence which she exercised over the Emperor Alexander, is mainly of interest as illustrating the religious sickliness of the age. Suffice it to say that she was the daughter of a wealthy Livonian noble and widow of a Russian ambassador, and that, after a youth spent in frivolity, she had in 1806 "found salvation" through the agency of a pious cobbler of Riga. A prophetic peasant whom she met when on a visit to Queen Louise of Prussia in 1807 had converted her to chiliastic views, and after sitting at the feet of Jung-Stilling and other leaders of mystical religion, she had herself started on the career of a prophetess, travelling hither and thither proclaiming to all and sundry the imminent approach of the "latter days." Her wealth, her rank, and her astonishing flow of emotional language secured her a large following; but her colossal vanity was not to be satisfied with small spiritual game, and she had long been ambitious of crowning her triumphs by the conversion of the Emperor Alexander. On the eve of the Congress of Vienna her chance seemed to have come. In September 1814 the Empress Elizabeth was at Karlsruhe, and she and the pietistic ladies of the Court were anxious to bring the Emperor into touch

with the Baroness von Krüdener, whose ardent disciples they were. To Roxandra Stourdza, who had accompanied her brother to the Congress of Vienna, the Baroness herself wrote urgent letters, full of prophetic fervour, begging her to procure an interview. "The storm is advancing," she wrote. "These lilies which the Eternal had preserved, this emblem of a pure and fragile flower which broke a sceptre of iron, because such was the will of the Eternal, these lilies which should have summoned to purity, to the love of God, to repentance, have appeared but to disappear; the lesson is given, and men, more hardened than ever, dream only of tumult."⁷ As for the Emperor, "I have long known," she said, "that the Lord will give me the joy of seeing him. . . . I have immense things to say to him . . . the Lord alone can prepare his heart to receive them."

These letters, which were intended for Alexander's eye and were undoubtedly shown to him, produced no immediate result, for the atmosphere of the Vienna Congress was unfavourable to religious emotion. But with the news of the return of Napoleon this atmosphere changed.⁸ Roxandra Stourdza remembered the prophecy about the lilies disappearing and persuaded herself that her inspired friend had foretold the fall of the Bourbons. In answer to her questions the Baroness said that she had written these words about the lilies "by an inspiration" which transported her, adding that she knew all that was passing in the soul of the Emperor, and repeating

⁷ To Roxandra Stourdza, October 27, 1814. In Muhlenbeck, *Les Origines de la Sainte-Alliance*, p. 209.

⁸ See, e.g., Metternich's account of Alexander's reconciliation with him (*Mem.*).

that she had great things to announce to him.⁹ Alexander, who had taken no notice of the prophecy until its apparent fulfilment, was troubled, and his curiosity piqued. Thus, when chance threw in the Baroness's way the opportunity of realizing her ambition, the ground was already prepared.

In the spring of 1815 the Baroness was established at Schlüchtern, a village belonging to Baden but *enclavé* in Württemberg,¹⁰ where she was busy persuading the unhappy peasants to sell all and flee from the wrath to come. Near by, at Heilbronn, the Emperor Alexander fixed his headquarters on the night of June 4th. So clear a hint on the part of Providence was not to be neglected, and that very night the Baroness sought an interview. To the Tsar, who had been reading the Bible in solitude, her sudden arrival came as an answer to his prayers. She was at once admitted, and for three hours preached her strange gospel, while the Autocrat of all the Russias sat sobbing, with his face buried in his hands. At last, alarmed at the effects of her words, she ceased, and prayed the Emperor to pardon her temerity. "Do not be afraid," replied Alexander; "all your discourse has justified itself to my heart; you have helped me to discover in myself things which I had never yet perceived. I thank God for it. But I shall often have need of similar conversations, and I beg you not to leave my neighbourhood."¹¹

⁹ April 10, 1815. Muhlenbeck, p. 214.

¹⁰ She had been expelled from Württemberg itself. In 1809 it had been inexpedient to allow Napoleon to be publicly described as "the Beast," and there were other more permanent reasons making her presence undesirable.

¹¹ H. L. Empeytaz, *Notice sur Alexandre, Empereur de Russie* (2nd ed., Paris, 1840). The Baroness von Krüdener's letters to Alexander

Next day, at the Emperor's invitation, the Baroness, with her disciple the Swiss evangelist Empeytaz, joined the Russian headquarters, which she accompanied to Heidelberg, and later to Paris. Here she was lodged in the Hôtel Montchenu, next door to the Elysée Palace, where Alexander was established ; a private door connected the two houses, and every evening during his residence in Paris the autocrat went to take part in the prayer-meetings conducted by the Baroness and Empeytaz.¹² Madame de Krüdener had, for the time at least, become a power to be reckoned with, and admission to her spiritual *séances* was sought by a crowd of people celebrated in the intellectual and social world. Of the effect of these mystical influences on the development of Alexander's idea of the Holy Alliance I shall speak later on ; meanwhile, the Tsar's religious exaltation reacted upon his whole policy at the time, and played a very important part in determining his attitude during the negotiations that led up to the signing of the second Treaty of Paris.

and Prince Golitsin are published in the Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich's *L'Empereur Alexandre I^{er}*, vol. ii. p. 215, *seq.* That of June 23, 1815 (p. 221), is a farrago of mystical and emotional nonsense covering several pages of close print. It ends with a long address to the Almighty, of which the following is an instructive sample : "Je ne Vous demande plus : Pourquoi m'avez-Vous attaché à cet Empereur ? . . . Vous le destinez à de si grands choses et daignez me choisir pour Vous obéir dans cette éducation. Montrez-lui donc combien je Vous dois." For Alexander's relations with Madame de Krüdener, see also the *Mémoires* of Baroness Edling (Roxandra Stourdza).

¹² "Since he has come to Paris he has passed a part of every evening with Madame de Krudener, an old fanatic" (Castlereagh to Liverpool, September, 1815. *Wellington Dispatches*, Suppl., vol. xi. p. 175).

decided, therefore, to submit a special memorandum to the King of Prussia, pointing out to him the absolute need for common control of all actions, whether civil or military. "For the moment," ran the protocol, "the four cabinets regard themselves as a single authority. In consequence, the French Government shall be invited to address all further communications to them in common." The ministers of the four Powers were to meet in conference at the house of the British ambassador every day regularly at 11 o'clock.¹³ Thus was constituted that Committee of Ministers which represented, as it were, the European Executive, and continued to exercise a controlling influence, more or less effective, in the affairs of France until the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle.

It is not my purpose to follow the long course of the negotiations that led up to the signature of the second Treaty of Paris on November 20th, our concern being more immediately with the other treaty, signed on the same day, by which the European Alliance was renewed with certain important modifications. It is, however, important to realize what were the problems involved in this second settling of accounts with France, and the influences within the Alliance that led to their solution. The principle of concerted action had been admitted in the conference of July 12th, but as to the policy to be pursued towards France there was no concert, and for the moment it almost seemed—to judge from the complaints of Talleyrand—that the sole outcome of the establishment of the principle

¹³ F.O.: Congress, Paris, Castlereagh. July 7-15, 1815. Protocol of the conference enclosed in Castlereagh to Liverpool of July 14th.

was to throw upon the Allies as a whole the odium of the hideous outrages which continued to be perpetrated by the Prussians.¹⁴ In a letter of July 24th, Castlereagh makes a report on the views of the various Governments as regards France. In favour of dismemberment were certain Powers which desired to rectify their frontiers and increase their territory: the King of the Netherlands, the Bavarians, the Würtembergers, and, most insistent of all, the Prussians. Russia was inclined to protect France, being remote from danger. "But," adds Castlereagh, "the Emperor's principles naturally led him to this line. He may also incline to keep up a connexion with France, and not to see her reduced too low. In conversation with His Majesty I could see that his mind was averse to any permanent abduction of the territory of France and that, as a measure of security, he looked with more favour to dismantling than to temporarily occupying certain of her fortresses. Austria, on the other hand, is nearer our mode of viewing this question, but in acting upon this principle the Austrian minister will be afraid to give Russia too much the lead in point of conciliation towards this Government, so as to produce between France and Russia too close a connexion."

"Our mode of viewing this question" was that of the traditional British policy, viz., to safeguard the Netherlands by an adequate barrier of fortresses. For the rest, though public opinion at home, and

¹⁴ These apparently included outrages on women at Fontainebleau. See *Actes divers d'Administration par les Agens des Puissances Alliés*. Enclosed in Talleyrand of July 20th, in Castlereagh to Liverpool, July 24th.

even Liverpool and certain members of his cabinet, urged a policy of dismemberment, both Castlereagh and Wellington realized the folly of driving France to desperation or of forcing her to make sacrifices which would have rendered a renewal of the war inevitable so soon as she had regained her strength. Their policy, which in fact prevailed, was, while securing the barrier, to consolidate the power of France internally ; and this, they considered, would be effected if they ensured to the restored monarchy, under the ægis of Europe, an opportunity of persuading the nation that in the monarchy lay the best and only guarantee of its own continued existence. Talleyrand, while protesting against any cessions at all, urged the expediency of reconciling the nation to the kingship. "All the passions, issuing in certain quarters in civil war," he said, "have been intensified during the Hundred Days. But the King, no longer an isolated stranger in France, has become the rallying centre for all who want order and peace. All will depend upon the moderation of the Allies. If France is treated with consideration, and the people believe that it is to the King that they owe it, all will be well."¹⁵

The exalted mood of the Emperor Alexander inclined him to generosity, while at the same time his anxiety to preserve the European concert led him to go a considerable way towards meeting the views of his allies in the matter of material guarantees. On July 29th, Castlereagh reported, as a result of an interview with the Tsar, that in his opinion it

¹⁵ *Mémoire du Cabinet Français sur les Institutions politiques de la France*. Addressed by Prince Talleyrand to the allied ministers. In Castlereagh to Liverpool, July 24th.

Chaumont against any menace from France to the peace of Europe ; (2) the occupation, with the consent of the French Government, of a part of France, so long as this should be judged necessary ; (3) the strengthening of the border states. For these purposes a considerable contribution should be levied, the Allied troops remaining in occupation until it was paid, the occupation then to be terminated by a formal treaty.

This Russian memorandum, which proposed to leave to France the frontiers of 1792, was certainly calculated "to curb the ambitions of the *limitrophe* Powers," and was especially disconcerting to Prussia. The Prussian army was reported to be in a state of revolutionary exaltation: Hardenberg told Lord Clancarty that he felt himself to be in the midst of prætorian bands. Nothing but absolute necessity, therefore, could persuade the Prussian statesmen to abandon their policy of revenge and dismemberment. In a counter-memorandum Baron Humboldt sought to justify this attitude on the ground that the declaration of March 25th had been issued in the belief—rapidly disproved by events—that Napoleon was not supported by the French people, and that an enforced cession of territory would be less irritating to France than a prolonged occupation. Metternich, not daring to run wholly counter to German sentiment, prepared a memorandum on the Russian note in which, while it embodied the principle of the substantial integrity of France, recommended the cession of the first line of offensive fortresses to form a barrier on the side of Belgium. This was also the view of Lord Liverpool and of the Government at home generally, who were inclined to go even farther in the direction of

enforcing the Prussian demands. It was not at first the view either of Castlereagh or of Wellington, who realized that a generous policy was the only sound one. Wellington's opinion is given in a letter to Castlereagh, dated Paris, August 11th. The Revolution and Restoration, he said, had left France too strong in relation to the other Powers; but, in spite of Baron Humboldt, the Powers were bound by the engagements of March 25th and subsequently "not to make any material inroad on the Treaty of Paris." "It is ridiculous to suppose that we could have overrun France after one battle if the people had been against us." As for "a great cession," if the King were to refuse—as he possibly would—he would rally the whole nation round him, and the Allies would have to remain to defend their conquest; if he accepted, he would lose his throne. In 1814 the unpopularity of the restored Monarchy in the Army was ascribed to its disinclination to go to war in order to recover the Rhine frontier. This being so, no French statesman could advise his sovereign to disarm. "Our great object is the peace of the world, and this Revolutionary France is more likely to disturb than France under a regular Government, however long her frontiers." ¹⁶

This was substantially the view expressed in the Russian memorandum. The main difference between the views of the Emperor Alexander and the British negotiators was as to the quality and quantity of the "material" guarantees of good behaviour to be exacted from France. Though Castlereagh regarded any cession of fortresses with some misgiving, as likely to rouse up national sentiment in France,

¹⁶ F.O.: Continent, Congress, France. Viscount Castlereagh.

he recognized that the temper of the Germans made some concessions inevitable, more especially as Metternich, for the reasons already stated, was proposing this course. It became necessary, then, to win over Alexander to the principle of modifying the terms of the first Treaty of Paris, if this should seem necessary in order to preserve the concert and secure Europe from all danger of a renewed French attack. On August 17th he was able to announce to Lord Liverpool that he had succeeded. The whole letter throws so much light on the problems to be solved that it is worth quoting. "The Emperor of Russia," he writes, "is in favour of restraining France within the frontiers of 1790, and has not shown himself disinclined to adopt such measures of salutary precaution as I suggested to him. . . . I not only deprived him of that character of being the *exclusive* protector of the King, a relation in which, for the general politics of Europe, it is of great importance that he should not be permitted to place himself, but I have gradually brought him publicly to adopt all the principles of the other Allied Powers as his own, and to push them as far as it is at all clear they can be pushed without a dangerous reaction."

Alexander, that is to say, had once more been successfully "grouped." The problem, however, though simplified by this fact, was still sufficiently difficult. Peace was the supreme object of Castlereagh's diplomacy, and to secure this he rightly maintained that it was essential not to force upon France terms calculated to leave a permanent sense of resentment, while at the same time, in order to maintain the "European police" effective for the purposes of international peace, it might be necessary to throw a sop to the

Germans, who were by no means so eager for a rapid settlement as Great Britain. "I agree with you," Castlereagh continued, "that our interests are with Austria and Prussia rather than with Russia. But we must be careful not to commit ourselves to a course of policy in common with them in which Great Britain has no interest. I much suspect that neither Austria, Prussia, nor the smaller Powers are anxious to end the present situation. Their armies are paid, clothed, and supported by France, and the British subsidies are free to go into their own pockets, which nothing can deprive them of previous to April 1, 1816, except the actual conclusion of a treaty with France. The Austrians have marched Bianchi's corps into Provence, in order to feed upon that poor but loyal province. The Prussians have 280,000 men in France, for whom they draw rations. The Bavarians have brought troops from Munich to the Loire in wagons at a moment when their service in the field was out of the question, the transport of these troops being, of course, at the expense of the country." After commenting on the immense burden imposed upon France by the Allied occupation and by the indemnity, he says that in the view of Great Britain the indemnity should be spent on fortresses, but that this opinion is not shared by Austria and Prussia, and that "we shall have to contend upon grounds of remote precaution against the immediate pressure of avarice and poverty." "To my surprise," he adds, "Russia, but remotely interested, has agreed to set aside one-third for fortresses."

As for Austria and Prussia, their politics were at the moment strongly affected by the public sentiment of Germany, which clamoured for dismemberment, since

neither was willing to yield to the other the influence in Germany which belongs to what is most popular. But even were France dismembered, none of the Powers which would benefit would be in a position to maintain their military establishments, and upon Great Britain would fall the burden of the fresh war which would be sure to result. Therefore the idea of the Duke of Wellington was best, namely, not to annex, but to occupy, certain fortresses for a time, a course which the French Government itself desired and which would leave no unhealable wound.

“If we push things to extremities, we leave the King no choice but to disavow us, and when once committed against us in sentiment, he will soon be either obliged to lead the nation into war himself, or possibly be set aside to make way for some more bold and enterprising competitor. The whole of this view of the question turns upon a conviction that the King’s cause in France is far from hopeless if well conducted, and that the European Alliance can be made powerfully instrumental to his support if our securities are framed in such a manner as not to be ultimately hostile to France after she shall have given protracted proofs of having ceased to be a revolutionary state.”

If Lord Liverpool thought it necessary, Castle-reagh proceeds, to demand securities against which every Frenchman must protest, then his advice towards Great Britain and the Allies would be “to have no reserve towards France.” In such a case the Prussian proposals did not go far enough, since they would leave France nearly intact, while depriving her of precisely those objects which would

revive in every Frenchman, whatever his principles, a desire for war at the first favourable moment. No doubt the acquisition of one or two famous fortresses would be most popular in England, "but it is not our business to collect trophies, but to try and bring back the world to peaceful habits. I do not believe this to be compatible with any attempt now materially and permanently to affect the territorial character of France as settled by the Peace of Paris, neither do I think it a clear case (if we can, by imposing a strait-waistcoat upon that Power for a number of years, restore her ordinary habits), and weighing the astonishing growth of other states in latter times, and especially of Russia, that France, even with her existing dimensions, may not be found a useful, rather than a dangerous, member of the European system." ¹⁷

The British proposal, then, was for (1) a large war indemnity, to be spent on fortresses along the French frontier; (2) a temporary occupation of certain French fortresses; (3) an army of occupation of 100,000 men. A Prussian counter-memorandum of August 28th put forward the view of the *limitrophe* Powers. The army of occupation was to number not 100,000 but 240,000 (60,000 of each of the four Powers). France was to cede the fortresses of Condé, Valenciennes, Maubeuge, Philippeville, Charlemont, and Givet to the Netherlands; Saarlouis and Thionville to Prussia, which was also to receive Luxemburg; Bitsch, Landau, Fort Vauban and Huningue (Hünningen) to South Germany; Forts Joux and L'Écluse to Switzerland

¹⁷ To Liverpool, Paris, August 17, 1815. F.O.: Congress, Paris, Castlereagh.

and Savoy. The fortifications of Quesnay, Mézières, Sedan, Montmédy, and Longwy (which had not yet fallen) were to be razed. Strassburg might be erected into a Free City of the Empire.

"It is curious to observe," wrote Castlereagh to Clancarty on September 4th, "the insatiable spirit of getting something without a thought of how it is to be preserved. There is not a Power, however feeble, that borders France from the Channel to the Mediterranean that is not pushing some acquisition under the plea of security and rectification of frontier. They seem to have no dread of a kick from the Lion when his toils are removed, and are foolish enough to suppose that the Great Powers of Europe are to be in readiness to protect them in the enjoyment of these petty spoils. In truth, their whole conception is so unstatesmanlike that they look not beyond their sop; compared with this, the keeping together an European force has little importance in their eyes."¹⁸

In dealing with "this petty spirit of German intrigue" Castlereagh had now the invaluable aid of Alexander, who, under the influence of the religious atmosphere of the Hôtel Montchenu, was aglow with love for humanity in general and France in particular. There can be no doubt that the high tone taken by Louis XVIII and his ministers was inspired by confidence in the Tsar's support. In answer to the proposals of the Allies, the French Government protested against Louis XVIII being made responsible for the crimes of a usurper, and while admitting the principle of the cession of recent acquisitions, refused to agree to any curtail-

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 51.

ment of the ancient frontiers of France.¹⁹ This was followed on the 23rd by autograph letters—said to have been drafted by Stourdza, the Tsar's Roumanian secretary—addressed by Louis XVIII to the Emperors Alexander and Francis, in which he declared his intention of resigning his crown rather than yield a foot of the soil inherited from his ancestors.²⁰ The situation had meanwhile been modified by a crisis in the French cabinet; for on the day following the writing of the King's letter it was announced that Talleyrand and Fouché had resigned and that their resignations had been accepted. In his letter of the 25th announcing this fact, Castlereagh complained of the duplicity of French ministers in advising the answer to the propositions of the Allies when they were actually out of office, and of the weakness of the King, who had not only yielded to the pressure of the Court party in making the position of Talleyrand and Fouché impossible, but had allowed them to retire covered with the glory of having taken "high ground, which their successors must occupy without credit or retire from with disadvantage."

The proposals of the Allies referred to were of the nature of a compromise between the views of Castlereagh and those of Prussia. On September 14th the Allies had come to an agreement on the question of indemnities, except Prussia, which held out for an indemnity of 1,200,000,000 francs instead of 600,000,000. On the 21st Castlereagh wrote to Liverpool that, desiring to arrange the terms

¹⁹ In F.O. : Congress, Paris, Castlereagh. September 21/October 4th, No. 28.

²⁰ Paris, September 11/23, 1815. *Ibid.*

of peace before the meeting of the Chambers on the following Monday, he had agreed to the principle of Prussia receiving Luxemburg and Saarlouis, with the subsidiary compensations to others, on condition of Prussia's accepting the indemnity of 600,000,000 francs. This was the basis of the proposals which the French cabinet had rejected. The new minister, the Duc de Richelieu, was, as Castlereagh expected, as loth as Talleyrand had been to accept them. The King would consent to cede the *enclavés* fortresses of Landau, Philippeville, and Marienbourg ; not even an offer to reduce the indemnity could induce him to yield on the point of Saarlouis, or of the cession of Condé and Givet as compensation to the Netherlands for Luxemburg. To have persisted, Castlereagh wrote on October 1st, "might have driven the King and his minister to some ostensible act of despair, and might have created disunion among the Allies."²¹ It was then agreed to accept the French offer, Prussia being compensated by the right to garrison Luxemburg, of which the sovereignty was left to the King of the Netherlands. Accordingly, at a conference of ministers on October 2nd, the basis was agreed upon of the terms embodied in the second Treaty of Paris, signed on November 20th, namely, the limits of France in 1790, subject to certain modifications and rectifications necessitated by mutual convenience and interests, such as the abolition of *enclavés*.

Under the terms of the treaty France was to remain under the tutelage of the Alliance. Pending the paying off of the indemnity her territory was to be occupied by an Allied army under the Duke of

²¹ Castlereagh to Liverpool. *Ibid.*, Nos. 68, 69.

Wellington, and, though this was not mentioned in the treaty, the Council of Ministers of the Powers continued its sessions in Paris, keeping in close touch with Wellington on the one hand and the French cabinet on the other. Not till, after a period of this strait-waistcoat, she had given proof of having been cured of her revolutionary madness, would France be restored into the bosom of the family of nations.

III

THE HOLY ALLIANCE

Question of the future of the Alliance—Proclamation of the Holy Alliance—A revival of the idea of a universal union—Comparison with the "instructions" of 1804—Renewal of the Treaty of Chaumont agreed upon—Differences as to necessary modifications—The Russian project—Castlereagh's counter-project—The Treaty of Alliance of November 20, 1815—Analysis of this—Article VI the basis of the future Concert of Europe.

THE bases of the treaty settled, the Allies had time to consider what form the future relations of the European family should take, and the discussions revealed interesting differences of opinion. The first symptom of these differences was a project of which the intention was certainly not to introduce discord into the Concert. It was on September 26th that the Emperor Alexander, at a great review of the Allied troops held on the plain of Vertus near Châlons, proclaimed in his own name and that of his brother sovereigns of Prussia and Austria the conclusion of the Holy Alliance,²² which all the Christian sovereigns of Europe were to be invited to join. The solemn instrument in which this idea was embodied, which Alexander presented for signature to his astonished Allies, had been drawn up under the evangelical influences of the Imperial prayer-meetings; but though the Baroness von Krüdener

²² Signed on September 14th.

claimed the merit of being its inspirer, if not its author, it was but an effort to embody an idea which had been for years in Alexander's mind, and, as he himself declared later,²³ would have been put forward by him at the close of the Congress of Vienna, but for the return of Napoleon from Elba : the idea, that is to say, of that great republic of Christian States which he had foreshadowed in his instructions to Novosiltsov in 1804.

There was nothing in the conception to deserve the sinister connotation which the name of the Holy Alliance from the first carried with it in the public mind. In general, it merely stated the intention of the signatory sovereigns to govern henceforth in accordance with the principles of the Gospel of Christ ; to regard each other as brothers and their subjects as their children. It was most certainly not consciously a conspiracy against popular liberty. Part of the scheme outlined in the instructions to Novosiltsov had been to attach the nations to their Governments by setting up Constitutions based on "the rights of humanity" ; the Constitutions granted to France and about to be granted to Poland proved that the Tsar was not yet converted from his Jacobinism ; and Alexander was for years to come to disconcert his autocratic allies by insisting that the granting of Liberal Constitutions was the logical outcome of the sacred principles to which they had subscribed.²⁴

²³ Alexander to Golitsin, Laibach, 8-15 February, 1821. In the Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich's *L'Empereur Alexandre I^{er}*, i. p. 221.

²⁴ In a letter to Castlereagh of March 21, 1816, given by Martens in his *Recueil des traités conclus par la Russie*, Alexander uses the following remarkable language : "There are countries where the attempt is now being obstinately made to revive institutions which have perished of old age. The new spirit of the peoples is too little consulted," etc.

Nor was there anything in the view, which gained a wide currency, that the exclusion of Turkey from the Holy Alliance meant that Alexander was meditating a concerted attack on the Ottoman Empire. It was the prevalence of this opinion, especially in England, that led Alexander, in March 1816, to publish the text of the Holy Alliance. On this occasion, in a letter to Count Lieven, his ambassador at the Court of St. James's, he explained its meaning: "The sole and exclusive object of the Alliance," he wrote, "can only be the maintenance of peace and the union of all the moral interests of the peoples which Divine Providence has been pleased to unite under the banner of the cross. An act of this character could not contain any design hostile to the peoples who have not the happiness to be Christians. Its only aim is to favour the internal prosperity of each state and the general welfare of all, which ought to be the outcome of the friendship between their sovereigns, made all the more indissoluble by the fact that it is independent of accidental causes." To make this quite clear, the Emperor added that he had instructed his envoy to address to the Sublime Porte a declaration in the same sense and calculated to dissipate all misgivings.²⁵

In its origin and idea, then, the Holy Alliance was not a conspiracy of tyrants; it was not a Christian league against Turkey; nor was it altogether the "piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense" that Castlereagh judged it to be. Its political significance did not lie on the surface, but it was none

²⁵ Shilder, *Imp. Aleksander*, iii. p. 552. The Emperor Alexander to Count Lieven, St. Petersburg, March 18, 1816. Also in the Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich's *L'Empereur Alexandre I^{er}*, i. p. 171.

the less there. It was that, in contradistinction to the treaties on which the Grand Alliance was based, it had been signed by all the sovereigns of Europe except the Prince Regent of Great Britain, the Pope, and the Sultan. It represented, that is to say, a revival by the Emperor Alexander of that idea of a "Universal Union" or "Confederation of Europe" which he had propounded to Pitt in 1804. It is clear, as we shall see when we come to deal with the debates at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, that this is what Alexander had in his mind, and also that he believed that, in securing their signatures to the act of the Holy Alliance, he had committed the sovereigns to the principle of an all-embracing international system.

It will be remembered that in 1804 the Tsar had written in the instructions to Novosiltsov: "It is no question of realizing the dream of perpetual peace, but one could attain at least to some of its results if, at the conclusion of the general war, one could establish on clear, precise principles the prescriptions of the rights of nations. . . . On principles such as these one could proceed to a general pacification, and give birth to a league of which the stipulations would form, so to speak, a new code of the law of nations which, sanctioned by the greater part of the nations of Europe, would without difficulty become the immutable rule of the cabinets, while those who should try to infringe it would risk bringing upon themselves the forces of the new union." Clearly, if the "universal union" thus conceived and symbolized by the Holy Alliance were to be made effective, it would need what the Napoleonic idea had provided: a central legislative authority, a central executive, and

a common armament to enforce its decrees. But even in matters of purely external policy this would be to endanger the sovereign independence of the nations; and if, as was inevitable, it should become difficult to draw a sharp dividing line between external affairs and internal affairs having an external effect, what would become of national liberties? Great Britain at least, who had strained her resources to the uttermost in the successful effort to save the principle of national independence by destroying the Napoleonic system, was not likely to consent to see it replaced by one equally obnoxious and probably far less effective. Pitt, as we have seen, had been willing to assist in establishing at the restoration of peace a convention and guarantee for the mutual protection and security of the different Powers, and a general system of public law in Europe; and Castlereagh had proposed such a system of mutual guarantee at Vienna. But both Pitt and Castlereagh had in their minds a very definite idea of the object and scope of the concert, which was to be directed solely to guaranteeing rights defined by treaty. But as for a union with vague and indefinite ends, Castlereagh from the first realized the danger involved in any interference of such a body, in the supposed general interests of Europe, with the liberties of the nations. He was a firm supporter of the Grand Alliance, with its clearly defined aims; from first to last he set his face against the vague and dangerous underlying principles of the Holy Alliance.

The difference of opinion was revealed in the discussions at Paris as to the future constitution of the Alliance. It was unanimously agreed to renew, simultaneously with the signature of the Treaty of

Peace, the Treaty of Alliance concluded at Chaumont and renewed at Vienna, with such modifications as had become necessary owing to the restoration of the legitimate dynasty in France. It was as to the character of these modifications that differences arose. The original draft of the treaty, drawn up by the Emperor Alexander, asserted in every line the right of united Europe to watch over the internal affairs of the country, provision being made for armed intervention in case of "revolutionary madness," etc. The fourth article provided that the Powers would renew among themselves, after the expiration of the temporary occupation of France, the treaties of reciprocal guarantee of their respective possessions as well as for the general peace and repose. The sixth article, which appeared in a significantly modified form in the actual treaty, ran as follows :

"In order to facilitate the execution of the present treaty, and in order to give the necessary effect to the system of reciprocal guarantees, the High Contracting Powers have agreed to renew at fixed periods, either under their own immediate auspices or by their respective ministers, conferences of which the results shall afford constant proofs of the permanence and intimacy of their union."²⁶

This draft was subjected by Castlereagh to a searching criticism. It was, he said, not sufficiently definite in the scope and nature of its stipulations. It bore upon the face of it too strong and undisguised a complexion of interference on the part of the Allied sovereigns in the internal affairs of France, without sufficiently connecting such interference with the policy which a due attention to the immediate security of

²⁶ F O. : Congress, Paris, Castlereagh. *Projet de Traité*. Enclosed in Castlereagh to Liverpool, Paris, October 15, 1815, No. 80.

their own dominions prescribed ; and it appeared to make the Allies too much the umpire in all the constitutional struggles of France. Finally, it presented but an indistinct view of the extent of the means with which the Allies were prepared to support their engagements, as well as of the particular objects to which those means were to be directed.²⁷

In his counter-project Castlereagh, to use his own language, "endeavoured to keep the internal affairs of France in the background, and to make the colour of the contingent interference as European as possible" ; to make it clear, that is to say, that the Allies would only intervene in the event of revolutionary troubles breaking out which should be an active menace to the general peace. This was made clear in the preamble, which no longer stated that the object of the Powers was "to establish royalty in France," but that the Powers,

"in order that the general peace, the object of the prayers of humanity, and the constant goal of their efforts, should not be troubled anew, desire to draw closer the ties that unite them for the common interests of their peoples, have resolved to give to the principles consecrated by the Treaties of Chaumont and Vienna the application best adapted to the actual conditions of public affairs, and to fix in advance by a solemn treaty the line of conduct which they propose to follow in order to guarantee Europe against the dangers that might yet threaten her."

By Article I the Powers bind themselves to carry out the second Treaty of Paris, and see it carried out. By Article II they renew the engagements entered into at Chaumont, and in the event of revolutionary troubles are to concert among themselves and with Louis XVIII and his successors the measures they

²⁷ To Liverpool, Paris, October 15, 1815. *Loc. cit.*, No. 80.

shall think necessary for the safety of their states and the general peace of Europe. The third and fourth articles define the contingents to be provided by each Power in the event of armed intervention. Article V provides that the "defensive engagements" of Chaumont shall remain in force after the temporary occupation of France. Article VI, based on the sixth article of the Russian draft above quoted, but with significant alterations, runs as follows:

"In order to consolidate the intimate tie which unites the four sovereigns for the happiness of the world, the High Contracting Powers have agreed to renew at fixed intervals, either under their own auspices or by their representative ministers, meetings consecrated to great common objects and the examination of such measures as at each one of these epochs shall be judged most salutary for the peace and prosperity of the nations and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe."

This counter-project of Castlereagh's, with certain modifications, was embodied in the Treaty of Alliance signed on November 20, 1815, which was to form during the following years the basis of the European Concert. This represented a triumph of British *Realpolitik* over Alexander's dangerous idealism. None the less, the sixth article was so far a compromise with the Emperor's ideas that it was capable of being strained in their support. It is true that, when we compare it with the equivalent article in the Russian project, we find that the mutual guarantee of possessions has disappeared; and though periodic meetings of the Allies consecrated to great common objects are provided for, the language of the rest of the sentence, when compared with that of the sixth article of the Russian draft, suggests that these

V

THE CULMINATION OF THE CONFEDERATION

The last attempt to provide the transparent
soul of the Holy Alliance with a body.—
GENTZ.



THE CONFERENCE OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE

The reaction in Europe—Conditions in France—Wellington advises evacuation—Rumours of a Franco-Russian Alliance—The Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle—Evacuation of France concerted—The future of the Alliance—Question of the admission of France—This opens the question of the future form of the European Concert—Attitude of Alexander—He revives the idea of a Universal Union—Russian Memorandum of October 8—Attitude of Metternich; of Prussia—The British Counter-memorandum—British view of the treaties—The principle of non-intervention—Outcome of the negotiations—Fresh proposals for a treaty of guarantee defeated by Great Britain—Variety of subjects debated—Public and private petitions—The Conference illustrates the difficulty of an international system.

NEARLY three years passed between the signature of the Treaty of Alliance of November 20, 1815, and the meeting of the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, the first occasion on which the sixth article was put into operation. The history of these three years I must pass over very lightly. In general it may be said that this was a period of great anxiety for those responsible for the peace of Europe, who watched with misgiving the practical working out of the principles they had set up. It must be remembered that the views of the sovereigns and statesmen of the Alliance, even those of Metternich, were conservative, not reactionary. The diplomatic correspondence of

the time reveals with what genuine disgust they watched the proceedings of some of the rulers they had helped to restore. They had no sympathy with Pius VII, one of whose first acts on re-entering Rome was to reconstitute the Society of Jesus; or with the unspeakable Ferdinand VII of Spain, who, to the wrath and alarm of his Bourbon brother of France, had set up the Inquisition once more and was busy conducting a war of extermination against all that savoured of Liberalism; or with Victor Emmanuel I of Sardinia, obstinately bent on restoring everything in Piedmont to the exact form it had possessed before the Revolution; or with such petty malignants as the Elector of Hesse, who returned to rule his subjects by divine right in the spirit of a usurer put in possession. All this, as the Powers were well aware, could not in the long run fail to breed revolution. And even had all the restored sovereigns been as wise as Nestor, there were, owing to the very imperfect and tentative nature of the arrangements made at Paris and Vienna, a mass of problems awaiting solution, of which some at least were pregnant with future trouble. In Germany, for instance, the ambiguities and incompleteness of the Act of Confederation gave infinite scope for intrigue and the development of particularist ambitions. Article XIII, which decreed that there were to be assemblies of Estates in all the constituent states of the *Bund*, was interpreted by each sovereign in accordance with his prejudices or his policy. Some, like Austria—which carried Prussia in its wake—insisted on its literal interpretation, in the sense of the traditional provincial assemblies of the Estates of nobles, burgesses, and peasants. Others, like the “Middle States,”

against the continued occupation of French soil. The elections, he argued, sufficiently proved that France desired the monarchy ; but the monarchy would never be really strong so long as it seemed to rest upon foreign bayonets. As for the payment of the indemnity, which was the excuse for maintaining the Allied army of occupation, France would not become a fraudulent bankrupt merely because this was withdrawn.²

These arguments carried weight. But the clinching argument which determined the Allies in favour of evacuation was the opinion of the Duke of Wellington that to continue the occupation would defeat the very ends at which it aimed. He had been strongly opposed to any gradual diminution of the Allied forces in proportion to the payments of instalments of the indemnity. But in 1818 he reported that such was the bitterness of public feeling that, in the event of the occupation being continued another two years, with the enormous additional burden this would impose on France, he would be compelled to draw in the scattered line of his troops and concentrate them between the Scheldt and the Meuse.³ This had its weight with the British Government, which as late as April had insisted that a complete settlement of all matters was the only ground on which Richelieu could expect the withdrawal of the troops to be favourably entertained.⁴ Something, too, was perhaps

² Wellington to Castlereagh, Paris, July 21, 1817. "Upon this point he (Richelieu) went a good deal into the federal system which must grow out of the existing state of things, to which France must be a party, and which he said must always give the Allies the power to force France to be just in case she should be disposed to be unjust."

³ Draft Memorandum laid before the cabinet. F.O.: Congress, Continent, Aix-la-Chapelle, September-December 1818.

⁴ Castlereagh to Wellington, April 24, 1818. F.O.: Continent, Congress, Paris.

due to persistent rumours, emanating from St. Petersburg, that the Emperor Alexander, weary of the dilatory processes of the Alliance, was meditating a union of Russia and France.⁵ If this were so, it was obviously necessary, if Alexander was to be kept properly "grouped," to reconcile France to the Alliance. It was then decided, after negotiations into which we need not enter, to summon a conference of the Powers, under Article VI of the Treaty of November 20th, for the autumn of 1818. The meeting-place chosen was Aix-la-Chapelle, the old capital of the Holy Empire.

The Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, of which the first session was held on September 30th, was attended by the Emperor Alexander of Russia, the Emperor Francis of Austria, and King Frederick William of Prussia in person, while Great Britain was represented by Wellington and Castlereagh. The ministers of the other Powers were Capo d'Istria and Nesselrode for Russia, Metternich for Austria, Hardenberg and Bernstorff for Prussia. Richelieu, though not admitted to the conferences, was present on behalf of France. The first question discussed was that of the withdrawal of the Allied army of occupation, and on this there was complete unanimity. At the second session, on October 1st, the four Powers signed a protocol agreeing to the principle of the evacuation of France at the end of the third year, or earlier if possible, subject to satisfactory arrangements being made for the payment of the instalments of the indemnity still due, which amounted to 265,000,000 francs. In regard to this latter, Wellington had been empowered to make an arrangement

⁵ Wellington to Castlereagh, August 24, 1818. *Ibid.*

with the financial houses of Hope, of Amsterdam, and Baring, by which these agreed to take over the debt on certain terms, thus converting it into an ordinary public obligation, which, to use the language of a draft memorandum laid before the Cabinet, could not be repudiated by the French Government without an act of violent bankruptcy. The details of the negotiation outstanding on September 30th were soon settled, and on October 9th a treaty was signed by which the Allies agreed to withdraw their troops from French soil by November 30th. As for the debt, 165,000,000 francs were to be paid by the French Government in nine monthly payments in bills drawn on Messrs. Baring, Hope and others, and regularly accepted by them. With regard to the other 100,000,000 francs, the Allies agreed to receive these in the form of Government stock at the price of the day, the financial houses agreeing to take this stock at the same price as that at which the Allies received it from France and to pay the 100,000,000 francs in the same manner as the 165,000,000, receiving $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. for their trouble and risk in realizing.⁶ They bought the debt of 100,000,000 francs, that is to say, for 98,500,000.

In coming to this decision there was complete harmony among the Powers; there was, however, no such harmony on the question of what further consequences were to follow on it. The Duc de Richelieu argued that the same reasoning which had induced the Powers to put an end to the armed occupation should lead them, as a logical consequence, to admit France to the Alliance on equal terms. This was, however, far from representing the mind of the Allies, whose policy of evacuation had not been inspired by

⁶ Castlereagh to Bathurst. F.O. : Cont., Aix, Castl., 1-13, No. 9.

any confidence in the improved temper of the French people. The autocratic Powers especially were seriously alarmed by what they considered the weak attitude of the French Government towards the Liberal Revival, to which recent elections had borne disquieting evidence. Alexander I, whose Jacobinism, though by no means extinct, was already fading, declared roundly that nine-tenths of the French people were corrupted by bad principles and violent party sentiments, and that the rest were incapable of working a Constitution; and when Richelieu pressed him to agree to the inclusion of France in the Alliance, he asked him how he could propose such a thing after admitting that the internal state of France was precarious,⁷ and characterized the request in conversation with Metternich as a rank piece of stupidity.⁸

Metternich himself, as was his way, disguised a policy inspired by very practical alarms under a cloak of lofty sentiment. The Quadruple Alliance, he argued, had its origin in the Treaty of Teplitz, of September 9, 1813, which followed the traditional diplomatic forms; but it had received a wholly new development in the Treaty of Chaumont, for which there was no precedent. In the "sacramental words" of Article XIV, which provided for the duration of the Alliance for twenty years and its eventual renewal, lay the origin of the true moral force of the Alliance. The treaty also contained temporary expedients, but its "true spirit" lay in the words of Article XIV, as reinforced by the preamble to the Treaty of Alliance of Novem-

⁷ Castlereagh to Bathurst, Aix, October 3, 1818, Nos. 2 and 4.

⁸ Interview with Metternich, September 29th. In *Cont.*, Aix, Castl., 1-13.

ber 20, 1815. The Treaty of Chaumont, is short, in its essence was based on eternal principles of political morality of which the special application was directed against France. If, then, France were admitted to it, this would undermine its very foundations by mixing the conservative principle with that of innovation, the remedy with the very evil it was designed to cure, stability with movement, and security with risk. It would be better to preserve the Treaty of Chaumont and to come to some other arrangement with France. After all, in addition to the Treaty of Chaumont, there existed the Holy Alliance as its complement, and one that sufficiently advertised the lofty intentions of the Powers. If this were not judged sufficient, France might become party to a Declaration, couched in general terms, reiterating these intentions.⁹

On the question of admitting France to the Alliance on the basis of the Treaty of Chaumont the British Cabinet was at one with the other Allies, for Castlereagh and his colleagues had a strong sense of the precarious tenure of the restored monarchy in France, and believed that the maintenance of the Quadruple Alliance was essential to the peace of Europe; they realized, too, the paradox involved in making France a party to a treaty which was primarily directed against herself. On the other hand, were she to be altogether excluded, she would inevitably become the nucleus of a separate alliance, and everything that had been gained by the European Concert would be placed in jeopardy. As for a new treaty, in addition to that of Chaumont, which should include France,

⁹ Mem. of Metternich on the Treaty of Chaumont, October 7, 1818. F.O.: Cont., Aix, Castlereagh, in No. 13.

in the actual temper of the House of Commons this could never be sanctioned. The same Cabinet memorandum (September 4th) in which these difficulties were pointed out contained an ingenious suggestion of a method by which they could be overcome. This was to introduce France, not on the basis of Chaumont, but on that of Article VI of the Treaty of Alliance of November 20, 1815, which was in addition to the provisions of the earlier treaty: the article which established "a deliberative system for the purpose of consulting at fixed periods and upon common interests, and for the consideration of such measures as may be deemed most salutary for the repose and prosperity of the nations and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe." True, in view of the fundamental objections of the British Government to anything in the nature of a universal union, this might be held to establish an awkward precedent. But as the treaty primarily concerned France only, it would not be necessary to invite other Powers to join, and in any case it would obviate the risk of so great a Power remaining outside and perhaps forming another combination as a counterpoise to this alliance.¹⁰

The problem of the future relation of France to the Alliance thus opened up at Aix-la-Chapelle the whole broader question of the future form of the "Confederation of Europe." As to this, much of course depended upon the attitude of the Emperor Alexander. His first care on arriving at Aix had been to place beyond doubt his own absolute loyalty to the European Alliance. In an interview with

¹⁰ Cabinet memorandum on the approaching Conferences, September 4, 1818. F.O. : Cont., Congr., Aix, No. 34.

Metternich on September 29th he indignantly repudiated the truth of the rumours that he had been meditating a breach with the Alliance and a separate understanding with France. "It will suffice," he said, "to explain my principles, in order to dispense with the necessity of replying in detail to false reports which have gained only too much currency. I seek the welfare of the world in peace, and I cannot find peace except in the attitude we have adopted during the last five years, and in the maintenance of this attitude. I should regard as a felon whichever one of us should think fit to establish a tie foreign to that which unites us, and as a crime any change, whatever it may be, in our relations. . . . I will admit that proposals for an alliance have been addressed to me. I will leave it to you yourself to dictate the reply which I made to such proposals. . . . You know that I am scrupulous in everything. I am equally so in politics. My conscience will always prevent my committing voluntary errors. My army, as well as myself, is at the disposal of Europe."¹¹

In subsequent interviews with Wellington and Castlereagh he used the same language, insisting that his army was the army of Europe, and that he could not admit that it would be otherwise employed than with Europe, to repress any attempt that might be made to shake the system of which his empire formed only a part.¹² In reporting this interview Castlereagh commented on "the cordiality and earnestness of Alexander, together with an exaltation of mind which perhaps hurried him into

¹¹ F.O. : Cont., Aix, Castl., 1-13, in Castlereagh to Bathurst, No. 2.

¹² Castlereagh to Bathurst, October 3rd, No. 2.

touching upon measures from which, he trusted, his views might be brought to subside."¹³

What these measures were was not as yet quite clear; for in the same letter Castlereagh mentions that Capo d'Istria and Nesselrode were at work on the future colour to be given to the Alliance, but had reached no satisfactory result, while Alexander had not yet made up his mind. Meanwhile, Castlereagh had laid before the Powers the proposal of the British Government to which I have already referred, which represented a compromise (a "middle term" Castlereagh called it) of which Metternich at once approved, while Hardenberg and Bernstorff gave it a friendly but more reserved reception. This formed the basis of the negotiations that followed, and in a couple of days Castlereagh reported home that the probable result of the Conference would be (1) to adhere strictly to the treaties, especially those of Chaumont and Paris, which constituted the Quadruple Alliance; (2) not to admit France to them, not to replace them by a Quintuple Alliance; (3) to invite France to join in the deliberations of the Powers under Article VI of the Treaty of Alliance of November 20th, which, as this article is the only one that survived the war or that would be operative so long as France kept quiet, would in effect place her in a line with the other Powers so long as the state of peace subsisted; (4) in order to calm the alarm of the other Powers, to issue a declaration to the effect that, by these regular assemblies the Powers had no intention of arrogating to themselves any supremacy, or of interfering in the politics of other states in any way not warranted by the law

¹³ No. 4, same date.

of nations. In concluding his statement, Castlereagh enlarged on the benefit derived from the cabinets acting side by side in this matter, which had obviated a host of delays and misconceptions which would have arisen had the negotiations been conducted through the ordinary diplomatic channels.¹⁴

These proposals, however, did not go far enough for the Emperor Alexander. On the one hand, he was eager to publish to all the world the renewal of the disciplinary Alliance of Chaumont, which the others were anxious to keep effective, but in the background. On the other hand, he was bent on using this opportunity of realizing his political ideal of a confederated Europe. "It is impossible," wrote Castlereagh, "to doubt the Emperor's sincerity in his views, which he dilates upon with a religious rhapsody. Either he is sincere, or hypocrisy certainly assumes a more abominable garb than she ever yet was clothed in," and he goes on to describe how Alexander, placing his hand on his heart and looking up to heaven, declared that, actuated, as he trusted, by a religious and conscientious feeling, he had that secret sentiment within him which would render it impossible for him to be inequitable or unjust.¹⁵

The outcome of this religious fervour was the presentation to the other Allies on October 8th of a confidential memorandum of the Russian cabinet drafted by Pozzo di Borgo, stating the Tsar's views on the measures to be adopted in order to preserve Europe from a return of revolutions and of the principle that might is right (*le droit du plus fort*) Europe, it said, had been restored in 1815 and pre

¹⁴ To Bathurst, No. 10.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, October 16th.

served till now by the Alliance of the great states, unalterable in principle, but extending its sphere according to circumstances, and becoming thus the Alliance of all the states. The results thus far achieved had been due, less to the uncertain combinations of men than to that Supreme Intelligence to which the sovereigns had done homage by the act of September 26, 1815. The woes of humanity had been caused by egoism and partial combinations in politics, and the proof of this was the good derived from the empire of Christian morality and of the Rights of Man which had given Europe peace. The system of Europe was a general association which had for *foundation* the Treaties of Vienna and Paris, for *conservative principle* the fraternal union of the Allied Powers, for *aim* the guarantee of all recognized rights. This system, which guaranteed the best interests of the great European family, was the work not of any man but of Providence. Its moral support lay in the Quadruple Alliance and the Holy Alliance, its material support in the armed occupation of France. Since this had now come to an end, more moral support was needed. This was not to be sought in the renewal of engagements already taken; for to swear too much weakens the force of oaths. It must be sought in the elements constituting the actual European system, and in a combination which in the eyes of all the world would make the cohesion of the system evident, necessary, and indissoluble. These elements were the Quadruple Alliance and the General Alliance, considered, in reference to the case under discussion, the first as a principle and the second as its consequence. The compact which consecrated and defined the first was the treaty of

November 20, 1815. The General Alliance was to be sought in the Final Act of Vienna and the subsequent acts signed at Paris in 1815.

The Emperor then proposed: (1) That the Quadruple Alliance should be preserved as against danger from France; (2) that a general Alliance should be formed, consisting of all the signatories of the Treaties of Vienna, having as its object the guarantee of the state of territorial possession and of sovereignty *ab antiquo*.

The first of these objects was to be established by a protocol defining the *casus fœderis* and the military measures to be taken should this arise, and arranging for future meetings. The second was to be accomplished by a declaration of the Great Powers announcing to Europe the results of their deliberations at Aix, to which declaration, since the Quadruple Alliance was not a partial combination but the basis of the General Alliance, all the states which had signed the acts of 1815 should be invited to subscribe. The Quadruple Alliance, the memorandum explained, was held together as yet only by the sentiment of the parties to it; but if it formed part of a wide European association no Power could break away from it without being at once isolated. The Quadruple and General Alliance would be proclaimed as a single and indivisible system by the signatures of the Powers to the declaration. Such a system would guarantee the security of Governments by putting the rights of nations under a guarantee analogous to that which protects individuals. The Governments, for their parts, being relieved from fear of revolutions, could offer to their peoples Constitutions of a similar type (*semblables*); so that the liberties of peoples,

wisely regulated, would arise without effort from this state of affairs once recognized and publicly avowed.¹⁶

The language of this memorandum will be familiar to you if you remember that of the instructions to Novosiltsov in 1804. Both in its principles and in its proposals for their practical application it is all but identical with the scheme submitted by Alexander to Pitt. The only important difference is that for the Dual Alliance of Russia and Great Britain which, under the original scheme, was to be maintained as a sort of directorate of the European Concert, has been substituted the Quadruple Alliance.

The proposals of the Russian memorandum met with a somewhat mixed reception. Metternich, who was noting with terror the activities of Russian agents everywhere, and especially in Italy, had begun to recognize in the "loud-sounding nothing" of the Holy Alliance an excellent instrument for curbing and guiding the Tsar's erratic ambitions, and he therefore hailed the memorandum with diplomatic unction. "The order established," he wrote to Nesselrode, after reading the memorandum, "needs not to be proved, it exists; it is recognized; it governs the world. 'To change this order of things would be a crime'—worthy words pronounced by your august master!"¹⁷ To the Prussians, who were in a highly nervous state about their new acquisitions on the Rhine, the principle of a universal guarantee was equally welcome. The British Government, on the other hand, could not but view with serious misgiving these iterated efforts

¹⁶ *Mémoire confidentielle du Cabinet russe*. September 26th (October 8th). Enclosed in Castlereagh to Bathurst, October 19th, No. 13.

¹⁷ To Nesselrode, October 7, in Castlereagh's of October 19, No. 13.

to revive a plan against which it had always protested. Public opinion in England was increasingly opposed to a system which not only threatened the liberties of others but might at some future time be applied to curtail the liberties of Great Britain itself. Moreover, as Castlereagh pointed out to the Emperor Alexander, "the British cabinet had now to deal with a new Parliament and a new people, intensely bent on peace and economy," and to initiate a fresh policy of "eventual exertion" would be to jeopardize the sanction already obtained from Parliament for their continental engagements. In the cabinet memorandum already referred to it had been laid down that the treaty between the Powers must rest "upon the sanction received in the address of both Houses, of May, 1816"; that its provisions "hardly admitted of being reinforced"; and that any attempt to renew them "would lead to serious difference of opinion." So far, indeed, from undertaking further obligations, the cabinet was rather in a mood for withdrawing from some of those already entered into. In reply to Castlereagh's letter announcing the probable outcome of the negotiations, dispatched before the presentation of the Russian memorandum, Bathurst wrote a long letter, dated October 20th, in which he expressed great doubts as to whether it would be in any way advisable to proclaim to Europe, by any new act, that it was the intention of the Powers to hold continued meetings at stipulated periods. "We admit," he wrote, "that Article VI of the Treaty of Alliance contemplated such meetings, and we are satisfied that under the circumstances as they now exist, when the Allied troops are to be withdrawn from France, it may be of the utmost importance to make the people of that country

feel that they are still under a sort of surveillance. We are therefore of opinion that the Allied Powers should fix a period at which to hold another meeting. This would not be liable to the objections which we think would result from a succession of such meetings being now proclaimed as part of a permanent system. . . . When the French Government has proved that it can maintain the peace, there will be no further need of them ; and though the mind might anticipate further circumstances under which such meetings might be productive of many advantages, one may likewise contemplate those under which they might be likely to lead to great embarrassment. Article VI could hardly have been accepted under present circumstances. We do not wish to abrogate it ; but we do not think it would be politic to reinforce it by any new declaration of a general nature.”¹⁸

I have quoted this letter at some length in order to show the somewhat nervous temper of the British Government, not for any practical effect it produced ; for, as a matter of fact, the whole question had been settled before it was received. That it was so settled was due to Castlereagh's clever, but at the same time perfectly straightforward, diplomacy. As for the Russian memorandum, “when the Duke of Wellington and I came to consider the paper together,” he wrote, “though abounding in the principles of unity and peace, we felt some dismay in observing the abstractions and sweeping generalities in which it was conceived. It appeared to us that, whilst we could by no means subscribe to its doctrine in the extent to which it was pushed, it would be hazardous to

¹⁸ Bathurst to Castlereagh, October 20, 1818. F.O.: Cont., September to December 1818.

attempt a written answer to it, and we therefore invited discussion and had a series of conversations on this very complicated subject." The object of these conversations was to find out how far Alexander's intention to republish, as it were, the Quadruple Alliance could be reconciled with a self-respecting entry of France into the Concert, as well as to devise means for making the future conferences as little offensive as possible to the Powers not in the Alliance, and in general to compel Alexander and his ministers to descend from their abstractions so as to prepare the Conference for some practical conclusions. In this delicate task Castlereagh was helped and not hindered by the temper of Parliament, on which he was able to throw the onus of obstructing the realization of Alexander's dream in its completeness. In effect, he succeeded almost at once in inducing the Tsar to agree to something like the "middle term" proposed by the British Government. Alexander declared that he wished to hold close to the Quadruple Alliance—"our sheet-anchor"—but that he had no objection to admitting France under the limitations named; that such admission, however, must be accompanied by a declaration publicly proclaiming that the Alliance remained unbroken, and also by "a digested plan of military concert, to be at once acted upon in case of necessity." In order to help Great Britain out of any parliamentary difficulty, he would not ask for a new treaty, but would make a protocol or a declaration sufficient.¹⁹

The British Cabinet, as we have seen, objected to the issue of any new declaration; but Castlereagh

¹⁹ To Liverpool, October 19, 1818, No. 13.

had not received Bathurst's letter in which the objection was formulated, and in any case he realized that if the Alliance was to be maintained, some sort of concession must be made to Alexander's views. But if there was to be a Declaration, he was determined that it should not be of a character to commit Great Britain to a policy of which it disapproved, and he at once commissioned Gentz to draw up one "in the spirit of our own view of the question." This, of course, was not Alexander's. In his opinion the Act of the Holy Alliance had never ceased to be in operation, or at least *in esse*, and Castlereagh reported that both the Emperor and Count Capo d'Istria "were, in conversation, disposed to push their ideas very far indeed, in the sense of all the Powers of Europe being bound together in a common league, guaranteeing to each other the existing order of things, in thrones as well as in territories, all being bound to march, if requisite, against the first Power that offended, either by her ambition or by her revolutionary transgressions."²⁰ It is not surprising that to Castlereagh even the blessing of perpetual peace would seem too dearly bought at the price of subjugating Europe to an international police of which the undiminished armies of Russia would form the most powerful element. As Castlereagh wrote later (November 9th), when the proposal for a "universal guarantee" had re-emerged in another form, "it was opening up to such a Power as Russia . . . an almost irresistible claim to march through the territories of all the Confederate States to the most distant points of Europe to fulfil her guarantee," a claim, it may be added, which Alexander actually

²⁰ To Liverpool, October 19, 1818, No. 13.

did make in connexion with the revolutionary troubles in Spain in 1820.

Yet the Russian Emperor, in pressing his scheme, was not unreasonable in believing that he was but carrying to their logical conclusion principles to which the British Government already stood committed. British ministers rightly held that under the actual conditions of Europe the maintenance of the Alliance was essential; they had committed themselves by Article VI of the Treaty of November 20th, 1815, to the principle of holding "at fixed intervals" meetings "consecrated to great common objects"; they had even allowed the Prince Regent to express his pious assent to the lofty doctrine of the Holy Alliance; they were vividly conscious of the necessity for "calming the alarm of the other Powers," to which the Kings of Sweden and Württemberg gave vigorous expression during the sitting of this very Conference. The formation of a universal union, as foreshadowed by the Holy Alliance, would at once give to the periodic meetings greater weight and disarm all opposition by giving to all states, great and small, a share in them; peace, the object of the Quadruple Alliance, would be secured by making it impossible for any Power to break it, since any attempt to do so would bring down upon it the armed forces of all the rest. Castlereagh, however, was less impressed by the excellence of Alexander's logic than by the danger of applying its conclusions. A limited Alliance, for certain defined purposes, was one thing; a universal union, committed to common action under circumstances that could not be foreseen, was quite another. The admission into the councils of Europe of a number of small states would, more-

over, open the door to intrigues, the perils of which were minimized in the narrower Alliance. The difficulty of duly distributing the weight of the constituent members of such an assembly had already been illustrated by the constitution of the Federal Diet, in which the disproportionately small voting power given to Austria and Prussia had early led to a rivalry between them to gain the rest. So far from such a league leading to disarmament, the decisive voice in it would be that of the master of the biggest battalions. It was feared, in short, that the Emperor Alexander was disguising even from himself, "under the language of evangelical abnegation," the ambition of usurping in the new Confederation of Europe the preponderant position which Austria had already obtained in the new Confederation of Germany.

This being so, it was all the more essential to keep the Emperor "grouped"; and to accomplish this it was necessary to humour him, or, as Castlereagh put it, "to hold the Emperor's mind within the principles that could be maintained in Parliament," and for this purpose "to present something that would at once be in our line, and at the same time present the subject somewhat in the tone of his own ideas."²¹ This was done in the memorandum in reply to that of the Russian cabinet which Castlereagh handed in, after preparing the ground in personal interviews.

The opening paragraph defines the British attitude towards the Holy Alliance in language which has more than a touch of irony. "The benign principles of the Alliance of September 26th, 1815," it

²¹ To Liverpool, October 19, 1818, No. 13.

runs, "may be considered as constituting the European system in the matter of political conscience. It would, however, be derogatory to this solemn act of the sovereigns to mix its discussion with the ordinary diplomatic obligations which bind state to state, and which are to be looked for alone in the treaties which have been concluded in the accustomed form." These treaties were of two classes : (1) those which bind the states collectively ; (2) those peculiar to particular states. To the first class belonged the two Treaties of Paris and the Treaty of Vienna, which together constituted the Great Charter of the restored territorial system of Europe. Their provisions were, however, almost exclusively territorial, and they contained in no case engagements capable of being pushed beyond the immediate objects which were regulated in the treaties themselves. There was no express guarantee by which the observance of the engagements contracted was to be enforced ; and, though breaches of these engagements might be resented collectively or separately, there was no *obligation* on the signatory Powers to do so.²² It was not clear how "the Confederacy" could, without the utmost inconvenience, be made to enforce their observance.

The treaties, therefore, did not form an *Alliance*, but at most a *general pact* by which the territories affected were regulated. This pact, however, gave them no special guarantee, to the exclusion of others not affected by these negotiations, but which rested for their titles on earlier treaties of equal authority.

²² This seems to represent a retreat from the standpoint of Great Britain at Vienna. See Castlereagh's proposal for a common Declaration at the close of the Congress, p. 119, *supra*.

To the second class, that of particular treaties, belonged those of Chaumont and Paris of November 20th. These were treaties of alliance in the strictest sense of the word. Their avowed object was the restoration of Europe and the prevention of renewed danger from France; but they did not contemplate the possibility that a mere change in the government of France itself, whether effected legally or brought about by indirect means, would constitute a *casus fœderis*, unless by such change the peace of the Allies were threatened. The latter contingency was the only one contemplated by Article V of the Treaty of Paris, and it could not for a moment be maintained that states have a right to intervene in the internal affairs of other states to prevent change whether legal or illegal, for how can foreign states be left safely to judge of what is "legal" in another state?

The only safe principle was that of the law of nations—that no state has a right to endanger its neighbours by its internal proceedings, and that if it does, provided they use a sound discretion, their right to interference is clear. This was the right upon which eventual interference in France was contemplated under the Treaty of Paris (Art. III). The Allies were presumed to have a common interest in judging this question soundly whenever it should arise; but until the case arose none of the contracting parties were engaged for more than an eventual concert and decision.

The memorandum goes on to discuss the Emperor's idea of a universal union. I quote it *verbatim*, with only insignificant omissions. "The problem of a Universal Alliance for the peace and happiness of the world," it runs, "has always been one of specu-

lation and hope, but it has never yet been reduced to practice, and if an opinion may be hazarded from its difficulty, it never can. But you may in practice approach towards it, and perhaps the design has never been so far realized as in the last four years. During that eventful period the Quadruple Alliance, formed upon principles altogether limited, has had, from the presence of the sovereigns and the unparalleled unity of design with which the cabinets have acted, the power of travelling so far out of the sphere of their immediate and primitive obligations, without at the same time transgressing any of the laws of nations or failing in the delicacy which they owe to the rights of other states, as to form more extended alliances . . . to interpose their good offices for the settlement of differences between other states, to take the initiative in watching over the peace of Europe, and finally in securing the execution of its treaties."

"The idea of an Alliance Solidaire, by which each state shall be bound to support the state of succession, government, and possession within all other states from violence and attack, upon condition of receiving for itself a similar guarantee, must be understood as morally implying the previous establishment of such a system of general government as may secure and enforce upon all kings and nations an internal system of peace and justice. Till the mode of constructing such a system shall be devised, the consequence is inadmissible, as nothing would be more immoral or more prejudicial to the character of government generally, than the idea that their force was collectively to be prostituted to the support of established power, without

any consideration of the extent to which it was abused. Till a system of administering Europe by a general alliance of all its states can be reduced to some practical form, all notions of a general and unqualified guarantee must be abandoned, and the states must be left to rely for their security upon the justice and wisdom of their respective systems and the aid of other states according to the law of nations." As for the actual Alliance, the beneficial effect of the four Powers consulting and mediating would be much increased by adding France, which would not render it too numerous for effective concert and would add to it immense moral weight.²³

This uncompromising statement of Great Britain's attitude had its effect, and on October 20th Castlereagh was able to report home that the Powers had agreed upon a basis of arrangement practically representing the British "middle term." There were to be two protocols, of which the first would merely proclaim that the eventual obligations of the Treaty of Chaumont still subsisted, though its clauses, so far as they were directed against France, would be, so to speak, in abeyance. As this protocol would be merely explanatory of principles already approved by Parliament, there would be no necessity for laying it upon the table of the House. In addition to this secret protocol, there was to be another, publicly concluded with the co-operation of Richelieu, by which France was to be admitted to the Alliance under Article VI of the treaty of November 20th, the Quintuple Alliance thus formed having for ostensible object the inviolable maintenance of the Treaties of Paris and Vienna.

²³ Memorandum of Lord Castlereagh, *loc. cit.*, enclosed in No. 13.

As to the form this protocol should take there were still, however, significant differences of opinion. Alexander objected to a phrase conceding to France the *right* to a place in the European system, an objection significantly anticipating the principle of the protocol of Troppau. Castlereagh objected to the "threatened return of revolutionary crises" being mentioned as a *casus fœderis*, and refused to endorse an article which described the union as having become stronger and more indissoluble by the bonds of Christian brotherhood between the sovereigns and the accession of all the European states to the act (of the Holy Alliance) which had consecrated these bonds. This latter objection Alexander admitted, professing himself, in order "not to cause parliamentary inconvenience," quite content with the autograph letter in which the Prince Regent had given his moral approval to the lofty principle of the Holy Alliance. The discussion having thus been brought down to the plane of practical politics, the details were soon settled, and on November 5th Castlereagh, who had meanwhile received the letter from Bathurst which I quoted earlier, was in a position to say, in answer to it, that all the objections contained in it had been met. The concert with France was confined within the limits of the most restricted interpretation that could be given to Article VI of the treaty of November 1815, *i.e.*, was confined to the maintenance of the peace as established by the treaties therein enumerated. The eventual reunions were to be strictly limited to those interests which grew out of the transactions in question; moreover, they were not to be held at fixed periods, but, as occa-

sion might arise, by agreement between the five Courts, and no Power could be held as pledged, *a priori*, to any meeting whatever.²⁴

In one respect only was there a further concession. It had been proposed not to publish the protocol, but merely to announce the adhesion of France to the Alliance by a circular note. To this procedure Alexander objected as not being sufficiently solemn, and as liable to lead other Powers to suspect some hidden menace which in fact did not exist. It was therefore after all agreed, Castlereagh announced, to issue a declaration, but one quite innocuous.

Everything seemed to be thus, from the point of view of the British Government, in satisfactory order, when on November 9th Castlereagh announced that the whole question of the universal guarantee had been reopened, not this time by Russia, but by Prussia, with the support of Austria. Prussia, he reported, was in a state of extreme nervousness about her Rhine frontier, owing to the discontent in her new provinces and the fact that her fortresses were unfinished; she had actually asked Alexander to leave Russian garrisons in the barrier fortresses. The question had been raised, he thought, because of his insistence on the fact that no such guarantee had been established at Vienna. Limited to a territorial guarantee, the scheme proposed was less obviously a nullity than Alexander's universal union; but from the British point of view the obvious objection was that it would commit Great Britain to obligations for which, as an insular Power, she would obtain no equivalent. Metternich urged that she might give her moral support only, and reduced

²⁴ To Bathurst, November 5th, No. 25.

the mutual guarantee to one between the signatory Powers of the Treaties of Paris and Vienna only, the German Confederation to count for this purpose as a single whole. Thus modified, Castlereagh for a moment thought the scheme might be worth considering, since it would bind Great Britain to nothing and might be a guarantee against Russia should she attempt an attack on Turkey. With reflection, however, the objections to the idea grew, and Wellington and he were able to persuade the Prussian and Austrian ministers to shelve the question. On the 12th Castlereagh reported that while Alexander was still anxious to give the guarantee a permanent basis, the general feeling was that the system already arranged would be safe during the lifetime of the actual sovereigns. A project, also suggested by Prussia, for establishing a miniature European force at Brussels was defeated by the opposition of Wellington himself, together with that of Castlereagh, who believed that it was better, at whatever risk, to affect at least complete confidence in France than to court trouble by an "intermediate system" which would only create the evils against which it was intended to guard.²⁵

So far as the European Concert was concerned, then, the outcome of the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle was a compromise, embodied in two instruments signed on November 15th. The first, in the form of a secret protocol, renewed the Quadruple Alliance for the purpose of watching over France in case of fresh revolutionary outbreaks menacing the peace of Europe ; this was communicated in confi-

²⁵ To Bathurst, November 19th, No. 37.

dence to Richelieu. The second, to which France was invited to adhere, was a declaration, which ran as follows :

“ The Convention of October 9, 1818, which definitively regulated the execution of the engagements agreed to in the Treaty of Peace of November 20, 1815, is considered by the sovereigns who concurred therein as the accomplishment of the work of peace, and as the completion of the political system destined to secure its solidity.

“ The intimate union established among the monarchs, who are joint-parties to this system, by their own principles, no less than by the interests of their people, offers to Europe the most sacred pledge of its future tranquillity.

“ The object of the union is as simple as it is great and salutary. It does not tend to any new political combination—to any change in the relations sanctioned by existing treaties ; calm and consistent in its proceedings, it has no other object than the maintenance of peace, and the guarantee of those transactions on which the peace was founded and consolidated.

“ The sovereigns, in forming this august union, have regarded as its fundamental basis their invariable resolution never to depart, either among themselves or in their relations with other states, from the strictest observation of the principles of the right of nations : principles, which, in their application to a state of permanent peace, can alone effectually guarantee the independence of each Government, and the stability of the general association.

“ Faithful to these principles, the sovereigns will maintain them equally in those meetings at which they may be personally present, or in those which shall take place among their ministers ; whether they be for the purpose of discussing in common their own interests, or whether they shall relate to questions in which other Governments shall formally claim their interference. The same spirit which will direct their councils and reign in their diplomatic communications will preside also at these meetings ; and the repose of the world will be constantly their motive and their end.

“ It is with these sentiments that the sovereigns have consummated the work to which they were called. They will not cease to labour for its confirmation and perfection. They solemnly acknowledge that their duties towards God and the people whom they govern make it peremptory on them to give to the world, as far as it

is in their power,²⁶ an example of justice, of concord, and of moderation ; happy in the power of consecrating, from henceforth, all their efforts to protect the arts of peace, to increase the internal prosperity of their states, and to awaken those sentiments of religion and morality²⁷ whose influence has been but too much enfeebled by the misfortunes of the times."²⁸

An analysis of the language of this declaration shows that it was a compromise. It was intended to conciliate Alexander by "presenting the subject somewhat in the tone of his own ideas," while making it clear that the foundation of the European system was the treaties and the treaties alone. It was not, however, so unambiguous as to deprive Alexander of all chance of again bringing forward his grand design, and the growing unrest in regenerated Europe was soon to give him an excuse for doing so, as we shall see when we come to deal with the Congresses of Troppau and Laibach.

I have followed in some detail the debates at Aix-la-Chapelle arising out of the question of the future form to be given to the European Alliance, because, so far as I am aware, they have never before been closely analysed, and they have a very practical value at the present day when the international organization of peace is being discussed and advocated sometimes with more zeal than discretion. These debates, however, by no means occupied the whole time of the Conference. It had been decided to use the occasion of its meeting to settle if possible a number of questions of common interest, of which the most important

²⁶ In the original draft was added "and in proportion to the means at their disposal."

²⁷ The words "among their subjects," in the original draft, are omitted.

²⁸ Hartslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, i. 573, No. 88.

were defined in the memorandum of the British Cabinet already quoted. These were: (1) The effective suppression of the Slave Trade, which had been abolished in principle at Vienna; (2) the suppression of the Barbary pirates; (3) the refusal of the King of Sweden to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of Kiel; and (4)—the most fateful of all—the proposed general mediation between Spain and her revolted American colonies.

It is clear that at this period the Alliance was looked upon even by British statesmen as something more than a mere union of the Great Powers for preserving peace on the basis of the treaties; and in effect, during its short session the Conference acted, not only as a European representative body, but as a sort of European Supreme Court, which heard appeals and received petitions of all kinds from sovereigns and their subjects alike. The German mediatized princes invoked the aid of the Powers against the tyranny of their new overlords, and received satisfaction. The Elector of Hesse begged to be allowed to exchange his now meaningless title for that of king; a request which was refused because it was judged inexpedient to make the royal style too common. The mother of Napoleon, in a pathetic letter, petitioned for the release of her son, pleading that he was now too ill ever again to be a menace to Europe, a petition refused on the ostensible ground that there was proof that the letter was a political move and had been concocted under Napoleon's own direction. The people of Monaco presented a list of grievances against their prince. Questions as various as the settlement of the ranks of diplomatic agents, the rival claims of Bavaria and the Hochberg line to the

succession in Baden, a quarrel between the Duke of Oldenburg and Count Bentinck about the lordship of Kniphaussen, the situation of the Jews in Austria and Prussia, were brought under discussion, settled or postponed. In general, on these minor matters it was possible to come to an agreement. It is, however, significant that on the greater issues discussed there was no such edifying harmony. The Powers had already agreed in principle to the suppression of the Slave Trade; jealousy of British sea-power prevented their accepting that mutual "right of search" by which alone it could have been suppressed. The Barbary pirates were the scourge of the whole continental sea-board; they held up trading vessels at the mouth of the Elbe, and in the Mediterranean no vessel was safe that did not sail under the British or the Ottoman flag; yet it was found impossible to concert measures against them because of British jealousy of Russian intervention in the Mediterranean. The struggle between Spain and her colonies was regarded as a serious menace to the peace of Europe; the Powers were agreed as to the principle of mediation, but could not agree as to its form. They did agree in calling the King of Sweden to order. He obeyed, but at the same time protested against the "dictatorship" arrogated to themselves by the Great Powers, a protest reinforced by an indignant letter from the King of Württemberg. I have already pointed out the effect of these protests on the attitude of the Powers.

Of the more important questions thus discussed and left unsettled at Aix-la-Chapelle, the most interesting, from our present point of view, was that of the Spanish colonies, the debates on which opened up

the whole question of the relations of the Old World and the New, and even foreshadowed the idea of that world-alliance which has been imperfectly realized in the Hague Conventions. This question, however, I reserve for separate treatment in connexion with the Congress of Verona and the origins of the Monroe Doctrine.

VI

THE BREAK-UP OF THE CONFEDERATION

Things are getting back to a wholesome state again. Every nation for itself, and God for us all ! Only bid your Emperor be quiet, for the time for Areopagus and the like of that is gone by.—CANNING.

REVOLUTION AND REACTION

The Treaty of Frankfort—Alexander and Liberalism—The Constitution of Poland—Enigmatic attitude of Alexander—Russian propaganda in Italy—Metternich and the Tsar's Jacobinism—Liberal reaction in France—Attitude of the Powers—Murder of Kotzebue—The Carlsbad Decrees—Alexander champions German Liberalism—Change in his views—Revolution in Spain—Murder of the Duc de Berri—Alexander suggests intervention in Spain—Opposition of Austria and Great Britain—Revolution in Naples—Metternich and Alexander—The idea of the Universal Union revived—Question of intervention—Attitude of Great Britain—Castlereagh and Metternich on intervention.

THE public acts of the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle advertised the completion of the work to which the Allies had solemnly dedicated themselves by the Treaty of Chaumont. The Quadruple Alliance, indeed, survived, a rod in pickle for a France but doubtfully disciplined. The rod, however, was not to be flourished; and, France having been solemnly restored to the bosom of the European family, the international committee of ministers in Paris suspended their irritating tutorship. Certain important details of the European settlement had been left uncompleted at Aix, and these, reserved for a conference of ministers to be summoned to Frankfort in the following year, were finally adjusted by a treaty signed on June 20, 1819. The bulk of this treaty was concerned with matters inside the German Con-

federation, the outstanding questions between Bavaria and Austria, and between Bavaria and Baden ; but it also arranged the cession of the border fortresses of Marienbourg and Philippeville to the Netherlands, defined the limits of Savoy, and determined the question of the reversion of the Italian duchies. The Frankfort Final Act thus takes its place with those of Paris and Vienna as part of the Great Charter of reconstituted Europe.¹ With the break-up of the Conference at Frankfort, Europe was left for the time without any central representation, nor had any date been fixed for another meeting of the Powers.

The Emperor Alexander, however, in spite of the discouraging experience of Aix-la-Chapelle, had by no means given up the idea of materializing the Holy Alliance ; and everything in the course of the two years succeeding the Conference strengthened his determination to persevere. His theoretical belief in liberty, indeed, persisted, in spite of his growing uneasiness at the increasing signs of revolutionary unrest in nearly every country in Europe ; as late as the autumn of 1819, when Metternich published the Carlsbad Decrees, which formulated the plans of the German Powers for the suppression of all Liberal movements within the Confederation, he associated himself with Castlereagh's protest against a policy calculated to range the governments against the peoples, allowed Capo d'Istria to issue in his name a manifesto in which he refused to support a league of which the sole object was to enforce "the

* "The Frankfort Final Act is considered as giving additional strength to those fundamental acts upon which the European system now happily rests" (Castlereagh to Clancarty, July 21, 1819. F.O.: Germany, Frankfort. Drafts to Lord Clancarty).

absurd pretensions of absolute power," and declared his belief in liberty, though liberty "limited by the principles of order."

His conception of liberty thus limited was luminously shown by his treatment of Poland. In November 1815 he had granted to the new kingdom a Constitution on the approved Liberal lines: biennial parliaments, responsibility of ministers, freedom of speech and of the Press, securities against arbitrary arrest. But the first signs of an independent spirit in the representative body he had created awoke his suspicious fears. In spite of Czartoryski's remonstrances he had left his brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, an ignorant, narrow martinet of the old Russian type, in command of the Polish army, and General Zaionczek,² the titular viceroy, was his obedient tool. Constantine thus became the real ruler of the country,³ and he governed it as might have been expected, with every abuse of the Russian system and an all but entire disregard of the Constitution and the limitations it imposed upon arbitrary power. In vain Czartoryski, using the privilege of old friendship, appealed to the Tsar's higher nature and besought him to intervene to save from ruin his own favourite creation. The kindly personal feeling between the friends remained; but the Tsar, restored to the atmosphere of St. Petersburg, listened to his Russian advisers and chose to regard the natural resentment of the Poles as only a proof of the folly of expecting gratitude from people possessed by the revolutionary spirit.

² Zaionczek had commanded the Polish contingent in Napoleon's Grand Army.

³ He sat in the Diet as member for a division of Warsaw.

Alexander's whole attitude during this transition period was, indeed, so enigmatic as to awaken the liveliest misgivings. By Metternich especially his Liberalism, like his evangelical professions, was regarded merely as a mask to disguise his perfidious plans of attack on Austria. In Italy Russian activities were especially disconcerting. Capo d'Istria, who after the close of the Conference at Aix had made a tour in Italy, had appalled the Neapolitan ministers by his revolutionary language, and had incidentally been "highly abusive of the Austrian Government,"⁴ while a little later La Harpe was reported as travelling about Italy preaching revolution and even presiding over meetings of Carbonari. Metternich saw in all this a deliberate plan to expel Austria from the peninsula and revive the idea of a united Italian kingdom under Russian patronage.

Sir Robert Gordon, who at this time was in close touch with Metternich, who was on a visit to Italy, and on the whole in sympathy with his views, found his fears both of Russian designs and revolutionary dangers exaggerated. "Prince Metternich," he wrote on April 22, 1819, from Rome "discovers the existence of Russian agency and intervention in every quarter and every passing event in Europe," and in an interesting letter from Florence of July 12th he gives his own impressions of the condition of Italy and of the Russian propagandists there. After saying that he himself has seen more to inspire confidence than alarm, he adds that the discontent of the people is largely due to the distrust exhibited by the Austrians—a distrust embodied in that elaborate secret

⁴ Gordon to Castlereagh, Florence, March 24, 1819. F.O.: Austria. Gordon, January–December 1819.

service system which was by no means confined to Italy. As for the travellers and agents of Russia, Gordon, it is true, reports that they held "very improper language," the conduct of M. de La Harpe being "beyond all palliation." But, he adds, all this perhaps depends "more upon the character of the nation than a duty imposed upon them by the Russian Government. Magnanimity is a Russian thesis, and on his travels each Russian composes a theme of his own upon it. For this exercise of his genius he naturally attracts to his person the unfortunate and discontented . . . who may build groundless hopes upon high-sounding words. The Emperor Alexander himself has ever protected the unfortunate and preached a magnanimous doctrine. His disciples in Italy, with less wit, have thought to ingratiate themselves more by going beyond their master."

This is a common-sense view, and perhaps gives the key to the puzzle of which he had spoken in an earlier letter—that of the different language of different Russian agents. "Decazes," he wrote, "complains that Pozzo does not express the sentiments of the Tsar; in Germany, Kotzebue is murdered, and Stourdza nearly so, for espousing the cause of unrestrained monarchy and obscurantism; while in Italy M. de La Harpe travels up and down holding a language of the purest democracy, not to mention that of the Russian ministers at the different Courts of this country."⁵ Perhaps, too, it gives the key to the enigma of Alexander's own attitude; for the

⁵ Compare Metternich to Gentz (April 9, 1819). "Pendant qu'en Allemagne on assassine les agents russes propter obscuritatem, d'autres agents russes président en Italie les clubs de carbonari" (Pierre Rain, *Alexander I*, p. 391).

contradictions in the language of his agents were but reflections of his own. As Czartoryski said, he loved phrases for their own sake. Magnanimity was his thesis; the theme he had been accustomed to compose upon it was modelled upon the philosophic platitudes of La Harpe, and he could not get out of the habit even when the whole trend of his practical policy was in the diametrically opposite direction. Yet there is as little reason to suspect him of conscious hypocrisy at this period of his life as earlier, when his idealism had not yet suffered the shocks of experience. The truth is that suspicion was in his very blood; he could trust neither his own servants nor the peoples for whose abstract liberty he laboured. So it came that he treated his ministers as clerks, and the peoples whom he believed himself to have enfranchised as children who had indeed certain rights, and were entitled to certain liberties, but ought to be grateful for such measures of these rights and liberties as paternal governments might choose to concede and not be guilty of the impiety of clamorously asking for more. In such circumstances it was the duty of the Powers who had undertaken, under the terms of the solemn covenant of the Holy Alliance, to treat their subjects as their children, not to spare the rod.

From his point of view the children of the European family were behaving very badly. Long before the meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle he had watched with alarm the effects of the Liberal Constitution which he had himself been instrumental in obtaining for France; and the alarm had been increased by the discovery of a ridiculous plot to kidnap him on the way to the Conference

and force him to proclaim Napoleon or his son Emperor of the French.⁶ Nor was he alone in his misgivings. Castlereagh watched with uneasiness the reorganization of the French army by Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr;⁷ and Metternich shared his alarms, citing the "seditious language" of Baron Louis and Gouvion St. Cyr and expressing the conviction that a revolution was no longer to be avoided.⁸ He was confirmed in this view by all the reports he received from Paris.⁹ As for the King, Baron Lebzeltern, the Austrian ambassador, reported that he was superior to Louis XVI only "in knowing his Horace and Virgil by heart," and inferior to him in not being able to exist without a favourite. The favourite of the moment—Decazes—was "piqued against the nobility, and drawn into the Liberal Party by his principles, by necessity, by the seduction of his father-in-law, further than perhaps he himself desired." With such elements what hope was there for peace and order in France? "When Capo d'Istria advised a Liberal policy, when he undertook to govern France from the banks of the Neva, did he realize the harm that Russia would do? When he spoke of a Con-

⁶ Castlereagh to Bathurst, November 12, 1818 (unnumbered). F.O. : Cont., Aix, Castlereagh. Also No. 33, containing the report of the Procureur-Général of November 6th.

⁷ To Gordon, January 19, 1819. F.O. : Austria, Gordon. January to December 1819.

⁸ Gordon to Castlereagh, February 11, 1819, No. 10.

⁹ Gordon wrote that he was uncertain how far to trust Metternich's correspondents in France. "It is certain that of his numerous correspondents not one has chosen bright colours for his picture ; and I fear Metternich's canvas takes the dark ones too kindly." The absurd rumour of a plot to make Bernadotte king was a "sample of the stuff that composes his bales of correspondence." To Castlereagh, Vienna, February 11, 1819. F.O. : Austria, Gordon. January to December 1819.

stitution and Liberal representation for this country, did he realize the fresh horrors to which they would lead?"¹⁰ To Metternich it was clear where the fault lay, and, in a dispatch on the actual state of France, he cleverly contrived to throw all the blame for it upon Russia, sarcastically congratulating Pozzo di Borgo on the effects of his policy.¹¹

The worst misgivings seemed to be justified when, in May, the Abbé Gregoire, ex-Conventional and Constitutional bishop, was returned to the Chambers. Even to Pozzo the situation seemed critical; he advised that the Alliance should intervene to persuade Louis XVIII to dismiss Gouvion St. Cyr; and, upon a report presented by Count Golovkin, the Russian cabinet recommended that Metternich's proposal to revive the international Conference of Ministers at Paris should be accepted.¹² The proposal, formally circulated, met, however, with little encouragement. Castlereagh, who believed that any threat of intervention would only strengthen the military party, declared that it was no part of the functions of the Quadruple Alliance to attempt to correct the "internal eccentricities" of France, and that, as for any danger of these developing into external aggression, the Alliance was, in his opinion, most effective when operating by the "silent force of its inactivity."¹³ As for Metternich, though he thought it a pity that the Conference had ever been suspended, he denied that he had ever proposed its resumption.¹⁴ He

¹⁰ Lebzeltern to Metternich, Paris, January 27, 1819. F.O.: Austria, Gordon. January-December 1819.

¹¹ Gordon to Castlereagh. *Ibid.*, February 15, 1819, No. 9.

¹² *Idem* to *idem*, May 26, 1819. *Ibid.*, No. 17.

¹³ Memorandum of September on the Russian proposal of intervention in France. F.O.: Drafts to Lord Stewart, May-December 1819.

¹⁴ Gordon to Castlereagh, Naples, May 26, 1819. F.O.: Austria, Gordon. January-December 1819, No. 17.

held, or affected to hold, the Emperor Alexander personally responsible for the system of "falsehood and intrigue" which was the cause of all the unrest in Europe; he declared that his vaunted loyalty to the European Alliance was but a mark of the deepest finesse, intended to cajole and win the suffrages of those Powers which would have dreaded and objected to any separate Alliance;¹⁵ and he was therefore the less anxious to see Alexander again playing Providence in France in the name of Europe. He therefore agreed with Castlereagh that any intervention of the Alliance would only "drive the evil forward,"¹⁶ and under these circumstances the Russian proposal, after a correspondence extending over months, was dropped.

Metternich, divided between fear of revolutions and fear of Russia, was not without hope of winning over Alexander to "good principles," and so making the Alliance effective for his own conservative policy. A senseless crime came to his assistance. On March 23, 1819, August von Kotzebue, dramatist and Russian agent, was murdered by the *Bursche* Karl Sand at Mannheim. Metternich was at Rome when the news reached him. He at once wrote to Count Nesselrode, calling on the Emperor Alexander to co-operate in the measures necessary to suppress the anti-social propaganda illustrated by Sand's crime.¹⁷ Clearly, whatever the condition of France might be, that of Germany was no better. To intervene in France would be dangerous; but in view

¹⁵ Gordon to Castlereagh, Vienna, February 11, 1819. F.O. : Austria, Gordon. No. 5.

¹⁶ *Idem* to *idem*, Rome, April 22, 1819. *Ibid.*, No. 14.

¹⁷ To Nesselrode, Rome, April 23, 1819. F.O. : Austria, Domestic. April-December 1819.

of the universal unrest, the Grand Alliance should "knit for itself a closer texture";¹⁸ and to this end international Conferences should be established permanently, not in Paris, but in Vienna or London.¹⁹ As for the state of Germany, "his brilliant imagination," to quote Sir Robert Gordon,²⁰ "immediately conceived a remedy," which was that policy of using the machinery of the Federal Diet for the purpose of suppressing the Liberal propaganda in the Universities, which in the following October was embodied in the Carlsbad decrees—or more properly resolutions—the principles of which were given effect to in the Vienna Final Act of May 15, 1820. From our present point of view, the most interesting thing about these acts was that they represented an attempt to realize within the group of sovereign states forming the German Confederation the principles of mutual guarantee and supervision which it was sought to apply to Europe as a whole.

It was precisely this fact that made them in acceptable to the British Government. Metternich had been careful to point out in his presidential address at the Conference at Vienna that the German Confederation was an integral part of the European states system as established by the Vienna Final Act of 1815, and that therefore not only the rights of the Confederation as a whole, but also those of its constituent states, depended on the guarantee of the treaties.²¹ It followed that a principle once admitted as applicable to a part might be logically

¹⁸ Gordon to Castlereagh, Rome, April 22nd. *Loc. cit.*, No. 14.

¹⁹ *Idem* to *idem*, Naples, May 26th. *Loc. cit.*, No. 17.

²⁰ No. 14.

²¹ In F.O. : Austria, Domestic, January–August 1820.

extended so as to embrace the whole; and the Carlsbad decrees were therefore rightly feared and denounced as a menace to the liberties of all Europe. Castlereagh saw the danger and, true to the British principle of non-intervention, protested against the decrees as an unjustifiable interference with the rights of sovereign and independent States, while to Count Lieven, the Russian ambassador in London, he pointed out the folly of producing the impression that the Governments were contracting an alliance against the peoples. Capo d'Istria's objections were equally emphatic;²² but the attitude of the Emperor Alexander, whom Metternich plied with interminable memoirs, was more equivocal. In private he admitted to Baron Lebzeltern, the Austrian ambassador, that in his opinion, so far as his knowledge went, the Carlsbad measures were necessary, and justified in view of "the spirit of corruption and immorality" in Germany.²³ Yet he allowed Capo d'Istria to draw up and circulate a memorandum in his name, in which the decrees were denounced as an attempt to enforce "the absurd pretensions of absolute power" and he was made to reiterate his belief in liberty, though in liberty "limited by the principles of order." It is not surprising if Metternich saw in this only another piece of hypocrisy, an attempt to prevent the consolidation of Germany by the ostentatious support of those lesser states which, like Württemberg, had set up Liberal Constitutions and protested against the Carlsbad policy.

²² Stewart to Castlereagh, Vienna, November 1, 1819. F.O.: Austria. Stewart, May-October 1819.

²³ *Ibid.* During the same conversation Alexander said that the revolution could only be combated by drawing the union of the sovereigns daily closer, and described Decazes as "un fourbe et un mauvais homme."

To those who came in closest contact with Alexander at this time it was clear that his Liberalism was waning. Two events strengthened this tendency: the military revolt under Riego in Spain, which in January 1820 forced Ferdinand VII to accept the egregious Constitution of 1812; and the murder on February 13th of the Duc de Berri, heir-presumptive to the French crown.²⁴ The latter, especially, produced upon Alexander a profound impression. The influence of Capo d'Istria was shaken, and the way was opened for that *rapprochement* between Austria and Russia which was consummated in the meeting of Metternich and Alexander at Troppau.

As early as November 1819 a dispatch of Lord Stewart from Vienna had foreshadowed a change in Metternich's attitude. Metternich, he reported, was inclined to withdraw from his support of the British policy of non-intervention in France, which was "no longer the France of Aix-la-Chapelle." Castlereagh having "closed the door of precautionary diplomacy towards France," Metternich had opened "a more anxious and flattering diplomacy towards Russia," and while seeking to expose their unjustifiable views, "or the falseness of their proceedings," aimed at preserving the most perfect understanding with the Russian cabinet.²⁵ The assassination of the Duc de Berri, by driving the Russian Government in the direction of reaction, certainly contributed to this

²⁴ Metternich to Esterhazy, March 23, 1820, enclosing an extract of a report of Lebzeltern at St. Petersburg on the effect of the assassination.

²⁵ To Castlereagh, Vienna, November 1, 1819. F.O.: Austria. Stewart, November-December 1819, No. 20. "This cabinet will always be endeavouring to create diplomacy. It is a food largely devoured and greatly sought after."

understanding. But the time was not yet ripe for its consummation ; the suspicion of Russia's ulterior aims remained, and was certainly not lessened by her proposed action in the affair of Spain.

On April 19, 1820, the Russian Government sent to the Powers of the Quintuple Alliance a circular note, the outcome of a note on Spanish affairs presented to the Tsar by the Chevalier de Zea de Bermudez, envoy of King Ferdinand VII. This document is interesting for more than one reason. In the first place it shows that Alexander realized something of the vastness of the issues involved, which were not merely those of the particular form of government to be maintained in Spain. "The Spanish Revolution," says the circular, "fixes the attention of two worlds; the interests to be decided are those of the universe . . . and involve the future perhaps of all civilized peoples." The idea of the European Confederation, that is to say, is growing in Alexander's mind into that of a World Union such as a century later it was in vain sought to materialize at The Hague. Secondly, the circular defines the Tsar's attitude towards constitutional liberty in words similar to those which he had used when condemning the Carlsbad decrees : "The Allies have recognized that institutions cannot be means of peace and happiness, if, instead of being the voluntary concession of benevolence, they are the last means of salvation for weakness." He is, that is to say, still in favour—theoretically at least—of Constitutions *octroyées* from above. Thirdly, and this is the most important, he foreshadows the policy which at Verona, two years later, led to the definitive breach of Great Britain with the Alliance, by suggesting that the ministers of the

five Courts should hold a common language at Madrid, the preliminary to a concerted, or at least to an authorized, intervention.

The circular met with a very unsympathetic reception. The British Government was little likely to abandon its settled policy of non-intervention, in order to assist in riveting on the necks of the Spanish people a yoke universally recognized as intolerable. As for Metternich, Austria was but little concerned with the troubles of royalty beyond the Pyrenees, while European intervention, as conceived by the Emperor Alexander, would have meant the advance of a huge Russian army across her territories for the purpose of acting as "European police" in the South. To Metternich, for all the Tsar's professions of disinterestedness, this appeared by far the most imminent peril, and he decided that in this particular instance collective action must at all costs be avoided. He extracted himself from a difficult situation with characteristic address. He was committed deeply to the opinion that the condition of the world demanded an organized system of international supervision; his task now was to prove that the case of Spain was the exception that proved the rule. In a series of lengthy dispatches he covered his temporary defection from the principles of the Alliance with a cloud of phrases. The Alliance indeed still existed and would continue to exist, for its moral basis was unalterable and eternal. Having the support of all honest and enlightened men, as against ambitious swindlers, false philosophers, and sectaries, it would still be effective for the cure of the ills of Europe, which were "moral." But the ills of Spain were "material"; King Ferdinand VII, moreover, had accepted the Revolution, and any

interference would merely create a ferment. As for the Russian proposal of a Conference of sovereigns and cabinets, he had always been in favour of meetings every three years or so, which, as being merely part of the established system, would not have disquieted public opinion. But a meeting called specially to consider the state of Spain would only disquiet that unhappy country yet more. Besides, the meeting would have to be one, not of the four, but of the five Courts; and it was unlikely that the British cabinet would be willing, and the French cabinet able, to combine with the three Courts which were "more free in their actions and more independent in their choice of forms." The four Powers, acting separately, could do all that was necessary by a firm attitude and a common language.²⁶

This was Metternich's attitude in June 1820. It underwent a significant change when, in the following month, a military revolt in Naples forced the King of the Two Sicilies to accept the Spanish Constitution of 1812. This was an event, from Metternich's point of view, of a totally different complexion from the revolution in Spain, since it directly threatened the stability of the whole Austrian system in Italy. In a sense it was an event which, however alarming, was not without its compensating advantages for Austria. It would serve to divert attention from the delicate Spanish Question, from which the Habsburg Monarchy could reap no

²⁶ Metternich to Lebzeltern, Prague, June 5, 1820. Annexe No. 1 à la dépêche de juin 3, 1820. F.O.: Austria, Domestic, Esterhazy. January–August 1820. There is another long dispatch, dated June 3rd, to Esterhazy, sketching the history of Europe since the Revolution and repeating most of No. 1, and yet another to Baron Vincent, dated June 15th, repeating it all over again.

possible advantage, to one in which, if Metternich's self-confidence was justified, the leading part would be played by Austria and not by Russia. For whatever criticism might be levelled at the claim of any Power or group of Powers to intervene in the affairs of Spain, there could be no question of the juridical basis of Austria's right to intervene in those of Naples. By the terms of the secret article of the treaty of June 12, 1815, between Austria and Naples, King Ferdinand IV had bound himself not to allow any changes in the political system of his dominions inconsistent with the ancient monarchical institutions or with the principles adopted by His Austrian Majesty for the internal administration of his Italian provinces; and as late as the preceding November Metternich had written to Cardinal Ruffo approving the reconstitution of the ancient Sicilian parliament, but at the same time calling his attention to the secret article of 1812, by way of warning him not to try constitutional experiments in Naples. The act of King Ferdinand in taking the oath to a revolutionary Constitution was then a distinct breach of his treaty obligations to Austria; and if Austria considered her interests imperilled by this, she had the undoubted right to safeguard them, if necessary by force. This was the view of the British Government, which was quite prepared to leave Austria a free hand; Prussia took the same attitude; and there was little doubt that France would follow. The doubtful factor in the situation was again the Emperor Alexander. The Neapolitan revolutionists loudly proclaimed that they had the "moral support" of Russia, and whatever the personal views of the Tsar might be, their claim certainly seemed to be

substantiated by the language which his agents in Italy continued to employ. That this language represented Alexander's sincere aspirations Metternich did not believe; he saw in it rather an effort to trouble the waters in order to favour his fishing at Austria's expense. In any case, it was of supreme importance once for all to disabuse the minds of the Italian Liberals of the idea that they could count upon Russian patronage. In a letter to Prince Esterhazy²⁷ he poured out, for the benefit of the British Government, his grievances against the Russian cabinet. For years past the policy of the "pitiable creatures" who composed it had been directed against what they were pleased to term "the influence of Austria," thus "confusing the solution of conservative principles with diplomatic intrigue." Alexander had personally recanted his evil opinions;²⁸ but words should be proved by acts, and now that the Revolution had infected the armies he would perhaps show more energy.

With Alexander in this mood, an ostentatious understanding between the Emperors of Austria and Russia would best have served Metternich's purposes, and a meeting between them was suggested. But the very alarms which had made him a desirable ally for Austria had redoubled in him that desire to realize his dream of a Universal Union which had been frustrated in Aix-la-Chapelle; and though for a week or two his attitude was characteristically ambiguous, he ended by refusing

²⁷ Vienna, August 8, 1820. F.O.: Austria, Domestic. September-December 1820.

²⁸ In another letter of the same date to Esterhazy, Metternich reports that Alexander on taking leave of M. de Schöler, had said, "J'ai méconnu l'esprit public depuis de la chute de Bonaparte, mais les derniers événements m'ont ouvert les yeux."

to be a party to a separate agreement. Moreover, to Metternich's intense annoyance, he refused to segregate the Neapolitan Question, insisting on mixing it up with that of Spain, though, as Metternich put it, "General Quiroga would be beaten in the person of General Pepe, and never to speak of July 6th without dragging in March 8th was to create difficulties which were foreign to the matter in hand."²⁹

They were not foreign, however, to the plans of Alexander, which seemed to embrace the problems of both worlds. In the last memorandum of the Russian cabinet on the affairs of Spain the four other Courts had been mentioned as "placed like Russia at the centre of the General Alliance," and if there was any doubt as to the meaning of this, it was set at rest by a dispatch of Golovkin, in which he spoke of the acts of Aix-la-Chapelle as proving that the monarchs who signed them considered themselves bound by ties of general fraternity to all the Powers signatory of the Treaty of Vienna, and regretted that "particular interests sometimes led to a divergence of views among the allied Courts as to the course which was, so to speak, forced on them when it was a question of putting into practice the theory of the Universal Union."³⁰ In short, Alexander affected to believe that the Powers at Aix-la-Chapelle had committed themselves to his dream of a general Confederation of Europe, and saw in the attitude of Great Britain "all the egoism of an exclusive policy," in flat contradiction to the principles

²⁹ To Esterhazy, Vienna, September 21, 1820. F.O.: Austria, Domestic.

³⁰ Report of Lebzeltern, St. Petersburg, July 25-17, 1820, and copy of Golovkin's dispatch, of July 15th. F.O.: Austria, Domestic, September-December 1820.

of the Declaration of 1818. As for even the Quadruple and Quintuple Alliances, Capo d'Istria, in conversation with Lebzeltern, denied their continued existence. They had been superseded, he maintained, by the Declaration of Aix-la-Chapelle, and, faithful to this, Russia would not recognize any but a "general association."³¹ The immediate practical outcome of these principles was that, in view of the critical state of affairs, not in Naples only, the Emperor Alexander considered that another Conference should be summoned on the model of that of 1818. His view was supported by France, where the obnoxious Decazes had given place to the Duc de Richelieu, on the ground that the revolutionary troubles in Spain and Italy were precisely the contingencies contemplated in the agreements made at Aix with a view to concerted action.

Metternich, however, still hoped to come to an arrangement which, by yielding somewhat to Alexander's ideas, should give to Austrian policy in Italy the imposing support of the Alliance without the necessity for summoning a Conference, at which other and more awkward questions would be likely to be raised. On August 28th, accordingly, he addressed to the Courts, in reply to the suggestion of the two Powers, a formal "proposition" in which he laid down the course of action which Austria intended to pursue. Since her special right to intervene in Naples had been generally admitted, she proposed to concentrate

³¹ "We differ," he said, "as to the basis of our engagements. You base them upon the alliance of four or five Powers, and in relation to France, while we see a general association which embraces all the Powers, and of which the function is to guarantee the principles of public law—that is to say, to guarantee their state of possession and the legitimacy of thrones."

in Italy a force sufficient to crush the "factions," to invite the Allies to unite themselves "morally" with her, and at the same time to make "frank overtures" to the Courts of Germany and Italy on the unsatisfactory state of affairs and the general attitude of Austria towards them. For the carrying out of this plan it was not necessary to summon a formal Conference, which would but waste time, and of which the moral effect was liable to be spoilt owing to Great Britain not having a "free hand." It would suffice if the allied Courts refused to recognize the revolutionary Government of Naples, declared all its acts null and void, and through their ministers supported such coercive measures as the Austrian Government might judge it necessary to employ.³² To this proposal the reply of Russia was favourable ; so far as Naples was concerned, the initiative was to rest with Austria, which was to have a free hand and to be backed by the "moral" union of the Powers. As for Great Britain, Metternich hoped to gain her adhesion by persuading her that the situation, dangerous alike to Austria, to Italy, and to Europe, was clearly one to which the treaties sanctioned by Parliament applied. Unfortunately for him, Castlereagh did not take this view. The suggested concert, he declared, amounted to a hostile league against Naples, and by adhering to it Great Britain would become a principal in the resulting war. This she had no intention of doing, since she refused to interfere in the internal concerns of Naples herself or to encourage others to do so. If Austria believed her vital interests imperilled by the revolution in Naples, Great Britain was prepared to

³² Castlereagh to Stewart, September 16, 1820. F.O.: Continent, Circular Dispatches,

stand aside and let her act. In that case a Conference of Ministers at Vienna would be useful, since it could receive the report of Austria and see that nothing was done "incompatible with the present system of Europe." ³³

In view of this unequivocal pronouncement, Metternich was thrown back upon the idea of a Congress. Castlereagh had declared himself ready to consider the question of a Conference as soon as the Austrian Government had clearly defined the purposes for which it was to be summoned; ³⁴ with the revolution in Naples—a military *pronunciamiento* in "wanton and unprovoked" imitation of that in Spain—he was wholly out of sympathy; and Metternich was therefore not without reason for judging that, were the Conference once assembled, the Powers might be readily induced to place their secret differences in the background and to give to the action of Austria in Italy the united "moral support" which was all she needed. It was the more unfortunate that the memorandum in which he states his views as to the attitude to be adopted by the Conference contained statements of principle in flat contradiction to those which inspired British policy, and scarcely less distasteful to France than to England. In the affair of Naples, he argued, the interests of Austria were those of all Europe, since all the Powers were equally interested in the preservation of the treaties, and therefore also in concerting measures for the suppression of any revolutionary movements by which the system established by the treaties might be threatened. The business of the

³³ *Idem to idem*, July 19, 1820. *Ibid.*

³⁴ Proposition adressée par l'Autriche aux Cours. F.O. : Continent, Circular Dispatches, 1820.

Conference which it was proposed to assemble at Troppau would therefore be to define the principles on which the Powers would intervene in Naples, and proceed at once to their application. As to what these principles should be, he proceeded to set out his own views. Revolutions, he argued, were of two kinds: legitimate when initiated from above, illegitimate when enforced from below. In the former case intervention from a foreign Power should not be allowed; in the latter case the Powers should bind themselves over never to recognize changes brought about in this way, and should undertake to abolish such as had taken place in their own states.

This was in effect to take a long step in the direction of Alexander's union of guarantee, and it was a step that Great Britain was less than ever disposed to take. In the refusal of Castlereagh to accept any such basis for the deliberations of the Conference Metternich affected to see an intention to break up the Alliance. Castlereagh, for his part, denied that this was the wish of his Government or that it was involved in the refusal of Great Britain to do what she was not bound to do by the treaties on which the Alliance rested. These were those of Chaumont and Paris, of which the terms were quite clear, and to which the acts of Aix-la-Chapelle had added nothing. By her treaty obligations Great Britain was prepared to abide, and she recognized that there were innumerable subjects outside these which from time to time might equally call for a cordial agreement among the Powers, but without their being bound beforehand to any particular attitude. In conversation with Prince Esterhazy, however, he made the limits of British sympathy with the ideal of European solidarity per-

fectly clear. "If," he said, "it is desired to extend the Alliance so as to include all objects present and future, foreseen and unforeseen, it would change its character to such an extent and carry us so far, that we should see in it an additional motive for adhering to our course at the risk of seeing the Alliance move away from us without our having quitted it." ³⁵

³⁵ Observations de Milord Castlereagh sur un passage d'un rapport de M. le Prince de Metternich, etc. Report of Esterhazy, October 1820. F.O. : Austria, Domestic, September-December 1820.

II

THE CONFERENCES OF TROPPAU AND LAIBACH

Alexander recants his Liberalism—Conversation with Metternich at Troppau—Mutiny of the Syemyenovski regiment—The Holy Alliance becomes an instrument of reaction—Rift between the Autocratic and Constitutional Powers of the Alliance—The Troppau Protocol—Consecration of the principle of intervention—Metternich's explanations—Protest of Castlereagh—Effect on the Powers—Adjourned Conference at Laibach—Continuation of the controversy—The British objections overridden—Breach in the Alliance.

THIS was said on the eve of the Conference, which opened on October 29, 1820; and the constitution of this august assembly emphasized its moral. At all previous Congresses and Conferences since that of Chaumont, Great Britain had been represented by her Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; to Troppau she did not even send a plenipotentiary, Lord Stewart, the British Ambassador at Vienna, being charged to watch the proceedings on behalf of his Government. France, too, though the Conference had been her suggestion and her attitude in the Neapolitan Question was less uncompromising than that of England, did not arm her representatives, the Comte de La Ferronnays and the Marquis de Caraman, with full powers.³⁶ But whatever misgivings Metternich may

³⁶ Richelieu's presence had been suggested; but the Emperor Alexander remonstrated against his leaving Paris and risking the possibility of Decazes using the opportunity of his absence to regain his ascendancy over the King.

have felt on this account were relieved by the changed temper in which he found the Emperor Alexander. On the afternoon of October 24th, he had, over a cup of tea in the inn parlour at Troppau, that famous conversation with the Tsar, in the course of which Alexander confessed that in all that he had done between 1814 and 1818, he had been grievously mistaken. "So we are at one, Prince, and it is to you that we owe it," he said. "You have correctly judged the state of affairs. I deplore the waste of time, which we must try to repair. I am here without any fixed ideas ; without any plan ; but I bring you a firm and unalterable resolution. It is for your Emperor to use it as he wills. Tell me what you desire, and what you wish me to do and I will do it." ³⁷ Four days later the Emperor Alexander was no longer to be without fixed ideas and without a plan. The change was wrought by the news, which reached him one day before the opening of the Congress, of the mutiny at St. Petersburg of the Syemyenovski regiment of his Guard. The effect upon him was instantaneous and profound ; nor is it surprising that it should have been so. This regiment, of which as Cesarevich he had been Colonel-in-chief, had supplied the guard at the Michael Palace on the night of Paul's murder and had since been treated by Alexander with special favour. A military Power such as Russia, as the Emperor explained to Wellington, could not afford to tolerate military revolutions in other countries, the example of which might prove infectious ; and now his worst fears were realized. In vain it was pointed out to him, by all those best able to judge, that no political

³⁷ Metternich to Esterhazy, Troppau, October 24, 1820. F.O. : Austria, Domestic, September-December 1820.

motives underlay the action of the soldiers, who had been goaded to revolt solely by the intolerable tyranny of their colonel, a stupid and cruel Prussian martinet.³⁸ Alexander insisted that the mutiny was the outcome of the conspiracy of the Carbonari, who had spread their network over all Europe and covered even the soil of Holy Russia. Crowning proof of his own folly! In the person of Napoleon he had thought to overthrow the Beast; and behold! it was not incarnate in one man, but a "many-headed monster thing" of which, in his blindness, he had himself encouraged the growth. At least his eyes were opened, by the Providence of God, before it was too late, and his duty was clear. To the servants of the Evil One no mercy must be shown; he set aside as too lenient the sentences passed by the court-martial on the ringleaders of the mutiny—two corporals and five poor privates—and ordered that they should receive six thousand strokes apiece.³⁹ Thus in Holy Russia at least the Lord's will could be done. As for Europe at large, to Alexander God's will was now equally clear. He searched the Scriptures, and found in the most unlikely places—in the stories of Nebuchadnezzar and of Judith and Holofernes, and in the Epistles of St. Paul—Divine lessons applicable to the perils of the hour. To the principle of Evil, bastard brood of Voltairean

³⁸ The mutiny occurred in St. Petersburg on October 18/30, 1820. Its immediate cause was hatred of the colonel, a German named Schwartz, who in disciplining his men after the Prussian model "did not spare them any of those indignities which are as dishonouring to those who suffer as to those who inflict them" (Report of Adjutant Buturlin, in Shilder, *op. cit.*, iv., Appendix VIII, p. 533).

³⁹ *I.e.*, to run the gauntlet between two lines of soldiers armed with sticks. The sentence was of course equivalent to one of death under torture.

philosophy falsely so called, must be opposed the principle of Faith, which found its supreme expression in that revelation of the Most High—the Holy Alliance.⁴⁰ Stripped of its verbiage, this meant that in Alexander's view the Alliance was henceforth to be used as a force purely conservative, if not reactionary.

Alexander's conversion from Jacobinism, which, as Metternich reported, was shared by Capo d'Istria, gave a wholly new merit, from the Austrian point of view, to the conception of the Holy Alliance. With the nebulous idealism which had first inspired this Metternich was wholly out of sympathy; so long as the Tsar continued to repeat the catchwords of Liberalism, its practical objects were suspect to him; but, with the Russian Emperor in this chastened mood, it could be put to the most practical uses. "A new era is beginning," he had written on August 22nd to Esterhazy, "and one positively contrary to the spirit of abstract analysis." The advantage to be derived from this far outweighed, in Metternich's mind, that of obtaining on the Neapolitan Question a complete concert of the Allied Powers. The fact that Great Britain and France were represented at Troppau only by ministers empowered to report, and not to decide, was even, under the actual circumstances, to his advantage. The Emperors Alexander and Francis were present

⁴⁰ See the extraordinary letter of Alexander to Prince Golitsin, dated from Laibach, February 8-15, 1821, in Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich's *L'Empereur Alexandre I^{er}*, i. p. 221. The Grand Duke thinks, not without reason, that this letter is proof that the Tsar's mind was deranged. To Castlereagh, as early as 1815, the Emperor's mind had seemed "not completely sound." To Liverpool, Wellington, *Supplementary Dispatches*, xi. p. 177.

in person, and Prussia was represented by the Crown Prince, afterwards King Frederick William IV, and the chief ministers of all three Powers were also present. The inferior status of the representatives of the two Constitutional Powers, then, gave an excuse for excluding them from the innermost councils of the three Powers "less fettered in their forms," and made it the easier for Metternich to win over the Emperor Alexander and his faithful shadow, the King of Prussia, to his views.

The result was, after negotiations carried on by the three Powers *in private*, the issue of the famous Preliminary Protocol of Troppau, which consecrated the principle of intervention in the following words :

"States which have undergone a change of Government due to revolution, the results of which threaten other states, *ipso facto* cease to be members of the European Alliance, and remain excluded from it until their situation gives guarantees for legal order and stability. If, owing to such alterations, immediate danger threatens other states, the Powers bind themselves, by peaceful means, or if need be by arms, to bring back the guilty state into the bosom of the Great Alliance."

Having secured the adhesion of the two other autocratic states to this principle, Metternich next tried to win over the "absent Allies" by minimizing its effects ; for any public protest on their part would have defeated its immediate object. He forwarded a copy of the Protocol to Prince Esterhazy, the Austrian ambassador in London, with a covering letter in which he explained that it was a mere assertion of principle to which any constitutional state might assent ; that the Emperor of Austria disclaimed any right to interfere with the internal legislation or administration of a separate state,

and that the Protocol did not apply to such internal affairs of another state as exercised no external influence, but only guaranteed legitimate power, as the Alliance guaranteed territorial possession, against *force*.⁴¹ In another letter of the same date he added that he wished to prove the unity of the Powers, and asked for the moral support of those who could not sign. Lord Stewart and Sir Robert Gordon had declared that the Protocol would lead to intervention in the internal concerns of other states. To this he had replied that this was not so, and that all he was aiming at was something like the guarantee of the German Confederation. "You mean then to establish a European Confederation?" they asked. This he had denied, adding that there might be an analogy between a measure of general conservation and some law of an individual state, without the sum of the laws governing this state being applied to the relations of the Powers. As for his object, it was necessary to prove to the world that the Emperor of Russia was not in favour of revolutions, and to bind him to the protection of the established order. Would Great Britain join in this plan?

Great Britain would not join. In a dispatch of December 4th to Lord Stewart, after defining once more the attitude of his Government in the affair of Naples as one of "absolute neutrality," Castlereagh turned to the Troppau Protocol and its underlying political ideas. "As for the idea," he wrote, "which prevails throughout the memoranda, especially the Russian, of some general systematic and solemn

⁴¹ To Esterhazy, Troppau, November 24, 1820. F.O.: Austria, Domestic, September-December 1820.

declaration to be agreed upon and promulgated, this is in effect a revival of those discussions with regard to the establishment of a general system of guarantee, not merely territorial but political, which at Aix-la-Chapelle were laid aside by common consent from the extreme difficulties in which the whole subject was involved." After referring to his own memorandum of September 15, 1818, on the subject, he proceeded to say that the British Government would dissuade the Powers "from attempting to reduce to an abstract rule of conduct possible cases of interference in the internal affairs of independent States." The French Revolution, he maintained, was an exception "from its overbearing and conquering character," and the course of policy pursued in this case could not be applied to all revolutions.⁴²

This letter had its effect. The Protocol had been signed by the three Powers before it had even been submitted to the British and French ministers. The signatures were now withdrawn, and it was explained that the Protocol was to be regarded as a draft, while renewed efforts were made to persuade the dissentient Powers to agree at least to its underlying principles. Whatever hopes may have been entertained of the success of these efforts were speedily belied. On December 16th Castlereagh forwarded to Stewart a long dispatch in which not only the particular provisions of the Protocol, but its whole underlying principle, were submitted to a masterly criticism. I shall quote it at some length, since its arguments apply not only to the immediate case of the Holy Alliance, but to all similar schemes for the organization of peace.

⁴² In F.O.: Continent, Circular Dispatches, 1821.

Of what, asks Castlereagh, is the Protocol a draft? of a reasoned basis for the interference in Naples? or of a general treaty to which the adherence of the other Courts is to be invited? In the latter case the question assumed a character such as must necessarily awaken the attention of all European states with regard to its principles as well as its provisions. It raised questions both as to the position of the contracting Powers towards each other and as to their relation to the independent states which were not parties to the obligations of the Alliance. It was impossible not to be alarmed by the wide and sweeping powers claimed for the Allies by the Protocol—powers which he denied to have any basis in existing treaties. The treaty of November 1815 only stipulated that, in the event of a revolutionary convulsion in France, the Powers were “to deliberate together” with a view to concerting measures to secure their common safety; but the fifth article of the Protocol proceeds at once to recognize their authority to place armies of occupation in such of those states as the Alliance may deem to require such a precaution. If this could not be based upon existing treaties, was it proposed to invite all other states to accede to this league, and thus by their voluntary consent to submit themselves in such cases to the jurisdiction of the Alliance? Could it be supposed that all the states of Europe would choose to accede to such a system, and if not, what was to be the position of the states that did not accede? After pointing out the disastrous effect of this system on the relations between the sovereigns and their peoples, Castlereagh goes on to consider its effect on the relations of the Powers of the Alliance to each other. The rights claimed

under the Protocol, he said, were presumably to be "reciprocal between the parties." Were, then, the great Powers of Europe prepared to admit the principle of their territories being thrown open to each other's approach upon cases of assumed necessity or expediency of which not the party receiving aid, but the party administering it, was to be the judge? As for Great Britain, any minister who should recommend the King to sanction such a principle would render himself liable to impeachment, and the British Government not only dissented from it, but protested against any attempt to consider it, under any conceivable circumstances, as applicable to any of the British dominions.

"It is proposed to create a confederacy for the exercise of a right which, though undoubtedly appertaining, upon the principle of self-defence, in extreme cases, to each particular state, has never yet, as a general measure, been made the subject of a diplomatic regulation or conjoint exercise." It was proposed, he said, to assume on the part of the Alliance a sovereign power over the other states of Europe, on the analogy of the German Confederation. But in the German Confederation the power was exercised, not by its most powerful members, but by the Confederation itself, represented in its Diet. In the present case there was no such regulation, and sooner or later, therefore, the claims of the Alliance would provoke counter-alliances, thus defeating the very objects for which they were advanced. "There are extreme rights to which nations as well as individuals must have recourse for their preservation, and for the exercise of which no legislature can provide. The extreme right of interference between nation and

nation can never be made a matter of written stipulation or be assumed as the attribute of any alliance." To promulgate a new code in connexion with the measures which certain Powers had thought it necessary to take in the case of Naples would only "open an unbounded field for agitation and controversy." In refusing assent to the Protocol, Lord Stewart was to be careful to point out that this did not depend on "the form or phrases of these particular instructions" and was "not susceptible of being removed by any partial modification of their stipulations." The British Government objected to the fundamental principle on which the Protocol rested, namely, that of rendering the powers, either of the existing or of any other alliance, applicable, under any circumstances, to the internal transactions of independent states. For this appeared to lead immediately to the creation of a species of general government in Europe, with a superintending Directory, destructive of all correct notions of internal sovereign authority; and Great Britain could not consent to charge herself, as a member of the Alliance, with the moral responsibility of administering a general European police of this description.⁴³

The Conference at Troppau had meanwhile been adjourned to Laibach, in order to give the King of Naples the opportunity of taking advantage of the invitation sent to him to attend. The adjourned Conference, it may be remarked, which met at Laibach in the second week of January 1821, had somewhat more of the character of a general Congress than that at Troppau, owing to the fact that all the Italian princes were represented at it. Its discussions, how-

⁴³ F.O. : Continent, Circular Dispatches, 1821, No. 32.

ever, were practically confined to the affairs of Naples and of Italy generally. With these we are not immediately concerned, and I shall confine myself to the debates arising out of the Troppau Protocol and its underlying principle.

Castlereagh's letter of December 16th reached Lord Stewart at Vienna. In his reply, dated January 4th, Stewart remarked on the great effect it had produced. All the cabinets, he said, were now expressing their disapproval of the Protocol, the Prussian minister Bernstorff being especially impressed by Castlereagh's arguments, while Capo d'Istria was asserting that the *fact* must precede the *principle*, which meant that the Neapolitan affair must be settled before the argument on general questions was reopened. It was soon clear, however, that this attitude was dictated by the hope that, if the principle of *collective* intervention were kept in the background, Great Britain could be persuaded to hold at Laibach a common language with the other Allies in the Neapolitan Question. This hope was rapidly belied.

Pending the arrival of Lord Stewart at Laibach the preliminary conferences were attended by Sir Robert Gordon, who at once defined the British position. The King of Naples had arrived, he reported, and the letters to and from him had been drawn up by Russia and approved by the Powers. Those from the Powers declared that they were determined to abolish the actual Constitution of Naples, by arms if necessary; that of the King advised submission in view of the circumstances. When the drafts were submitted to the Conference, Gordon quietly suggested that the words "*sovereign Powers*" should be substituted for "*allied Powers*," as

Great Britain was no party to the transaction. Asked, point-blank, whether he would sign the drafts, he replied that he certainly would not do so, as Great Britain was neutral and had sent no plenipotentiary to the Conference. Upon this Capo d'Istria proposed that he should be excluded from the Conference altogether. Gordon replied that Great Britain was too much interested in discussions of such importance to consent to this, and added the clinching argument that it would give that very appearance of disunion which the Allies were anxious to avoid. The French minister, M. de Blacas, was equally opposed to the drafts as they stood, as being too reminiscent of what had been done in France in 1814; he proposed that the views of the Powers should simply be embodied in journals, and that, for the rest, the royal letter should be reinforced by separate instructions to the representatives of the Powers at Naples. To this course Gordon equally objected; Great Britain could not and would not hold a common language in this matter with the coercive Powers. Thereupon Capo d'Istria, giving up the hope of making Great Britain toe the line, revived the notion of a declaration deducing the whole action of the Allies from general principles and basing it on their treaty obligations. To this Gordon objected strongly, as implying that Great Britain was departing from her treaty obligations.⁴⁴

The situation had thus been defined when Lord Stewart arrived, and from the point of view of the solidarity of the Alliance it was not improved by his arrival. The refusal of Great Britain to come into line with the other Powers on ground outside that of

⁴⁴ F.O. : Austria, Stewart, January-February 1821.

the Troppau Protocol, determined them to return to the principles enunciated in it, since there was apparently nothing to be gained by deserting them. At the seventh meeting of the Conference, Capo d'Istria read to the assembled Italian plenipotentiaries a recapitulation of all the Emperor Alexander's arguments and sentiments on the questions of the general guarantee and the measures adopted at Troppau. Stewart at once protested that, if the Russian ministers thought it wise to proceed to a new development of their former sentiments, he would be forced to record "upon the face of the proceedings" the views entertained by his Government, which made Great Britain arrive at a different conclusion. Accordingly, he annexed to the journals of the proceedings a "declaration" recording that Great Britain was not at one with the Allied Sovereigns in this matter.

The strong action of the British Government, he reported, had to all appearance completely stopped for the time being all questions of "general measures," and he hoped that, in the event of the action towards Naples being successful, the three Powers would be less anxious for the guarantee. This was, however, far from being the case. In the Conference of January 31st he found it necessary to interrupt Metternich, who was delivering an allocution to the Duke of San Gallo in the name of the Alliance, and to insist once more that the British attitude should be made clear by the reading of the declaration inserted in the journals.

Two days later the Emperor Alexander himself condescended to argue the matter with him. The Troppau Protocol, he said, was necessary for the safety

of Europe; and if at Aix-la-Chapelle the mutual guarantee had only been suggested, as Stewart pointed out, for territorial integrity, and not against internal revolution, this was because the Powers had never dreamed of the possibility of military revolts such as had revolutionized Spain, Naples, and Portugal.⁴⁵ On the same day Metternich read a paper in which he used the phrase "the solidarity of the Allied Powers as established by the transactions of Troppau and Laibach." Stewart objected to the words "solidarity" and "established," and succeeded in getting the latter altered to "defined."

Stewart now read to the assembled ministers Castlereagh's circular note and dispatches condemning the Troppau Protocol and defining the British position. This caused the utmost dismay. "It is clear," wrote Stewart, "that the Emperor of Russia has grounded all his doctrines of right of interference on the conservative principles of the Alliance and of existing treaties; and H.I.M., having availed himself of this reasoning towards his subjects (who are by no means pleased at seeing him again wandering over Europe), finds at once, when he did not look for it, a complete denial on our part of assumptions which, through the directing influence of the Russian cabinet, have been fulminated through all the transactions of the Conferences of Troppau and Laibach." The bitterness, he added, was very evident. Metternich exclaimed that the British ministers would have done better to have stayed away from the Conferences; to which Stewart replied that they would have done so had they not been *implored* to come.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ To Castlereagh, February 2, 1821.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* F.O.: Austria, Stewart, February 1821, No. 19.

It is unnecessary to pursue the quarrel further in detail. On March 20th Stewart reported to Castlereagh the character of the acts closing the Congress of Laibach. The declaration, he said, was not objectionable from the British point of view. But the three Powers—Russia, Austria, and Prussia—had in addition issued circular dispatches and instructions to their ministers in Naples, in which they recurred to a development of the Troppau Protocol in terms which they could not but know would be highly displeasing to Great Britain and France. "In short," said Stewart, "there can be little doubt from the complexion of these instruments that a Triple Understanding has been created which binds the parties to carry forward their own views in spite of any difference of opinion which may exist between them and the two great constitutional Governments."⁴⁷ In another letter of the same date he emphasizes the practical outcome of the whole debate that had arisen out of the Troppau Protocol. "The first acts of Troppau," he wrote, "framed an Alliance between the three Courts which placed them entirely in a new attitude from us, and they have now, I consider, hermetically sealed their treaty before Europe."

Thus at Laibach, though it must be remembered that these debates were not made public, we have already foreshadowed that sharp division between the three autocratic Eastern Powers—the "Holy Alliance," as the term came to be understood—and the two Western Liberal Powers, a division which was to determine the international relations of Europe from the revolution of 1830 till the Crimean War. That

⁴⁷ To Castlereagh, Vienna, March 20, 1821. F.O.: Austria, Lord Stewart, March–September 1821.

ten years passed before the schism in the Great Alliance became defined in this sense was due to the emergence of two questions which cracked it, so to speak, on different lines of cleavage. The first of these was the outbreak of the War of Greek Independence in the spring of 1821, while the Conference of Laibach was actually in session. The second was the progress of the revolution in Spain and the determination of France to intervene on principles similar to those which had led to the Austrian intervention in Naples. The latter question, which involved that of the future relations to each other of the New World and the Old, I reserve for a separate section. With the other, which was destined during the next few years to act as so powerful a solvent of the Alliance, I propose to deal here only in so far as it falls within the limits of the period under review and affects the development of my main theme.

III

THE EASTERN QUESTION

Alexander and the Christians in Turkey—Suggestions to Pitt—Agreement of Tilsit—Treaty of Bucharest—Turkey and the Congress of Vienna—Exclusion of Turkey from the Holy Alliance—Effect of the Greek insurrection—Metternich keeps Alexander “grouped” at Laibach—Insurrection in the Morea—Rapprochement of Great Britain and Austria—Meeting of Metternich and Castlereagh at Hanover—Peril of Russian intervention—Alexander and Capo d’Istria—The Holy Alliance *v.* Russia—Meeting of Castlereagh and Metternich at Hanover—Alexander agrees to a Conference—Death of Castlereagh—George Canning—No breach in the continuity of British policy—Castlereagh’s “instructions” as plenipotentiary at the Conference—These handed unaltered to Wellington—Definition of the attitude of Great Britain towards the questions to be raised—Wellington at Vienna—Dismissal of Capo d’Istria—The Eastern Question shelved.

THE fate of Turkey and of its Christian subject populations had long exercised the mind of the Emperor Alexander. In 1804 he had enlarged to Pitt on the grievances of the subject races, and had suggested that Russia and Great Britain should concert beforehand the measures to be taken in the event of a break-up of the Ottoman Empire. The compact of Tilsit, however, altered his views; the armies of Russia advanced into the Danubian principalities; and in 1812 the Treaty of Bucharest, besides giving her a foothold on the Black Sea to the south of the Caucasus, established her European boundary with Turkey on the Pruth and consecrated her claim to a

special right of protection over the autonomous Balkan states. The campaign of 1812 and the revival of Alexander's European ideals again changed the situation. At Vienna Alexander expressed his willingness to have the integrity of Turkey placed under the guarantee of the Alliance. The negotiations broke down, primarily, on the obstinate refusal of Sultan Mahmud to ratify the terms of the Treaty of Bucharest; for it was obviously impossible to guarantee territories of which the boundaries were not defined.⁴⁸ Thus it came that, neither at Vienna nor at any subsequent meetings of the Powers, had any attempt been made to settle the "Eastern Question"—as it was soon to be called—while the exclusion of Turkey from the territorial settlement effected by "the Treaties" and of the Sultan from the Holy Alliance gave plentiful scope for those sinister rumours as to his intentions against which Alexander thought it necessary to issue his solemn protest.

The sudden emergence, then, of the Eastern Question in an acute form was a serious danger to the harmony of the European Concert. The Emperor Alexander might protest that he had never had any intention of attacking Turkey; but, rightly or wrongly, his reputation for truthfulness was not of the highest, and appearances were against him. The Greek Capo d'Istria, committed as a member of the *Hetairia Philike* to the dream of Hellenic independence, was still at his elbow. Alexander

⁴⁸ See for this and, generally, for the relations of Turkey and Russia after the Treaty of Bucharest, a letter of Sir Thomas Liston, British ambassador at Constantinople, to Wellington at Vienna, dated March 25, 1815. F.O.: Congress, Turkey. Misc. Archives, September 1814–July 1815. The situation is well summed up in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (11th ed.), s.v., Turkey, xxvii, p. 455d.

Ypsilanti, the leader of the northern revolt, was a Russian general and a *protégé* of the Tsar; he had crossed the Pruth in company with other Greeks in Russian service; and, above all, he had issued a proclamation stating that he was supported by "a Great Power." The statement was a lie, the proclamation empty bombast, characteristic of the whole conduct of that foolish and tragic adventure. From the point of view of Great Britain and Austria, however, for whom the integrity of Turkey was a cardinal article of political faith, it was fortunate that the news of the rising reached Alexander at Laibach, where it was possible for Metternich to exert all his newly acquired influence to persuade him to look at the matter with "European" eyes.

Never had the Tsar's idealism led him into a more awkward situation. The sympathies of his people were wholly with their fellow-Christians in revolt; his armies, irritated by a stupid and galling discipline, were honeycombed with disaffection,⁴⁹ for which a successful campaign in Turkey would have been the obvious cure; every tradition of his house would have led him to pose as the protector of the Orthodox Greeks against their Mussulman oppressors, and incidentally to push forward the frontiers of Holy Russia at the expense of the infidel. But he had committed himself to the principle of organized peace; at Troppau and since he had loudly proclaimed the duty of the Powers collectively to intervene to assist legitimate sovereigns against their revolted subjects; how could he now risk a general conflagration in Europe by marching to the assistance of subjects in revolt against their legitimate sovereign? The

⁴⁹ See note 38, p. 220.

most that he could do was to interfere neither on one side nor the other, and to leave the revolt to burn itself out, as Metternich put it, "beyond the pale of civilization." From Laibach, accordingly, Capo d'Istria addressed at his orders the letter to Ypsilanti which, by denouncing his action in claiming the support of Russia, dashed whatever hope of success the revolt in the north may have had.

The self-congratulation of Metternich upon the success of his diplomacy was, however, premature. The conferences at Laibach had hardly come to an end when the far more serious insurrection broke out in the Morea. One singular result of this, and of the rapid success of the revolted Greeks, was to postpone the public breach of the Alliance by making the British Government realize once more that the principles proclaimed by the Emperor Alexander, however objectionable in their general application, might be made serviceable in particular cases. It was, in short, again necessary to group him; and the best way to do this was once more to "present something somewhat in the tone of his own ideas." For this purpose it was not only convenient, but imperative, to come to an understanding with Austria, and Castlereagh decided to take advantage of the visit of King George IV to Hanover in October, in order to arrange a meeting with Metternich. He was fully aware of the interpretation which his political opponents would put upon this action. "Had the question been of an ordinary character," he wrote to Sir Robert Gordon, "and involving the form of government under which any portion of Europe was to subsist (as that of Naples lately did), I should have felt as you have done about an inter-

view with Prince Metternich, that it might lead to more noise and jealousy than was worth encountering. But the question of Turkey is of a totally different character, and one which in England we regard, not as a theoretical, but as a practical consideration of the greatest moment." What these practical considerations were he explained in a letter to Charles Bagot. Of the Greeks, "the descendants of those in admiration of whom we have been educated," he speaks with a warmth of sympathy which could not have been exceeded by Canning. If a statesman were allowed to regulate his conduct by the dictates of the heart, instead of the dictates of the understanding, he sees no limits to the impulse that might be given to his conduct by this sympathy. "But," he adds, "we must always recollect that his is the graver task of providing for the peace and security of those interests immediately committed to his care; that he must not endanger the fate of the present generation in a speculative endeavour to improve the lot of that which is to come. I cannot, therefore, reconcile it to my sense of duty to embark in a scheme for new modelling the position of the Greek population in these countries at the hazard of all the destructive confusion and disunion which such an attempt may lead to, not only within Turkey, but in Europe."

From this point of view the situation was, indeed, sufficiently critical. The Turks obstinately refused to carry out the terms of the Treaty of Bucharest; they still occupied the Danubian principalities; Greek ships, sailing under the Russian flag, had been impounded in the Straits; and, worst of all, the judicial murder of the Patriarch Gregorios was an outrage

and a challenge to the whole Orthodox world, and had been followed by the withdrawal of Strogonov, the Russian ambassador, from Constantinople. The vacillating attitude of the Emperor Alexander betrayed the contradictory influences by which he was swayed. To Sir Charles Bagot he protested that the withdrawal of Strogonov made for peace, for had he remained at Constantinople he would have had to report all the outrages passing under his eyes, and the Porte, in a moment of anger, might have put him—in accordance with old tradition—in the Seven Towers.⁵⁰ A little later he was inquiring of Castlereagh what attitude Great Britain would assume in the event of war and the collapse of the Ottoman power.

This question Castlereagh refused to answer.⁵¹ He admitted the special grievances of Russia, and, true to the principles he had consistently championed, he joined with Metternich in pressing the Porte to meet its treaty obligations and thus to deprive Russia of all valid excuse for intervention. The difficulty was to persuade the Turks that concessions on their part would produce the desired effect. To the representations of Count Lützow, the Austrian internuncio, the Reis Effendi stated the willingness of his Government to evacuate the principalities if Austria would guarantee that they should not be occupied by Russia. The Austrian enlarged on the

⁵⁰ Copy of report of Lebzeltern to Metternich, St. Petersburg, September 16/4, 1821. Enclosed in Londonderry to Liverpool. F.O.: Continent, Hanover, Marquess of Londonderry. September–November 1821, No. 1. "Ce qui prouve," comments Lebzeltern, "que l'Empereur ignore combien ce ministre a été prêt d'éprouver ce sort et ceux qui le savent se gardent bien de le lui révéler."

⁵¹ To Bagot, Hanover, October 28th. *Ibid.*

peaceful disposition of the Emperor Alexander as revealed at Laibach. "It may be so," replied the Turk, "but he has 100,000 men concentrated on the frontier."

It was the old distrust, born of the old contradiction in Alexander's character and attitude: the language of peace in his mouth and behind him the frowning menace of his armaments. For the moment this contradiction was, for Metternich, embodied in the two men in whom the direction of Russian policy lay—Alexander himself and his minister, Capo d'Istria. Capo d'Istria was bent on moulding this policy to Greek ends, disguised as those of Russia. Alexander, if for no other reason than that he was conscious of the immense risks of war under the circumstances, was inclined to look at things neither from a Greek nor a Russian, but from a European point of view.⁵² Salvation lay in taking advantage of the Emperor's mood of the moment; and Metternich plied him with arguments to prove that the unrest in Turkey did not differ essentially from that elsewhere in Europe, and that the Greek insurgents were rebels against legitimate authority like any others.

Such was the condition of things when Castlereagh (now Marquess of Londonderry) and Metternich met at Hanover. In the broad objects of their policy they were at one: they were equally agreed that, in

⁵² "I believe that the Emperor and his minister are farther apart than ever in their principles, their views, and their calculations. Situated in all essential respects like two hostile Powers, the only cement that binds them together is the want of energy in the character of the two men, the spirit of suppleness in the minister, and the lack of a man to take his place" (to Esterhazy, Vienna, October 2, 1821. F.O.: Continent, Hanover, Marquess of Londonderry. September–November 1821).

order to attain them, it was necessary that Alexander should be "grouped," and they had, therefore, the less difficulty in concerting the means for attaining this end. These were, briefly, to tie the Tsar down to a logical development of his own loudly proclaimed principles. In a confidential memorandum Metternich defined the attitude of Austria. Her aim was the maintenance of peace on the basis of existing treaties, and she would therefore continue to press the Porte to yield on the points at issue with Russia under the Treaty of Bucharest. The question of war, on the other hand, she refused to consider. "There exists," he wrote, "an explicit engagement on the part of Russia that on no hypothesis would the Emperor ever separate himself from the conservative principles of the Alliance. It is to this declaration that the Emperor of Austria has attached the moral guarantee which he has been invited by his august ally to accord him. We believe that it would be sufficient, both in the general and in the particular interests of the Powers, to regard this basis as existing in fact."⁵³ The same argument was used in the letter, already quoted, addressed by Castlereagh to Sir Charles Bagot at St. Petersburg on October 28th. As for the question of making war out of sympathy for the oppressed Christian subjects of the Porte, "the nature of the Turkish power," he wrote, "was fully understood when the existing state of Europe, including that of Turkey, was placed under the provident care and anxious protection of the general Alliance."

⁵³ *Mém. confidentiel et secret*. Hanover, October 22, 1821. F.O.: Continent, Hanover, Marquess of Londonderry. September-November 1821.

In so far as this asserted the equal sanctity of all treaties, it was but emphasizing a principle for which the British Government had throughout contended. But it went far beyond this in claiming that all territorial treaties, and not only those executed in common, were equally "placed under the protection of the general Alliance." The language of the last sentence, indeed, seemed to endorse the principle of a universal guarantee, against which Great Britain had hitherto set her face, and to come perilously near a recognition of that idea of a universal union against which she had always protested. At whatever cost of consistency, however, it served its immediate purpose. Metternich's diplomacy, thus supported, was successful; the Emperor Alexander, faced with the alternative of offending the sentiment of his people or of bringing down in ruin the whole edifice of his international ideal, chose the former. After much correspondence, with which it is unnecessary to concern ourselves, it was decided to summon another solemn Conference of the Allies, to which, among other outstanding questions of general interest, that of Turkey was also to be submitted. Whatever turn the debates on this subject might take, the danger of a separate intervention of Russia in the Ottoman Empire was at least postponed. The Emperor Alexander was once more "grouped."

The solemn Conference, which the Russian Emperor signified his intention of attending, was fixed for the end of October at Verona. A preliminary meeting of ministers was, however, to be held at Vienna in September, at which the Eastern Question (as it now began to be called) was to be the main subject of

discussion. It was Castlereagh's purpose to attend an assembly fraught with such momentous issues for the peace of Europe, and all his preparations were made. Overwork and anxiety had, however, wrought upon his brain, and on August 12th, in a moment of crushing depression, he put an end to his life. The wits of the Opposition found matter for jesting even in the tragic circumstances of his death; at his funeral the mob was loud in its demonstrations of joy; and the triumph of the political tendencies he had opposed stereotyped for three generations an estimate of his character and his aims founded upon ignorance and party spite. It has been reserved for the present age to begin to realize something of the debt of gratitude which Great Britain and Europe owe to a statesman who, if he lacked superficial brilliance, possessed in his high sense of duty, in his transparent honesty of purpose, and in his clear common sense, qualities far more valuable in a man of affairs than those which are more apt to win the admiration of the crowd.

The death of Castlereagh was, from Metternich's point of view, a supreme misfortune for Europe, an opinion strengthened by the subsequent career of that "malevolent meteor" George Canning, who succeeded him at the Foreign Office. In fact, however, the change produced less effect than was commonly supposed upon the attitude of Great Britain towards the Alliance, for Canning merely took up and developed the policy of Castlereagh, for which, indeed, as a member of the Cabinet, he had been equally responsible. It is true that Canning, whose knowledge of European conditions was less intimate than that of Castlereagh, had long

viewed with impatience the supposed hampering of the free initiative of Great Britain by her continental ties, and he therefore regarded the possibility of a breach with the Alliance with a complacency which Castlereagh could never have felt. But the difference between the two statesmen was less in their fundamental attitude than in its expression. If Canning posed ostentatiously as the champion of a "British" policy, this was to do less than justice to Castlereagh, in whose mind the interests of his country had ever held the first place. If he looked forward to the gradual dissolution of the Alliance by the gradual withdrawal of England, this was but to emphasize the opinion of Castlereagh that, in certain eventualities, the Alliance would "move away from England" without her having quitted it. For Castlereagh, like Canning, had already made the discovery that the fundamental difficulty in any attempt to organize an international system is not so much that of holding the balance "between conflicting nations," though that is difficult enough, as that of holding the balance "between conflicting principles." Had he lived, his eventual policy would probably have differed from that of Canning only in the more conciliatory choice of its forms.

This is proved by the tenor of the memorandum, drawn up for his own use at the Conference, which was handed over unaltered to the Duke of Wellington, to whom the mission was now confided. The selection of the Duke to represent Great Britain was in itself proof that there was no intention of violently reversing the continental policy with which, equally with Castlereagh, he had been throughout identified. But this made all the more significant the limitations

imposed upon him by his instructions, which defined the course that, in certain eventualities, Great Britain would be forced to follow, and in doing so laid down the lines on which Canning's policy in opposition to the continental Powers was presently to develop.

The subjects which, according to the memorandum, were to come up for discussion at the Conferences sufficiently illustrate, in their complexity and the wideness of their range, the immensity of the task which the Allied Powers had undertaken in making themselves collectively responsible for the world's peace. There was the Turkish Question, including both the controversy of the Porte with Russia and the internal situation arising out of the Greek revolt ; the Spanish Question, involving the fate of the nascent republics of Latin America, and complicated now by the claim of France to intervene, as Austria had done in Naples, for the purpose of ending a revolutionary *régime* of which she feared the contagion ; there were the multiplex questions arising out of the affairs of Italy, where Austria, having crushed the military revolts in Naples and Piedmont, still looked to the Alliance to perfect and to consecrate with its approval the edifice of her supremacy. Outside these matters of "European" interest there were others scheduled as more specifically British. These included the inevitable question of the suppression of the Slave Trade, which had throughout been a severe handicap on Great Britain in her negotiations, and the situation arising out of the *ukaz*, issued by the Emperor Alexander in the preceding year, excluding all but Russian ships from the Behring Sea and from the Pacific coast of the American possessions

of Russia. The inclusion of the latter subject for discussion by the Allies has a special interest in view of later developments, since it directly affected the United States of America, which, equally with Great Britain, had immediately protested against the *ukaz*.

As regards the subjects of general European interest to be discussed, the memorandum defines very carefully the attitude to be adopted, from the point of view of principle, in each case. But for the extreme urgency of the Eastern Question, the precedent of Troppau and Laibach would have been followed, and Great Britain would not have been represented by a plenipotentiary. Lord Londonderry's mission was intended, as is specifically stated, "to counteract the probable effect of the Ottoman refusal to send plenipotentiaries to the frontier," and not as a proof that Great Britain had once more placed herself on the same platform as the other Allies. This was made especially clear in reference to the affairs of Italy—so far as England was concerned a *chose jugée*. "With regard to the Italian States," the memorandum ran, "the position of the British minister must necessarily vary from that of his colleagues at Vienna, as we are no parties to the acts taken by the allied cabinets. We acquiesced in their measures, and reserved to ourselves the right to interfere when we saw occasion, but we did not agree to charge ourselves with any superintendence of the system decided on." As for the Greek Question, the memorandum is equally explicit as to the attitude of Great Britain towards any possible suggestion of a concerted intervention between the Porte and the insurgents; care was to be taken not to commit her

to any concert which should go beyond the limits of good offices, and engagements of the nature of a guarantee were to be considered altogether inadmissible. On the other hand, the situation had been radically altered by the collapse of the Ottoman naval power in the Levant, by the consequent total inactivity of the Turkish commanders in the Morea, and the progress made by the Greeks towards the formation of a Government. "So long as the force of the insurgents was directed by the mere will of the leaders, the principle of neutrality led to no other consideration than that of giving an equal rule of accommodation to the parties, but by the erection of a Government admitting of formal acts being done on the part of that Government, we are more positively brought to deal with them *de facto*, upon matters of blockade and other questions dependent upon the law of nations. Considering the course pursued by Great Britain now for so many years towards the local Governments exercising dominion in South America, and her avowed neutrality as between the Greeks and the Turks, it may be difficult for this country, if a *de facto* Government shall be actually established in the Morea and the western provinces of Turkey, to refuse it the ordinary privileges of a belligerent."

On the question of Spain and of her colonies the language of the memorandum was equally explicit. As for Spain herself, there was to be "a rigid abstinence from any interference in the internal affairs of that country." The problem of the colonies offered a wider choice of alternative action. It was certain that, if Spain did not succeed in re-establishing her authority within a given time, other states would, sooner or later, acknowledge their separate existence ;

and, this being so, it was to the interest of Spain herself to find the means of restoring an intercourse, when she could not succeed in restoring a dominion. It was impossible now to interrupt the intercourse which had grown up between Great Britain and the Spanish colonies, and the question had resolved itself into one rather of the mode of the relations between them, than as to whether they should or should not subsist "to the extent in matter of right as regulated by the law of nations." Recognition might take three forms: either *de facto*, as was actually the case, or by diplomatic agents, or *de jure*, "so as to create a certain impediment to the assertion of the rights of the former occupant." There was as yet no fair pretence for calling upon Great Britain to recognize the Latin American republics *de jure*, but it was a question how long it would be before she would in her own interests have to recognize them by the dispatch of diplomatic agents. On this matter an attempt was to be made to obtain a concert, but in such a way as to leave Great Britain independence of action.

In the views embodied in this memorandum there is little disposition shown to subordinate the essential interests of Great Britain to those of her continental Allies, while they clearly foreshadow the later policy of Canning in the questions both of Greece and of the Latin American states. In enclosing the memorandum to the Duke of Wellington, Lord Bathurst made it clear that there was no intention of departing from the standpoint taken up in the preceding year. He pointed out that at Troppau and Laibach the position of the British minister was somewhat distinct from that of his colleagues, being

limited to informing himself of what was going on and to seeing that nothing was done inconsistent with the existing system and the treaties.⁵⁴ Wellington, accordingly, was instructed to wait until the affairs of Italy had been settled before going to Verona, where Lord Londonderry (Lord Stewart) was to attend in the same capacity as at Troppau and Laibach and with the same instructions. As to this, however, Wellington soon perceived in the course of the proceedings at Vienna that the debates at Verona would "turn almost entirely on the affairs of Spain." A solution, at least temporary, of the perilous Turkish Question had been reached in the preliminary conferences with surprising ease, owing mainly to the disappearance from the Tsar's side of Capo d'Istria, who, on the eve of the meeting, had passed into retirement, from which he was destined to emerge five years later as President of Greece. The removal of this implacable opponent of Austria had been due to the influence of Metternich, who now, as Wellington reported, himself became in a great degree the Russian Emperor's principal adviser and had little difficulty in impressing his views upon him. Under these circumstances the attitude of the Allied Powers towards the whole Turkish Question was settled in the sense desired by Austria, and the hopes which the Greeks had built upon the active sympathy of Russia were once more dashed. When, on October 20th, the Conference was opened at Verona the only question of first-class importance raised was that of Spain, and this, with the momentous issues involved in it, occupied practically all its

⁵⁴ Bathurst to Wellington, September 14, 1822. F.O.: Continent, Verona, Duke of Wellington. September-December 1822.

sessions. Before dealing with the Conference and its outcome, I shall give some account of the earlier debates in the councils of the Alliance on this question of Spain and her colonies—debates which, in view of recent developments of the Monroe Doctrine, have at the present time perhaps more than a merely academic interest.

IV

THE QUESTION OF SPAIN AND HER COLONIES

The Spanish colonial system—The Latin American revolutions—Monarchies or republics?—Misgivings in Europe—Rivalry of Spain and Portugal on the River Plate—Danger of European war—Supposed ambitions of the Emperor Alexander—Proposed intervention of the Alliance—Opposition of Castlereagh—He foreshadows the recognition of the Latin American Republics—The question at Aix—Refusal to invite the King of Spain—Proposed peaceful mediation rejected by Spain—Richelieu's memorandum on the perils of the New World—Proposal to invite the United States to co-operate with the Allies—Criticisms of Wellington—Interview of Castlereagh with Alexander, whom he converts to the principle of non-intervention in this case.

THE revolt of the Latin American colonies had in the first instance been directed not against the Spanish monarchy, but against the intolerable Spanish colonial system :—the narrow trade monopoly which impoverished the New World without enriching the Old ; the moral and intellectual tutelage symbolized by the Inquisition and enforced by a corrupt and extortionate administration, in which the Creoles were not allowed to have a share ; the narrow *conquistador* spirit which continued after three centuries to hold the native races in slavery. The revolution which broke out on January 1, 1809, in Buenos Aires and, under the leadership of San Martin in the South and Bolivar in the North, developed

into the great War of Independence, which lasted until, in 1824, Bolivar's victories at Junin and Ayacucho completed the liberation of Latin America, was not at first a republican movement. Indeed, after Napoleon's conquest of Spain, loyalty to Ferdinand VII became the avowed motive of the insurgents, and in the earlier stages they would have been perfectly content with practical independence under the suzerainty of the Spanish Crown. With the restoration of Ferdinand VII, however, the war developed into a struggle against the monarchy itself; and the insurgents took for their model the United States, of which the independence had been recognized by Charles III in 1783. The result was that at the very time when in the Old World the Powers were engaged in curbing "revolutionary madness" and in setting up the principles of the prescriptive rights of legitimate sovereigns, in the New World a whole series of young republics were emerging from a chaos of revolutionary violence.

It is not surprising that this state of things should have been regarded by the Powers with serious misgivings, as calculated to set an evil example to Europe, and that their attention should have been early directed to it. The question of what attitude they should assume was, however, one of extreme complication. To begin with, it was not merely one between Spain and her colonies, but between Spain and Portugal, which had invaded the River Plate territories and occupied Montevideo; and in September 1816 it looked as though this would lead to another Peninsular War. The firm attitude of Great Britain prevented this war from breaking out; but as to coming to an agreement, the Spanish

Government, as Castlereagh reported in December 1817,⁵⁵ was as unbending as if Europe were at its feet, and all the ministers of the Powers failed to induce it to send plenipotentiaries to Paris, where it was hoped to settle the matter in concert; so the struggle between the Portuguese and Spaniards on the River Plate continued, until it was settled by British mediation in 1828.

As to the more general question, the antithesis was between the views of Russia and Great Britain.⁵⁶ The Emperor Alexander was represented at Madrid by an agent, Ivan Tatishchev, whose activities were in the highest degree disconcerting, aimed as they seemed to be at securing for Russia alone a preponderating influence in Spain and her empire when reconquered. Russian aid in the reconquest had been foreshadowed by the sale to Spain, very cheap, of three line-of-battle ships, which, proving unseaworthy, were afterwards reinforced by three frigates. Again, it seemed, Alexander needed "grouping." The conditions upon which he was prepared to be grouped were—Castlereagh said he had reason to suspect—that terms should be offered by the Powers to the insurgents, and that, if these were refused, Spain should be supported by the force of the Alliance. Castlereagh, for his part, was averse from any such proceeding. It was not only that public feeling was strongly in favour of the colonies—Bolivar's British Legion was famous in the War of Independence—but the British Government itself was

⁵⁵ "Secret and Private," to Wellington, Cray, December 18th. Cont., Paris, Wellington. June–December 1817.

⁵⁶ It must be remembered that until 1867 Russia was an American Power.

not prepared to aid in riveting once more on Latin America the wretched misgovernment against which it was protesting in Spain itself. Moreover—and this in the long run was the determining factor—a vigorous British trade, impossible under the old colonial system, had grown up with the new republics, and this trade the Spanish Government stubbornly refused to recognize. Already Castlereagh was considering the possibility of that ultimate recognition of the Latin American Republics which he was to formulate in the instructions drawn up by him for his use at the Congress of Verona, which formed, after his tragic death, the basis of the policy afterwards carried out by Canning. As early as the spring of 1818, a long step had been taken in this direction by his refusal to remonstrate, at the request of Spain, with the government of the United States for recognizing the *de facto* South American Governments, and by an offer of mediation between Spain and the United States which the Spanish Government declined.⁵⁷

That the subject of the Spanish colonies was brought up at the Aix-la-Chapelle was largely due to the urgency of France. In July 1817 Richelieu had spoken strongly to Wellington of the condition of South America, which, he said, was “becoming daily more and more an object of attention and of hope to the disaffected in France and to the Jacobins throughout the world.” He was not, at this time, in favour of submitting the question to a conference, “with its inevitable conflict of opinions,” but thought that the initiative should be taken by Great Britain

⁵⁷ To Wellington, March 27, 1818. F.O.: Cont., Congress, Paris, Aix.

backed by the Powers. This plan appealed to Castlereagh as likely to counter Russian intrigues and to force Alexander to "urge Liberal principles upon the Spanish Government," but, as we have seen, it broke down on the stubborn obstinacy of Spain. A year later, on the eve of the Conference, the French Government urged that Ferdinand VII should be invited to Aix-la-Chapelle, not with a view to the restoration of his authority in Latin America by arms or mediation—which was now considered impracticable—but to press upon him the policy of establishing one or more of his family as independent sovereigns in the revolted provinces, Richelieu suggesting that a beginning should be made by setting up a Bourbon king of Buenos Aires. On August 24th the Spanish chargé d'affaires approached Alexander on this subject, on which the Emperor said he would consult his allies. The idea broke down owing to the opposition of Castlereagh, who gave as the ostensible reason of his disagreement his unwillingness to break the existing agreement "by receiving one Power to the exclusion of others," or to turn the meeting into a congress, which the Allies had determined to be inexpedient.⁵⁸

This decided the fate of the proposed mediation, the discussion of which began at Aix-la-Chapelle on October 23rd, and was concluded, so far as formal proceedings were concerned, on November 2nd.⁵⁹ The outcome of these debates was that force was not to be used; that the same treatment should be meted out to the revolted as

⁵⁸ F.O. : Cont., Aix, Castlereagh. Protocol 18. In Castlereagh to Bathurst, No. 20.

⁵⁹ To Bathurst, No. 22.

to the loyal colonies ; and that mediation should be offered either by a board or by one delegate, the Duke of Wellington being suggested. The whole question of mediation, however, was ultimately shelved, owing to the proud refusal of Spain to accept the results of a Conference from which she was excluded.

Before the Conference broke up, however, the debates took a new turn, which is of very great interest in the light of subsequent events leading up to the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine. This was no less than a proposal advanced by France and Russia to invite the United States to take part in a Conference of Ministers to be held at Madrid on the subject of the relation between Spain and her colonies. It was initiated by Richelieu in a memorandum on "the perils of the New World" which, in view of what has happened since and is occurring still, is certainly a remarkable document. In isolation, he argued, the United States would not constitute a danger ; but it would be different were the Latin American states to imitate their institutions. "A complete republican world, young, full of ardour, rich in the products of all climates and with soil of incomparable fertility, establishing itself in the presence of a Europe grown old, everywhere ruled by monarchs, overcrowded with inhabitants, shaken by thirty years of revolutionary shocks, and scarce as yet re-established on its ancient foundations, would certainly present a spectacle worthy of the most serious reflections and a very real danger." The United States should be invited to co-operate with the Allies, partly to gain time, partly "in order to attach the United States to the general system of

Europe and to prevent a spirit of rivalry and hatred establishing itself between the Old and the New World." ⁶⁰

In a memorandum on the French and Russian notes Wellington pointed out that it was extremely doubtful whether Spain would accept the mediation of the five Powers in this form either, and that without such acceptance it was useless to approach the United States. After all, he argued, the questions at issue between Spain and her colonies were of the nature of domestic politics. The United States were doubtless, like the rest of the world, interested in the settlement of these questions, and their Government had a right to demand that nothing should be done that might be specially obnoxious to them. But, even were Spain to agree, he very much doubted whether the United States would bring to the discussion the same desire to agree and the same views as to the preservation of the ancient monarchy of Spain as animated the other Powers. In conclusion, he objected altogether to the proposed conferences at Madrid, and gave it as his opinion that no settlement was possible which did not take into account the wishes of the colonies as well as those of Spain. ⁶¹

The matter was finally settled in an interview between Alexander and Castlereagh. Castlereagh was entirely opposed to the use of force. The Alliance, he said, was not competent to *arbitrate* or *judge*, and was therefore not competent to enforce any such

⁶⁰ F.O. : Cont., Aix, Castlereagh. November 1818. In Castlereagh to Bathurst, No. 48. The last sentence is annotated in the margin, it would seem by Canning (the next note being dated 1824), with the remark, "Sound enough in itself, but not in its application here."

⁶¹ F.O. : Cont., Congress, Aix. November 1818.

judgment directly or indirectly ; it could only mediate or facilitate, but not compel or menace. As for the commercial boycott (to use a word of later date), which had been suggested, Great Britain could be no party to it. We had had a large direct trade with France during the war, and had suffered her armies to be clothed by our manufactures ; how could we interdict commerce with South America in time of peace ? Since Russia could not fight either by arms or by an interdict on trade, it would be better to tell Spain so at once than to buoy her up by false hopes in the maintenance of a false attitude. There was, besides, the *moral responsibility* involved in forcing the colonies to submit to such a Government as that of Spain.

It was the last argument, wrote Castlereagh, which made Alexander's mind "shrink from the subject." He expressed his regret that he had not taken the British minister's advice before the matter had been carried so far. As it was, he at once conferred with his ministers, with the result that at the next conference their tone was so altered that Richelieu withdrew his project. Thus ended the question so far as the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle was concerned.⁶²

It was revived as a result of the military revolt of Riego in 1820 and the compulsory acceptance of the revolutionary Constitution of 1812 by King Ferdinand VII. Of the appeal of King Ferdinand to the Emperor Alexander, and the Russian circular which was its outcome, I have already spoken. For various reasons the suggested intervention of Russia, under cover of the Alliance, was equally objection-

⁶² Castlereagh to Bathurst, November 24, 1818, No. 48.

able to all the other Powers, and the project dropped, the sudden emergence of the Italian crisis proving a not wholly unwelcome diversion. The "material" sickness of Spain, from which the life-blood was being drawn by her obstinate determination to preserve her oversea dominions, was not arrested by her isolation. Above all, it became evident month by month that her American empire was being hopelessly lost to her. Chile and the great territories of the River Plate—the Argentine Republic—had conquered their independence as early as 1810; in 1821, the year following Riego's rebellion, Mexico and Colombia (embracing the vast jurisdiction of the viceroyalties of Quito and New Granada) proclaimed their independence; on the whole American continent it was only in Peru that the issue of the struggle was still in doubt. The resulting situation was in the highest degree complicated. To the vital interests of the United States in the fate of Latin America the Powers, as we have seen, had done at least lip-service. But more immediately important in their bearing on international relations were the conflicting interests within the Alliance itself. Of these the most fateful, as the event was to prove, were those of France and Great Britain, representing a new and critical phase in their secular rivalry; for the German Powers were only indirectly interested, through a native dread of the contagious character of democratic revolutions, and as for the vague world-ambitions of the Emperor Alexander, though these acted as a somewhat incalculable disturbing force, experience had proved that, with a little diplomacy, these could be prevented from passing from the world of dreams into that of action.

The attitude of Great Britain in the question of Spain and her colonies was complicated by the various, and to all appearance contradictory, influences by which it was determined. On the one hand, she was firm in the maintenance of her traditional policy of maintaining the strength and independence of the Spanish monarchy, more especially against the pretensions of France; and the ancient friendship between the two countries, founded on this basis, had been cemented by their alliance during the recent Peninsular War. On the other hand, the Court of Spain, magnificently contemptuous of the law of supply and demand, saw little friendliness in the fact that British traders had taken advantage of its weakness to open a lively "contraband" trade with the revolted colonies, and less in the refusal of the British Government to recognize its right to interrupt this trade. Moreover, in spite of the Treaty of Neutrality, as between Spain and the colonies, signed by Great Britain, recruiting was actively carried on in England by the agents of the Latin American rebel Governments, and British adventurers had taken a conspicuous, and sometimes a leading, part in the overthrow of the royal authority in America.⁶³ To meet this grievance, which was acknowledged, the Government in 1818 passed the Foreign Enlistment Act; but at the same time it pointed out, in reply to the

⁶³ The most famous of these was Lord Cochrane, afterwards Earl of Dundonald. The names of many of the English volunteers have been preserved among the leading families of the Republics. In the autumn of last year, on my journey to Lima, I had the pleasure of making the acquaintance of Señor Don Alberto Smith, Rector of the University of Caracas, then on a special mission from the Venezuelan Republic to the President of Peru. He told me that his grandfather, who had fought in Bolivar's Legion, was an English officer and had taken part in the Battle of Waterloo.

further remonstrances of Spain, that at the time the Treaty of Neutrality was signed there was a distinct understanding that commercial intercourse between Great Britain and the Spanish colonies was not to be considered a breach of its stipulation. To this condition the Spanish Government obstinately refused to agree. The harbours and inlets of "ever faithful" Cuba swarmed with pirates, disguised as Spanish privateers, whose depredations on British commerce necessitated the dispatch of British warships for its protection ;⁶⁴ and by the end of 1822 the situation had developed into something like a formal naval war between Great Britain and Spain in the West Indies, at the very time when, in Europe, Canning was straining every nerve to save Spain from foreign invasion.

It was clear that, under these circumstances, the situation contemplated in Castlereagh's memorandum had practically already arisen; and if the British Government had postponed the recognition, in a more or less formal manner, of the *de facto* Latin American States, this was partly out of consideration for the difficult situation in which the Spanish Government was placed, partly in the hope that the Liberal Cortes might take the initiative in seeking a friendly settlement. The approaching Conference, however, made it clear that Great Britain must define her attitude; and on September 27th Canning wrote to Wellington warning him not to be a party to any declaration affirming the rights of Spain over her colonies, or to fetter in any degree the discretion of the Government as to the time, the mode, or

⁶⁴ A vivid account of the conditions is given in Michael Scott's *Tom Cringle's Log*.

the degree in which it might be found expedient "tacitly to admit, or more or less formally to recognize, the *de facto* States of the South American Continent." "Indeed," he added, "it would not be fair to withhold the expression of our opinion that, before Parliament meets, the course of events, the interests of commerce, and the state of navigation in the American seas will have obliged us to come to some understanding, more or less distinct, with some of those self-erected Governments."⁶⁵ If the recognition was postponed for another year or two, this was due to the necessity of keeping on as good terms as possible with Spain, in view of the attitude of France.

The Revolution in Spain, which seemed to place the Bourbon Ferdinand VII in much the same position as the French Revolution had placed Louis XVI, before the overthrow of the monarchy, could not but be in the highest degree disconcerting to the Government of the Restoration; and if France opposed the idea of intervention of the Alliance, this was because, in view of the proposals of the Emperor Alexander, such intervention would have been scarcely less of a danger to France than the Revolution itself. A providential outbreak of cholera in the Peninsula, however, gave the French Government the excuse for establishing a strong cordon of troops along the frontier, and this was maintained, long after the danger of physical infection was past, in order to guard against the even more dreaded moral infection. Thus matters remained in suspense until the resignation of Richelieu on December 12, 1820, and the accession of the

⁶⁵ Canning to Wellington, September 27, 1822. F.O.: Continent, Verona, Duke of Wellington. September-December 1822. See also No. 9 of October 15th and No. 16 of November 8th.

Ultra-royalists to power under the leadership of Villèle.

It had from the first been a maxim of the extreme partisans of the traditional monarchy in France that the Bourbons would never be firmly established until they should have "mounted on horseback" and wiped out the memory of Napoleon's glory by fresh exploits of their own. For such adventures the time now seemed to them singularly opportune. The "military preparations" of Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr, which had early excited the apprehensions of Castlereagh, had been completed, and an army had been created in which the sentiment for the tricolour flag was dead. It would add enormously to the prestige of the monarchy if this could be used to rescue the Bourbon King of Spain from revolutionary duress, and so not only remove a standing menace from the borders of France, but extend the sphere of her influence by a revival of the "family compact" established by Louis XIV. The temper of the French people, at least as reflected in the Chambers, favoured such a plan; for the murder of the popular Duc de Berri had reacted violently against the cause it was intended to serve. The diplomatic situation was scarcely less favourable. Of the other Powers of the Alliance, Russia was already committed to the principle of intervention in Spain; Austria, in view of her own recent action in Naples under circumstances almost identical, could hardly fail to support the French claim to intervene; and Prussia, however much she might dread any renewed activity on the part of France, could be won over by playing on her fears of revolution. The great stumbling-block, of course, was Great Britain. Efforts would be made to win

her over by protestations as to the purity and disinterestedness of the intentions of France. If these efforts failed—well, Troppau and Laibach had proved that, with the other Powers united, the protests of Great Britain could be safely ignored. In any case, the greatness of the prize was worth such risk as there might be from the effects of British jealousy ; for, in the event of the success of the arms of France, not only would she be predominant in the Peninsula, but by aiding Spain to recover her colonies she would be able to bargain for exceptional trade privileges throughout the vast Spanish Empire. Of these views the Vicomte Mathieu de Montmorency, who, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, was to represent France at the approaching Conference, was the enthusiastic champion.

The question of intervention in Spain was not formally raised at the preliminary meeting at Vienna ; but it was informally discussed, and the discussions showed that the French Government would have other formidable obstacles to overcome, besides the uncompromising opposition of Great Britain, before it could hope to obtain the sanction of the Alliance for its policy. The chief of these obstacles was the Emperor Alexander, whose deep-seated suspicions of the inherent revolutionary vice of the French people survived, in spite of the present conspicuous proofs of moral regeneration. Mindful of the British attitude in the affair of Naples, Villèle, in conversation with Wellington, had emphasized his determination to keep the question of intervention in Spain wholly “French,” in the hope that, the principles of Troppau being ruled out, Great Britain might allow to France the same free hand in Spain that she had conceded

to Austria in Italy.⁶⁶ In doing so he had merely placed a new diplomatic weapon in the hands of Great Britain; for whatever her objections were in general to the whole principle of European intervention, in the particular case of Spain it was, in consonance with her traditional policy for a century past, to the intervention of France that she objected. At Vienna, in the course of a private conversation with the Emperor Alexander, Wellington repeated the substance of Villèle's communication. The Tsar expressed his surprise at the intention of the French Government to regard as "French" a question of which the interest was so obviously "European." He was, Wellington reported, in favour of interfering in Spain, but only by means of a Russian army—of that army which, as he had made clear at Aix-la-Chapelle, he maintained solely in the interests of European peace.⁶⁷ Since Austria, now that Metternich was established as the Tsar's confidant, was interested in humouring his whims, this attitude augured ill for the success of Montmorency's activities at Verona, and Wellington, in an optimistic moment, recorded his opinion that the Conference would issue in "an unanimous decision to leave the Spaniards to themselves."⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Wellington to Canning, Vienna, October 4, 1822: "Secret and confidential." F.O.: Continent, Verona. From the Duke of Wellington, September–October 1822.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

THE CONGRESS OF VERONA

Character of the Congress—Subjects for discussion—The Spanish colonies—The Spanish Revolution—France proposes intervention—Montmorency's questions to the Congress—Answers of the Powers—Alexander proposes concerted intervention—Attitude of Austria and Prussia—Wellington withdraws from the conferences—Attempts at compromise—The policy of identical notes—Protest of Great Britain—Open breach of the Alliance—Views of Canning on this.

THE Conference which met at Verona in October 1822 was destined to be the last of the series of solemn meetings of sovereigns and their ministers growing out of the Treaty of November 20, 1815, and, though technically no more than a Conference, its imposing character justifies the description of Congress commonly given to it. The meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle had been confined to the five Powers; that at Troppau had been of the nature of a confidential symposium of the three autocratic Powers, to whose councils the representatives of Great Britain and France had been only intermittently and grudgingly admitted; the Conference at Laibach had worn a more universal air, owing to the presence of the Italian princes, but had been less than European both in its composition and its immediate aims. The meeting at Verona, on the other hand, summoned to decide the fate of two

worlds, recalled by the splendour of its concourse the glories of the Congress of Vienna. The Emperor Alexander was there, accompanied, as became the divinely-inspired champion of "morality based on bayonets," by five adjutants-general and by Prince Wolkonsky, his chief of the general staff, while his diplomatic advisers were Count Nesselrode, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Count Lieven, ambassador in London, and Count Pozzo di Borgo, ambassador in Paris. The Emperor and Empress of Austria came, with a numerous suite, including Prince Metternich, with his faithful henchman Gentz, Prince Esterhazy, ambassador in London, Count Zichy, ambassador in Berlin, and Count Lebzeltern, ambassador in St. Petersburg. With King Frederick William of Prussia came Prince William—afterwards the Emperor William I—Prince Charles, Count Bernstorff, and Baron Alexander von Humboldt. The Duke of Wellington, as plenipotentiary of Great Britain, was accompanied by Lord Clanwilliam, Lord Londonderry (Lord Stewart), Lord Strangford and Lord Burghesh. France was represented by the Vicomte de Montmorency, who had with him the two ministers present at Troppau, *i.e.*, the Marquis de Caraman and M. de La Ferronnays, and M. de Rayneval and the Vicomte de Chateaubriand. The Italian sovereigns were present in person; the Kings of the Two Sicilies and Sardinia, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the Duke of Modena, and, the centre of much curiosity, the Archduchess Marie Louise, Duchess of Parma, accompanied by Count Neipperg. Chateaubriand has left us an impression of this lady. "We found her very gay: the universe having charged itself with the care of this *souvenir* of

Napoleon, she no longer had cause to think about him. I told her that I had met some of her soldiers at Piacenza, and that she formerly had more of them; she replied: 'Je ne songe plus à cela.' She said some light words in passing about the King of Rome: she was *enceinte*."⁶⁹ At Verona she was in her element; for here were renewed the gaieties at Vienna, and from these she was no longer debarred. The Roman amphitheatre, cleared at this time of its sordid occupants and restored, remains as the memorial of these forgotten splendours.

At the very first "confidential meeting" of the ministers of the five Allied Powers, on October 20th, Montmorency handed in, on behalf of the French Government, a paper with three inquiries: Whether, in the event of France having to withdraw her minister from Madrid, the other Allied Powers would do the same. In case of war, under what form and by what acts would the Powers give to France their moral support, so as to give to her action all the force of the Alliance? What *material* aid would the Powers give, if asked by France to intervene under restrictions which she would declare and they would recognize?⁷⁰

The discussions that arose out of these questions at once revealed the conflict of opinion in the councils of the Alliance. The views of the French Government itself, as set forth in the questions, were not without a certain ambiguity, the outcome of conflicting counsels. By her whole attitude

⁶⁹ *Congrès de Vérone*, i. p. 69.

⁷⁰ Précis des communications verbales faites par M. de Montmorency . . . à Vérone le 20 Octobre, 1822. F.O.: Cont., Verona. From the Duke of Wellington, September-October 1822.

towards Spain since 1820 France, as Wellington pointed out, had placed herself in a position in which it was perilous to advance and impossible to withdraw with dignity. Villèle, who had succeeded Richelieu as head of the Government in the preceding December, did not share the enthusiasm for a royalist crusade in Spain of which Chateaubriand was the most eloquent advocate. He was conscious of the risks of such an adventure; for the memory of the Peninsular War was still fresh, and Great Britain had made it abundantly clear that she would regard any attempt of Louis XVIII to subjugate Spain with no greater favour than the previous attempt made by Napoleon. The precedent of Laibach had suggested a way out of the *impasse*; for with the example of Naples before it, the Liberal Government of Spain would, it was thought, listen to the remonstrances of France if backed by the moral support of the European Powers, even though Great Britain, as at Laibach, held aloof. Hence the appeal to the European Alliance. But Villèle was determined that, in making this appeal, France should control the issue; he instructed the French plenipotentiaries not to allow the Congress "to prescribe the conduct of France towards Spain"; and the language of the questions shows how little they were dictated by any but French interests. The phrase about inspiring "a salutary fear into the Revolutionists of all lands" is a mere blind; more significant is the third question, which suggests that the time and nature of any eventual intervention of the Alliance should be left to France to determine.

The Emperor Alexander was little inclined to

suffer any such restrictions. For him the question was European, not French. Remote as his Empire was from the troubles beyond the Pyrenees, it was not too remote to be corrupted by the infectious example of successful military revolt; three years before, he told Wellington, he had been compelled to give the Spanish minister at St. Petersburg his passports for tampering with the loyalty of his troops. The offence, commented the Duke, seemed somewhat old to serve as a pretext for war at the present juncture; the real reason why the Tsar was anxious to intervene in Spain was "because of his embarrassment with his army," which badly needed occupation; and how could it be more beneficently occupied than as a European police force for the upholding of "morality"? He at once, then, offered to march 150,000 men through Germany into Piedmont, where they would be available for use either in Spain or, in the event of a Jacobin rising, in France. As for the intervention in the Peninsula, this should be the affair of the Alliance and based on a new Treaty *ad hoc* to be signed before the break-up of the Congress.⁷¹

The renewal of this disconcertingly disinterested proposal for the moment drew Great Britain and Austria together, as the similar proposal had done two years previously. Montmorency had at first approved of the Tsar's design;⁷² but Wellington

⁷¹ Wellington to Canning, "Secret and Confidential," Verona, October 29, 1822. F.O.: Cont., Verona. From the Duke of Wellington, September-October 1822, No. 18.

⁷² *Ibid.* Doubtless a move in the diplomatic game; for Villèle's instructions to Montmorency clearly state that France could not allow the passage of foreign troops across her territory. (See Chateaubriand, *Congrès de Vérone*, i. p. 103.)

and Metternich combined to impress upon him the dangers inherent in its execution, and, in the end, he told the Emperor Alexander "in positive terms" that any movement of troops would be injurious to France. This effectually nipped the proposal in the bud once more, but in doing so it also widened the growing rift between Austria and Great Britain. So long as there had been a danger that the Russian Emperor's idea might materialize, Metternich had shared Wellington's views as to the inexpediency of the affair of Spain being made the subject of a fresh treaty and of summoning another Conference to Paris, as the Tsar suggested, for the purpose of perfecting the work begun at Verona; for there was little enough to attract Austria in the idea of a Conference presided over by Pozzo di Borgo and supported by the presence of an overwhelming Russian force. But now, having by the intervention of the French minister got rid of the greatest danger of all to Austria, Metternich—to use Wellington's phrase—"turned short round upon the remainder of the question" and "took up the Emperor of Russia's idea of having at least a treaty and all the ultra views of the French Government."

The motive for this *volte face* was again not "European," but purely Austrian. The German Powers had no interest in the particular question of Spain; they did not want war, and least of all a war which would have involved the passage of a Russian army across their territories; but they were above all anxious to distract Alexander's attention from the affairs of Turkey, where lay the most immediate danger of Russian aggression, and for this purpose it was necessary to humour him in

the matter of the intervention in Spain, if only to keep him "grouped." To preserve the ascendancy over Alexander's mind which he had acquired since the dismissal of Capo d'Istria seemed to Metternich worth the risk of a breach of the good understanding between Austria and Great Britain—a breach which, if it could not be avoided, his vanity made him believe he would soon be able to repair.

During the discussions on the answer to be returned to the French questions he had laboured to persuade Wellington to hold a common language with the other Allies. The fundamental divergence of views between Great Britain and the continental Courts had been revealed in the "confidential communication" that passed between them during the first days of the Conference, and when, on October 30th, the answers of the Powers to the French note were handed in, the divergence was patent to all. "The three continental Powers replied that they would act as France should in respect to their ministers in Spain, and would give that country every countenance and assistance she should require, the cause for such assistance, the period, and the mode of giving it being reserved to be specified in a treaty. The minister of Great Britain replied that, having no knowledge of the cause of dispute, and not being able to form a judgment upon a hypothetical case, he could give no answer to any of the questions." ⁷³

Wellington's reply was so far non-committal as to give occasion for further attempts to reach an understanding. Hitherto, he reported, the conti-

⁷³ Memorandum of Wellington, Verona, November 12, 1822. F.O. : Cont., Verona, D. of W., November 22, 1822.

mental Powers had carefully refrained from using any language or taking any action against which it would have been necessary for him to protest,⁷⁴ but there were now signs of "a different mode of proceeding." He himself had suggested, as the best means of averting a rupture between France and Spain, the selection of a single Power as mediator, and with this Metternich agreed. But the only Power whose mediation would have been accepted by Spain was Great Britain, which was too much interested in the dispute to be acceptable to France. This solution thus being impracticable, Metternich proposed to the Conference that all the Powers should speak, so as to prove to Spain that in whatever action she might take France would have the support of Europe; at the same time he disclaimed any intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Spain. The question of a treaty, though pressed by Montmorency, was shelved, and it was ultimately decided that the Allies should, through their ministers at Madrid, "hold a common language, but in separate notes, though uniform in their principles and their objects." This was settled in the conference of October 31st. On the following day it was arranged that dispatches to the ministers should be substituted for notes, as allowing greater latitude. These were to be at once drawn up by the four Courts and to be communicated to Wellington, who was then to declare what line his Government would take.⁷⁵

As to this there could not be much doubt. In

⁷⁴ "Nearly up to the last moment he (Metternich) assured me repeatedly that he concurred in all my opinions and views" (Wellington to Canning, November 22nd).

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

the discussions between the Powers the attitude of Wellington had been throughout quite unequivocal. He had urged the Powers to confine their attention to the "external" causes of quarrel between France and Spain, to abstain from menace, and "above all not to approach Spain in the form of enemies, bound in a treaty of defensive alliance against her." As for Great Britain, she could not be a party to any general declaration against Spain, to any hostile interference in her internal affairs, or to any defensive alliance between the Powers. The adoption of the principle of intervention by the four Powers led to Wellington's formal withdrawal from the conferences, and the character of the notes to be sent to Madrid was discussed in his absence.

This attitude of the British representative increased the irritation of the continental Powers against Great Britain, which, they complained, was again making, as at Laibach, "an unnecessary display of difference of opinion upon a theory"; and the outcome of their deliberations showed little disposition to meet her views. On November 12th Wellington wrote to Canning that he had seen Montmorency's draft note to Spain, and that it was "highly objectionable." But this was not all. The Emperor Alexander had by no means given up his idea of collective intervention; he still expressed his desire for an allied occupation of Spain, and at the Conference of November 17th, as a concession to his views, a *procès verbal* had been drawn up defining the objects and principles of the Alliance with regard to Spain. The duty of Wellington, in accordance with his instructions, was now clear, and in a formal note, in the course of which he reiterated the British

principle of non-intervention, he definitely refused to sign the *procès verbaux* of October 30th and November 17th. The breach with the continental Allies was complete.

But, as Castlereagh had foreseen, it was the Alliance that had moved away from Great Britain, which had merely "adhered to her course." This is clearly brought out in a letter of Canning of September 16, 1823, to Sir H. Wellesley, the British ambassador at Vienna, who had reported a conversation in which Metternich complained of the speeches in Parliament and the support allowed in England to revolutionary movements. "The pretensions of Prince Metternich in respect to this country," he wrote, "appear to me to be perfectly unreasonable; they must be founded upon some strange misconception of our obligations, our interests, and our feelings. . . . England is under no obligation to interfere, or to assist in interfering, in the internal concerns of independent nations. The specific engagement to interfere in France is an exception so studiously particularized as to prove the rule. The rule I take to be, that our engagements have reference wholly to the state of territorial possession settled at the peace; to the state of affairs between nation and nation; not (with the single exception above stated) to the affairs of any nation within itself. I thought the public declarations of my predecessor . . . had set this question entirely at rest. . . . What is the influence which we have had in the Alliance, and which Prince Metternich exhorts us to be so careful not to throw away? We protested at Laibach; we remonstrated at Verona. Our protest was treated as wastepaper; our remon-

stances mingled with the air. Our influence, if it is to be maintained abroad, must be secure in its sources of strength at home: and the sources of that strength are in the sympathy between the people and the Government; in the union of the public sentiment with the public counsels; in the reciprocal confidence and co-operation of the House of Commons and the Crown." "Our business," he concludes, "is to preserve the peace of the world, and therefore the independence of the several nations which compose it. In resisting the Revolution in all its stages . . . we resisted the spirit of change, to be sure, but we resisted also the spirit of foreign domination."⁷⁶

Thus Canning revealed himself as the champion of Nationality, as opposed to the international system on which it had been sought to establish the peace of the world; and in doing so he became, for all his essential Toryism, the protagonist of those nationalist sympathies which, during the century to come, were to inspire the foreign policy of British Liberalism. He himself, however, clearly did not realize the direction that would be taken by the forces he helped to set in motion. For him Nationality was not a question of abstract "rights," but a juridical status based upon long precedent or defined by international agreement in treaties, and for him, as for Metternich, a nation was but the aggregate of people bound together by a common allegiance. Like Castlereagh, he sympathized with the Greeks in their struggle for freedom; like Castlereagh, he repudiated any obligation upon Great Britain to intervene on their behalf, maintaining that

⁷⁶ To Wellesley, September 16, 1823. In Stapleton's *Life of Canning* i. p. 374.

such intervention would be an unjustifiable interference with the right of the "Turkish nation" to manage its own affairs. If then the name of Canning, more than that of any other contemporary statesman, is associated with the birth of new nationalities in the Old World and the New, this was not due to any enthusiasm for the abstract idea of nationality, in the sense of an ethnical group claiming the right of untrammelled self-expression, but was the outcome of a policy wholly opportunist from the point of view of British interests.

The principle of national independence, as opposed to "the spirit of foreign domination," was not destined to make for peace. But even if Canning, himself the minister of a dominant Power, had foreseen this, it may be doubted whether it would have modified his attitude, which was determined first and last by what he considered due to the position of Great Britain. It was not only that her dignity had been wounded at Verona; her material interests were also seriously threatened. The Alliance, of which the very *raison d'être* had been the fear of French aggression, had stultified itself by supporting France in her designs on Spain, and in doing so had been at no pains to safeguard the interests of Great Britain in the New World. The question of the Spanish colonies had been raised only to be shelved; it must await the restoration of King Ferdinand VII to liberty and, possibly, the assembly of a Congress summoned to determine the whole relations of the Old and New Worlds. This was to imperil the commercial treaty signed by Great Britain with the Liberal Government of Spain and, worse still, to condone the piracies to which in the Spanish Main the "contraband" commerce of Great Britain

with the new Latin American states was exposed at the hands of Spanish "privateers." In reply to Wellington's memorandum on these piracies in their relation to the whole question, Chateaubriand had drawn up a *note verbale* in which he deprecated the recognition in America of a political system hostile to that which ruled in Europe, and, in reference to the British grievances, declared that "the principles of justice on which society is based ought not lightly to be sacrificed to secondary considerations." Secondary considerations! "You know my politics well enough," wrote Canning on November 5, 1822, to Sir Charles Bagot, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, "to know what I mean when I say that for Europe I should be desirous now and then to read England." ⁷⁷

While resenting the dictatorial attitude of the continental Allies, with their tendency to deliver "simultaneous sermons," Canning neither broke, nor desired to break, the ties which bound Great Britain to them under the treaties; and he was prepared to act even with Metternich, for all his loathing and contempt of him, on any points on which they were agreed. Two years after the close of the Congress of Verona he defined his attitude in this respect very clearly, in order to allay the misgivings of King George IV. His Majesty, who as Prince Regent had expressed his heartfelt agreement with the lofty moral principles of the Holy Alliance, had long regarded himself as one of the pillars of the European system; his vanity was flattered by the increasing tendency—against which Canning protested—of the continental Governments to approach him direct, as

⁷⁷ Stapleton, *op. cit.*, p. 363.

though he too were an autocrat; and he viewed with dismay the disruptive consequences of the erratic orbit followed by his meteoric minister. He reduced his misgivings to writing in a memorandum laid before the cabinet on January 27, 1825, in which he deplored the separation of Great Britain from her continental Allies and its cause, the recognition of the Spanish American states. "The late policy of Great Britain," he said, "has loosened these beneficial ties, by demonstrating a restless desire of self-interest in direct opposition to those wise and comprehensive principles by which the peace and general interests of Europe were bound together." The King desired to know from the cabinet individually whether the great principles of policy established by his Government in the years 1814, 1815, and 1818 were or were not to be abandoned.⁷⁸ In reply, a cabinet minute stated that ministers fully recognized, the principles of policy laid down in the years mentioned, in the sense repeatedly given to them by His Majesty's plenipotentiaries, and especially in the circular issued in 1821,⁷⁹ and in no other; it added that ministers were deeply impressed with the obligation of preserving His Majesty's engagements, and with the advantages which might result from maintaining the system of confidence and reciprocal communication established with His Majesty's Allies.⁸⁰

The King expressed himself satisfied with this answer; yet three months later we find Canning again reassuring him, this time in language which gives the key to his whole attitude. "My object,"

⁷⁸ Stapleton, *op. cit.*, p. 416.

⁷⁹ See p. 231.

⁸⁰ Stapleton, *op. cit.* p. 420.

he said, in an interview with Sir William Knighton, "is to make His Majesty happy and comfortable, by placing him at the head of Europe, instead of being reckoned fifth in a great Confederacy."⁸¹ As for this Confederacy, the circumstances which gave rise to it, justified it, and held it together had, he said, gone by. More than two years before, indeed, he had welcomed its dissolution and the return to the healthy system of free competition among the nations. The ministers of the three autocratic Powers had delivered their simultaneous sermon at Madrid and, finding it produced no effect, had withdrawn, leaving the French representative, who had received no orders to withdraw, to make what profit he could out of the effect of their action. To Canning it seemed that France, having gained what she could from the Alliance, was now, in however mean a way, bent on asserting her independence; and he rejoiced in the fact. "The issue of Verona," he wrote to Bagot on January 3, 1823, "has split the one and indivisible Alliance into three parts as distinct as the Constitutions of England, France, and Muscovy. . . . Villèle is a minister of thirty years ago—no revolutionary scoundrel: but constitutionally hating England, as Choiseul and Vergennes used to hate us—and so things are getting back to a wholesome state again. Every nation for itself and God for us all. Only bid your Emperor be quiet, for the time for Areopagus and the like of that is gone by."

⁸¹ Stapleton, *op. cit.*, p. 433.

VI

THE GENESIS OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The French invasion of Spain—Ferdinand VII restored to power—The question of the Spanish colonies—A Congress *ad hoc* proposed—Attitude of the Emperor Alexander—Russia as an American Power—Russian overtures at Washington—Attitude of Canning—He suggests a concert between Great Britain and the United States—Suspicious attitude of the American minister—The question at Washington—Favourable attitude of President Monroe—Influence of the Russian proposals—John Quincy Adams—Victory of the principle of the isolation of the Americas—President Monroe's Message of December 2, 1823—The Monroe Doctrine—Effect on the Allied Powers.

INTO the further discussions that preceded the armed intervention of France in Spain it is unnecessary for our present purpose to examine. The hesitations of the French Government, inspired by the fear of a rupture with Great Britain, were ended when Montmorency was succeeded in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Chateaubriand, from the first an enthusiastic partisan of the war policy, and on April 7th, 1823, a French army of 95,000 men, under the Duc d'Angoulême, crossed the Bidassoa. The confidence of Chateaubriand in the issue was soon justified. Of the implacable resistance which the Spanish people had offered to Napoleon there was no sign; on September 30th, Cadiz, the last stronghold of the Liberal Government, surrendered; and Ferdinand

VII was once more free to abuse his divinely consecrated authority. Chateaubriand was right, too, in believing that Great Britain, exhausted by her long struggle with revolutionary France, would not embark on a fresh war in which the European Alliance would have been ranged against her, instead of on her side. Whatever the sympathies of the British people, the Tory Government, quite rightly, had no great belief in the Spanish system as established by the unworkable Constitution of 1812 ; and, in any case, it repudiated any obligation or right to intervene, whether for the purpose of overthrowing or of supporting it. British interests, which alone determined Canning's policy, were threatened by the French intervention mainly through its possible effect on the question of the over-sea empire of Spain, involving as this did the newly acquired right of Great Britain to trade with Latin America, and British action would be eventually determined by the developments of this question. Powerful voices in Parliament denounced the revival by Louis XVIII of the aggressive policy of Louis XIV and urged the Government to prevent by arms the renewal of the Family Compact. But Canning realized that the Spain of Ferdinand VII was no longer the Spain of Philip V ; and when the determination of the French Government to embark on the war was announced, he contented himself with intimating at Paris that Great Britain would in no circumstances tolerate the subjugation of the Spanish colonies by foreign force.

The rapid success of the French arms brought the question forward more rapidly than had been expected. In overthrowing the revolutionary Government in Spain, France had acted as the mandatory of

Europe ; but with the restoration of Ferdinand VII to liberty the mandate was at an end, for on the larger question of the Spanish colonial possessions no decision had been reached in the councils of the Allies. In view of the attitude of Great Britain, all-powerful at sea, it was clearly impossible for France to undertake alone to assist the King of Spain to re-establish the principle of legitimacy beyond the ocean. Yet the re-establishment of this principle seemed to her essential to the security of the very foundations of the restored order in Europe. Chateaubriand, whose personal relations with Canning were intimate, exhausted the resources of his literary art in attempting to impress upon him the perils, upon which Richelieu had enlarged at Aix-la-Chapelle, of allowing the New World to develop upon lines antagonistic to the Old. Convinced that the motives of Great Britain in threatening to recognize the Latin American states were wholly material, he laboured to persuade Canning that, in seeking to restore these states to their legitimate allegiance or, failing this, to erect them into Bourbon monarchies, France was not actuated by any selfish motives and would be content to receive in the trade with the New World the same treatment conceded to Great Britain. It was the final proof of this disinterestedness that she was prepared formally to subordinate her interests to those of Europe, and supported the appeal of Ferdinand VII to a Congress of the Powers.

To this idea of a Congress the Emperor Alexander, needless to say, gave his whole-hearted support. The vast mass of his Empire stretched unbroken from the shores of the Baltic to those of the Behring Sea, and its frontiers in America were as yet still

sufficiently undefined to leave play for Russian ambitions along the Pacific coast. He had already asserted his position as an American Power by the *ukaz* of September 21, 1821, which declared all the coastlands of North America, as far south as fifty-one degrees of latitude, to be Russian territory.⁸² He thus seemed to himself to be specially called to convert the Confederation of Europe into a Confederation of the World, and in spite of his discouraging experience with his allies at Aix-la-Chapelle, he pursued this ideal with characteristic obstinacy. The main obstacle in the path, so far as the New World was concerned, was the United States, which had recognized the infant Republic of Colombia with disconcerting promptitude. Alexander received the news with sorrow rather than with anger, and did not despair of persuading the Government at Washington of the error of its ways. On June 14, 1823, Count Nesselrode addressed to Baron Tuyll, the Russian minister in Washington, a letter telling him to inform the Government at Washington that in no circumstances would the Emperor receive any diplomatic agent accredited by any one of the *de facto* Governments of Spanish America. This was followed by a long dispatch, dated August 30th, in which, after stating that the time had come when it would be useful to lay before the Government of the United States "the decisions and ulterior views of His Imperial Majesty," Count Nesselrode unfolded to the unsympathetic eye of the Secretary of State Alexander's vision of the Holy Alliance

⁸² This claim, which was at once contested by Great Britain and the United States, was in effect soon limited to the claim of Russia to declare the Behring Sea a *mare clausum*.

and its work, accomplished and yet to be accomplished.

"The force of arms applied where needed (*déployée à propos*); surrounded by all the guarantees demanded by the resolution to have recourse to it; tempered by all the measures and all the promises calculated to tranquillize the peoples as to their future; supported, finally, by that power of union and of concord which in our days has created a new political system: the force of arms has only had to let itself be seen in order to unmask to the world a despotism too often disguised, either by the errors of theorists, perhaps themselves involuntarily deceived as to the true state of affairs, or by the bad faith of men of criminal designs who only sought the means to extend and propagate the same misfortunes."⁸³

Of the effect, far other than that intended by its author, produced at Washington by this attempt to commend the Holy Alliance, with its principle of intervention by force in order to guarantee the peace of the world, I shall speak later. It was not laid before the Secretary of State until October 4th, and, meanwhile, other and more fateful negotiations had been opened between Great Britain and the United States in Europe.

Ten days before the date of Nesselrode's dispatch, on August 20th, George Canning sent to Richard Rush, the American minister in London, as the outcome of conversations, an "unofficial and confidential" letter in which he suggested that Great Britain and the United States should come to an understanding on the question of the Spanish American colonies with a view to a concerted attitude in opposition to the designs of the continental Powers. "We ourselves," he wrote "have no disguise."

⁸³ In Worthington Ford's "Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine," Massachusetts Hist. Society Proceedings, Second Series, vol. xv. p. 402.

"1. We conceive the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless.

"2. We conceive the question of the recognition of them, as independent States, to be one of time and circumstances.

"3. We are, however, by no means disposed to throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between them and the mother country by amicable negotiations.

"4. We aim not at the possession of any portion of them ourselves.

"5. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other Power, with indifference."⁸⁴

Three days later he wrote again, urging as an additional reason for a concert between the two Governments the news that had just reached him, that, as soon as the military objects of the French in Spain were achieved, a proposal would be made for a Congress, or a conference of some sort, with special reference to the affairs of Spanish America.

Richard Rush received these communications without enthusiasm. As a doctrinaire Republican he was outraged by Canning's view that monarchy was the type of government best suited to the Latin American nations; he noted that Great Britain had for years past acted in general harmony with the European Alliance; he suspected that her motives in the matter of the Spanish colonies were wholly "selfish"; and he concluded that, her particular interests once secured, she would again join in the general conspiracy of monarchs against liberty. The pledge of sincerity which he demanded, namely, a definite promise that Great Britain would acknowledge the independence of the Spanish American states, Canning refused to give. "It is France that must not be aggrandized," he reported to Washington,

⁸⁴ Ford, *loc. cit.*, p. 415.

"not South America that must be made free"; and in confirmation of his doubts he pointed out that, after Canning's conference with the Prince de Polignac early in October, "the fresh discussion since the fall of Cadiz" had been "brought to a sudden pause."

In view of the urgency of the crisis and of the *non possumus* attitude of Rush, who insisted on the recognition of the Latin American states out of hand, Canning had indeed recognized the necessity of attempting to come to an understanding with France, and early in October, in conversations with Polignac, certain bases of agreement were reached. Polignac, on behalf of his Government, agreed that the recovery by Spain of her colonies was hopeless; he declared that France had no intention of assisting Spain to recover them, though she would be glad to see the dispute settled by an amicable arrangement between the mother country and the colonies; he disclaimed for France all idea of deriving exclusive commercial advantages from the colonies, her object being, like England, to be placed on the most favoured nation footing, after Spain. On the other hand, France could not recognize the independence of states established on radically unsound principles, and urged the necessity for a Congress, in which Great Britain should take part, for the settlement of the whole matter. This represented a certain amount of concession to the British point of view; and, though Canning resolutely refused to listen to the suggestion of a Congress, the extreme tension of the situation was relieved.

Meanwhile, however, the centre of interest in the discussion had been transferred to Washington. Rush's dispatch of August 19th, enclosing Canning's

proposals, reached the State Department on October 9th. Upon President Monroe these proposals exercised a profound influence. He shrank, indeed, from the prospect of entangling the United States in European politics by an alliance with any Power, but, "if a case exist in which a sound maxim may and ought to be departed from," he conceived the present to be such a case, since it seemed that Great Britain was starting on a new career, in which she would be ranged with the United States on the side of liberty against despotism.⁸⁵ The alliance, however, was not destined to be realized. This was due not so much to the fact that Rush's suspicions were reflected at Washington, where Canning was regarded as a master of Machiavellian statecraft, as to the determination of the American cabinet to profit by the occasion to assert a principle to which Great Britain would never have given her consent—the principle, foreshadowed in the letter of Pozzo di Borgo quoted earlier,⁸⁶ of the isolation of the Americas. And by a singular irony it was the well-meant advances of the Emperor Alexander that hastened the very consummation it was his object to avoid. President Monroe himself not only inclined to favour a concert with Great Britain, but even seriously considered the expediency of sending representatives of the United States to Europe with authority to attend a Congress summoned to discuss the South American Question.⁸⁷ The chief opponent of this policy was John Quincy Adams, the Secretary of State; and it was the language of the Russian

⁸⁵ Monroe to Jefferson, October 17, 1823. Ford, *loc. cit.*, p. 375.

⁸⁶ See p. 90.

⁸⁷ Monroe to Jefferson, December. Ford, *loc. cit.*, p. 411.

dispatches, with their lofty assumption of the divine right of universal intervention in the interests of "legitimacy," which gave him the opportunity of "speaking out." In the end it was his masterful will that prevailed over the irresolution of President Monroe, and the famous Message to Congress of December 2, 1823, in which the "Monroe Doctrine" was defined, was essentially his work.

The Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed as a counterblast to the pretensions of the Holy Alliance, was a declaration of policy of which the full significance is only being realized in our own day. It was based on two underlying principles: (1) That no non-American Power should be allowed to intervene in the affairs of the American states, and that the American continents should be henceforth closed to colonization by such Powers; (2) that the United States, in their turn, should refrain from intervening in the affairs of Europe. The isolation of the Americas was commended as reasonable owing to the double barrier that lay between the Western and the Eastern Hemispheres, the physical barrier of the ocean, and the moral barrier of the fundamental difference of the principles upon which their political systems were established.⁸⁸ This was a principle which went far

⁸⁸ In the "draft of observations on the communications recently received from the minister of Russia," prepared by the Secretary of State, occurs a sentence which, more explicitly than in the Message of President Monroe itself, defines the attitude of the United States towards Alexander's idea of a universal union. It reads as follows: "In the general declarations that the allied monarchs will never compound, and never will even treat with the revolution, and that their policy has only for its object by forcible interposition to guarantee the tranquillity of all the States of which the civilized world is composed, the President wishes to perceive sentiments, the application of which is limited, and intended in their results to be limited, to the affairs of Europe" (Ford, *loc. cit.*, p. 408).

beyond anything that Canning had contemplated when he made his first advances to Rush. That the United States should prefer to make their declaration of policy without any concert with Great Britain troubled him little, since the result was equally favourable to his plans. So far as the Monroe Message repudiated the principle of intervention and the idea of the Spanish colonies being transferred to any other Power, it gave expression to views with which he not only agreed, but which had actually been inspired by him. It was otherwise with the claim of the United States to oppose the colonization by any European Power of the vast unoccupied spaces of the American continent, and against this he at once protested. The question, however, was only to become of pressing importance later, in connexion with the Oregon boundary dispute; and, for the present, the uncompromising attitude of the United States Government was a valuable factor in securing the success of British policy.

The Allied Powers did not, indeed, at once give up the idea of a Congress, but they showed an immediate disposition to recede from their extreme position. Metternich, who was anxious to keep on good terms with Great Britain, suggested that those Spanish colonies which had succeeded in throwing off the yoke of the mother country should be recognized, and that the Powers should confine their intervention to those in which the struggle was yet doubtful.⁸⁹ With this idea the Emperor Alexander expressed his agreement, but it did not appeal to the King of Spain, who stood obstinately upon his rights,

⁸⁹ Carlos A. Villanueva, *La Santa Alianza*, pp. 86 seq.

nor to France, which, under the disguise of zeal for legitimacy, was still hoping to secure an extension of her colonial possessions in America.⁹⁰ This divergence of views led to mutual suspicions. Chateaubriand noted that Russia was more prodigal of talk about the necessity of harmony and concerted action than of promises of material help, and he suspected Alexander of a desire to weaken France by entangling her in difficult enterprises over-sea and leaving her without support.⁹¹ The decision of the Conference at Paris, on March 21st, to abandon the idea of a Congress, tended to confirm this view, which the suggestion of Alexander, to continue the conferences in secret, did nothing to weaken. This, commented Chateaubriand scornfully, was but a device to adjourn the whole discussion *sine die*, without the appearance of having been routed by Mr. Canning. He himself continued to press the Spanish Government to urge upon Great Britain the necessity of a Congress, and it was not till June that another peremptory refusal on the part of Canning led even King Ferdinand to see the hopelessness of the project. This occurred at about the same time as the rupture of Chateaubriand with Villèle and his retirement from office. The idea of an intervention of the Holy Alliance in the affairs of America was at an end.

⁹⁰ In January 1824 an unofficial French agent, M. Chasseriau, was dispatched by Chateaubriand to Colombia, in order to counteract the influence of the British consular officers sent by Canning and watch over French commercial interests. In view of the attitude of France, however, M. Chasseriau was not allowed by the Colombian authorities to proceed to Bogotá. That the suspicions of the Colombians were justified is shown by the dispatches to General Donzelot, the Governor of Martinique, of December 17, 1823, and to Admiral Jurien, of March 1, 1824. (See Villanueva, *op. cit.*, pp. 27 and 90.)

⁹¹ To Talaru, April 14, 1824. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

VII

CONCLUSION

Permanent results of the "Confederation of Europe"—The Concert of Europe—General lessons of the international experiment.

THE "sublime conception" of the Emperor Alexander, the visionary good in the pursuit of which he had neglected his duties to his own people, had proved itself the stuff that dreams are made of. His attempt to realize a Confederation of the World had ended in drawing the Old World, worn out as it seemed with cataclysmic convulsions, further apart from that New World of which the fiery youth proved a centrifugal force too strong to be resisted. As for the Confederation of Europe, from the moment that Great Britain decided to "revolve in her own orbit," the harmonious cohesion of the European system became impossible, and after the Revolution of July 1830 it broke definitively into two opposing groups. On the one side were the two Western Liberal Powers, Great Britain and France, under whose active encouragement the forces of nationalism and constitutional liberty developed, amid wars and revolutions, until the system established at Vienna had been shattered. On the other side were the three Powers who had signed the Troppau Protocol, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, united in a Holy Alliance which, under the

influence of the "Iron Tsar," Nicholas I, narrowed and hardened into a close league of which the object was to crush out, within the limits of its sphere, all motions towards national independence or constitutional change. Its principles were applied for the last time in the fateful intervention of the Emperor Nicholas in Hungary, on behalf of the Habsburg Monarchy, in 1849. It did not survive the Crimean War and the death of the Emperor Nicholas, the last uncompromising champion of its principles. Thenceforth it was but a memory, accursed in the eyes of the triumphant Liberalism of the age, its original character and aims forgotten or distorted by the legitimate prejudices aroused by its later developments, until in 1898 another Nicholas of Russia summoned its uncorrupted spirit from the dead to aid him to convert a warring world to the gospel of perpetual peace.

It remains to consider what light the history of the "Confederation of Europe" throws on the problems presented by that modern peace movement to which the rescript of Nicholas II gave so great an impulse. It may be argued that it can throw very little light upon them; that the conditions of to-day are wholly different from those which existed in Europe a hundred years ago; that the Powers who constituted the Grand Alliance were for the most part autocrats selfishly bent on safeguarding their dynastic interests; and that the territorial system which they set themselves to maintain was an artificial one which, sooner or later, was bound to suffer violent disruption, since it took no heed of legitimate national aspirations. The assumption that these conditions have now been fundamentally changed lies at the very root of the

question of the possibility of organizing a system of international government. But is the assumption well grounded? It is true that in civilized countries the people have now a share in the responsibility of government, that universal military service is a very general rule, and that where this rule prevails the people are naturally averse from war. It is true also that the rearrangement of national boundaries, as the outcome of the diplomacy and the wars of the nineteenth century, has satisfied some of the more dangerous revolutionary aspirations against which the Holy Alliance had to contend ; but it is none the less true that the new Holy Alliance, of which the pacifists dream, would be faced by very much the same problems as those which confronted Alexander and his allies. They too propose to establish their international system on the principle of the preservation of the *status quo*—indeed, there is no other practical principle conceivable ; they too would apply the principles of the Troppau Protocol, by empowering the Universal Union, in the event of any state violating, or threatening to violate, the public law of the world, to bring it to reason “by peaceful means, or if need be by arms.” Now, it might be possible that, as Sir Frederick Pollock points out,⁹² “contests for supremacy or predominant influence,” which in their very nature cannot be “disposed of by argument,” might be effectually prevented by a coalition of Powers of superior collective strength which “should be prepared to enforce the principles which now stand unanimously acknowledged by the Second Peace Conference of The Hague.” This would, in effect, be to apply the principle which the

⁹² *Cambridge Modern History*, xii. p. 719.

Grand Alliance directed against France, that of a coalition *ad hoc*. But if an attempt were made to expand this coalition into a "universal union" and to base its action, not on the exigencies of circumstances as they arise, not on the particular joint interests recognized by all the parties to it, but on the general right of the world-organization to coerce its refractory members—what becomes of the sovereign independence of nations? Especially it would be the small states whose independence would be prejudiced; for though international law recognizes in theory the equality of all sovereign states, no international system which should attempt to translate this theory into practice would survive. If, on the other hand, the voting power of the central "directory" were to be proportioned to the size and importance of its constituent states, the result would be precisely such a hegemony of the Great Powers as was exercised by the Grand Alliance after 1815. Nor is it extravagant to suppose that the new Holy Alliance, thus constituted, would develop, *mutatis mutandis*, very much on the lines of the old. It would begin by repudiating the principle of intervention in the internal affairs of the constituent nations, only in the end to find itself compelled to intervene: for, in new forms, the old difficulty of drawing a sharp distinction between external affairs and "internal affairs having an external effect" would be sure to emerge.

The truth is, to cite Sir Frederick Pollock once more, that the effective working of an international federal system demands a far greater uniformity of political institutions and ideas among the nations of the world than at present exists. This truth was

realized by the sovereigns and statesmen of the Holy Alliance, and they attempted to secure the necessary uniformity by forcing their own model on the European states, not primarily in the interests of despotism, but in the supposed interests of the general peace of society. It has quite recently received a fresh and striking illustration in the attitude of President Wilson towards the revolution in Mexico and similar conditions in other Latin American states, an attitude developed logically out of the assumption by the United States, under the Monroe Doctrine, of the duty of policing the Americas.⁹³ Like the signatory Powers of the Troppau Protocol, he too demands "guarantees of legal stability and order" before he will recognize a *de facto* Government; like them, he proposes to reconcile the guilty state to his system "by peaceful means, or if need be by arms"; he differs from them only in his conception of what constitutes the guarantee required. The sovereigns of the Holy Alliance found this in the submission of the peoples to their Governments *ab antiquo*; by President Wilson it is assumed to depend upon the will of the people "properly expressed and registered." From the point of view of our present inquiry it matters not which conception of "legitimacy" be the more reasonable. The important thing is that for any international organization, whether dominated by a group of Powers or by a single Power, a certain uniformity of political system is essential, and that, sooner or later, this uniformity would be enforced by armed intervention. The moment of such intervention, moreover, will be

⁹³ See my article "The New Monroism" in the *Edinburgh Review* for January 1914.

determined always by the interests of the dominating Power or Powers. "This abyss of iniquities which we call politics," wrote the beautiful and unhappy Empress Elizabeth of Russia in 1817, "is vainly covered with a tissue of brilliant phrases, since it is easy for any one of the least intelligence, whose heart is in the right place, to see through this tissue and to recognize that, in spite of *evangelical treaties*, in spite of *the reign of justice*, it is always the weaker who are sacrificed to the interests of the more powerful."⁹⁴ This was true enough when it was spoken; is there any reason to suppose that it is less true of the present age, or will be less true of the age to come?

Moreover, if we study the map of the world, it is impossible not to be struck with the fact that national boundaries, even in Europe, are still in the highest degree "artificial." The function of a new international confederation would again be, like that of the Holy Alliance, to protect these artificial boundaries: to attempt, that is to say, to stereotype political systems with which, certainly in many cases, the people who live under them are not content. The attempt would be even less likely to succeed now, when the spirit of nationalism is strong, than a hundred years ago, when it was in its weak beginnings. We may hold what opinion we like about the reasonableness or unreasonableness of these particularist ambitions; the point is that they exist. They exist even in the ranks of the adherents of the peace movement, whose cosmopolitanism is often subject to serious reservations. That of the Poles, for instance,

⁹⁴ The Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich, *L'impératrice Elizabeth*, ii. p. 633.

which—according to a correspondent of the Baroness von Suttner ⁹⁵—makes them more amenable than the Germans to the influence of the propaganda, is not enough to outweigh their Polish patriotism: first Poland must be free and independent, then peace. Thus, too, Mazzini had dreamed of perpetual peace; but first Italy must be united under a republican government and the other “oppressed nationalities” of Europe secured in their rights.

The new Holy Alliance, then, like the old, would find itself face to face with revolutionary forces which it would have to repress, save in the very improbable event of its being willing to conciliate them by conceding their extreme demands: the satisfaction of every nationalist aspiration, and the universal establishment of pure democracy under unimpeachable republican forms. In any case conflicting ideals would, sooner or later, struggle within it for the mastery, and in the end it would not bring peace, but a sword. We may, then, without being unfaithful to the true cause of peace, adopt towards the modern programmes for a Confederation of the World the attitude of Rousseau towards that of the Abbé de St. Pierre, “admire so beautiful a plan, but console ourselves for not seeing it put into execution, since that cannot be done save by means violent and redoubtable to humanity.”

It is not, however, my wish to conclude on a note of pessimism. The experiment in the international organization of peace with which we have been concerned failed, it is true, as in the long run it was bound to fail. But it was by no means wasted effort. Its temporary use I have already pointed out; it

⁹⁵ Letter of Baron Kübeck, *Memoiren*, p. 198.

preserved peace during the critical years following the fall of Napoleon, and so gave to Western Europe the opportunity for that marvellous industrial and economic development which was to change the face of the world. It did more than this. It set the tradition of that feeling of common interests among nations the growth of which is the strongest factor making for peace. It gave a new sanction to international law, the outgrowth of this feeling, thus making possible the developments that culminated in the Conferences of The Hague which, whatever the disappointments they may have prepared for the world, went a long way towards providing means by which war should be made the exception and not the rule. Last, but not least, it set the precedent for that Concert of Europe to which the world owes more than sometimes, in its more impatient moments, it has been willing to allow. The life of Alexander I of Russia was, to all appearance, a tragic failure. But the wonder is, not that the shadowy world of his ideals collapsed in utter ruin, but that so much of what was noble in it survived and survives.

APPENDIX

THE ACT OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE

IN the name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity.

Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Russia, having, in consequence of the great events which have marked the course of the three last years in Europe, and especially of the blessings which it has pleased Divine Providence to shower down upon those States which place their confidence and their hope in it alone, acquired the intimate conviction of the necessity of settling the steps to be observed by the Powers, in their reciprocal relations, upon the sublime truths which the holy religion of our Saviour teaches ;

They solemnly declare that the present Act has no other object than to publish, in the face of the whole world, their fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respective States, and in their political relations with every other Government, to take for their sole guide the precepts of that Holy Religion, namely, the precepts of Justice, Christian Charity and Peace, which, far from being applicable only to private concerns must have an immediate influence upon the counsels of Princes, and guide all their steps, as being the only means of consolidating human institutions and remedying their imperfections. In consequence, their Majesties have agreed on the following articles :—

ART. I. Conformably to the words of the Holy Scriptures which command all men to consider each other as brethren, the Three contracting Monarchs will remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity, and, considering

each other as fellow-countrymen, they will, on all occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and assistance; and, regarding themselves towards their subjects and armies as fathers of families, they will lead them, in the same spirit of fraternity with which they are animated, to protect Religion, Peace, and Justice.

ART. II. In consequence, the sole principle of force, whether between the said Governments or between their subjects, shall be that of doing each other reciprocal service, and of testifying by unalterable goodwill the mutual affection with which they ought to be animated, to consider themselves all as members of one and the same Christian nation; the three allied Princes, looking on themselves as merely delegated by Providence to govern three branches of the One family, namely, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, thus confessing that the Christian world, of which they and their people form a part, has in reality no other Sovereign than Him to whom alone power really belongs, because in Him alone are found all the treasures of love, science and infinite wisdom, that is to say, God, our Divine Saviour, the Word of the Most High, the Word of Life. Their Majesties consequently recommend to their people, with the most tender solicitude, as the sole means of enjoying that Peace which arises from a good conscience, and which alone is durable, to strengthen themselves every day more and more in the principles and exercise of the duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to mankind.

ART. III. All the Powers who shall choose solemnly to avow the sacred principles which have dictated the present Act, and shall acknowledge how important it is for the happiness of nations, too long agitated, that these truths should henceforth exercise over the destinies of mankind all the influence which belongs to them, will be received with equal ardour and affection into this Holy Alliance.

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